

# THE MODERN REVIEW

*A QUARTERLY MAGAZINE.*

"INQUE BREVI SPATIO MUTANTUR SÆCLA ANIMANTUM  
"ET QUASI CURSORES VITAE LAMPADA TRADUNT."

LUCRETIVS.

---

VOL. II.—1881.

---

London :

JAMES CLARKE & CO., 13 & 14, FLEET STREET.

MANCHESTER: JOHN HEYWOOD.

AGENT FOR THE UNITED STATES: GEORGE H. ELLIS, BOSTON.

1881.

*THE FOLLOWING WRITERS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO  
THE SECOND VOLUME OF THE MODERN REVIEW :*

J. H. ALLEN.

A. ARMITT.

CHARLES BEARD, B.A.

ELIZABETH BLACKWELL,  
M.D.

PROF. J. E. CARPENTER, M.A.

W. B. CARPENTER, C.B.,  
M.D., F.R.S., &c.

EDWARD CLODD, F.R.A.S.

FRANCES POWER COBBE.

H. W. CROSSKEY, F.G.S.

WILLIAM DORLING.

R. B. DRUMMOND, B.A.

THE EDITOR.

H. H. ELLIS.

T. W. FRECKLETON.

T. P. FORSYTH.

E. M. GELDART, M.A.

Mrs. WILLIAM GREY.

CHARLES HARGROVE, M.A.

GEORGE HENSLOW, M.A.

DR. HOOYKAAS.

J. PAGE HOPPS.

F. H. JONES, B.A.

R. CROMPTON JONES, B.A.

ANNIE MATHESON.

GEORGE MATHESON, D.D.

ALLAN MENZIES, B.D.

HERBERT NEW.

J. E. ODGERS, M.A.

J. ALLANSON PICTON, M.A.

R. LANE POOLE, M.A.

GEORGE SARSON, M.A.

MINOT J. SAVAGE.

HENRY SIDGWICK, M.A.

H. SHAEN SOLLY, M.A.

S. A. STEINTHAL.

R. RODOLPH SUFFIELD.

J. FREDERICK SMITH.

GEORGE ST. CLAIR, F.G.S.

PROF. C. B. UPTON, B.A., B.Sc.

CHARLES VOYSEY, M.A.

PHILIP H. WICKSTEED, M.A.

MARK WILKS.

ANDREW WILSON, Ph.D.,  
F.R.A.S.

H. SCHÜTZ WILSON.

SIR ROWLAND K. WILSON,  
BART.

JOSEPH WOOD.

W. H. WOODWARD, B.A.



# THE MODERN REVIEW.

---

JANUARY, 1881.

---

## *THE PROPHECIES OF ISAIAH.\**

### I.—THE MINISTRY OF ISAIAH.

STUDENTS of the prophetic writings of the old Testament were glad to welcome, ten years ago, a little volume entitled "The Book of Isaiah Chronologically Arranged." It contained in small compass an admirable summary of the results of recent inquiries into the composition of a book which offers more perplexing problems, perhaps, than even the Pentateuch itself. Moreover, its brief expositions showed a thorough mastery of the literature of Hebrew prophecy, and a happy combination of philological accuracy and sympathy with the prophetic spirit, though traditional interpretations were, for the most part, set aside.

The present volume, in which the author offers the results of ten years' further study, is not laid down upon the lines of its predecessor. The different oracles are not arranged chronologically; the order is that of the Hebrew text and the authorised version. The discussion of literary and critical questions is reserved for separate treatment. The translation is much more independent, and the commentary much fuller. Mr. Cheyne's wealth of

\* The Prophecies of Isaiah; a new Translation with Commentary and Appendices. By the Rev. T. K. Cheyne. Vol. I. 1880.

knowledge enables him with easy mastery to present a selection of the best judgments on difficult or disputed passages, and he seeks to maintain a strict impartiality among conflicting views. Many readers might have preferred a little less caution and a little more decision, but students will know how to value the author's self-restraint. Among the new features of the commentary, which at once distinguish it from all other productions of English scholarship, may be reckoned, first of all, the abundance of illustration derived from the recent investigations into Assyrian history, and their application to fix the dates of oracles hitherto uncertain. A second very valuable and interesting element is the frank recognition of the traces of popular religion and mythology occasionally appearing in the prophetic language amid ideas far more exalted. The causes which have led to some change of view with regard to the spirit and scope of prophecy the writer does not set forth, nor is the exact nature of the modifications apparent. But it may, perhaps, be said that this volume exhibits a richer sense of the relation between the human soul and God, enabling it to become the medium of the communication of higher truths to the world. This question affects the treatment of the later rather than the earlier portion of the prophecies gathered under Isaiah's name, and may be more freely discussed when the publication of the second volume shall have put us in complete possession of Mr. Cheyne's views on the significance of the "Servant of Yahveh." We shall, perhaps, best prepare our readers for a consideration of this topic by endeavouring to sketch the conditions under which Isaiah exercised his ministry, and to bring out some of the chief themes of his preaching.

( I. )

The eighth century B.C., to which we owe so many precious monuments of Israel's religion, opened happily for the

country and the people. The division of the monarchy was not, indeed, healed. There were still two States watching each other with mutual jealousy. But first one, and then the other was strong enough to take a decisive lead. On the northern throne sat Jeroboam II., whose energy and skill secured for his kingdom a long period of peace. His father's conquests were confirmed and extended. Judah was still suffering from Amaziah's rash declaration of war against Joash, which soon placed even Jerusalem itself at the mercy of the victor from Samaria. Moab and Ammon were once more subject, and paid their yearly tribute of sheep and wool. The upper districts on the east of the Jordan valley were closely reunited with the western provinces. Damascus, which had so haughtily sent army after army into the uplands of Gilead and the fair valleys of Ephraim, now owned allegiance to the conqueror, who restored the ancient power of his people, and ruled without opposition from the Dead Sea to the distant Hamath under the northern slopes of Lebanon.

The death of Jeroboam, and the murder of his son Zachariah after a brief reign of six months, destroyed whatever hopes might have been formed of permanent prosperity for the northern kingdom. Some of the tributary nations took advantage of the rapid succession of incompetent rulers to revolt, while others sought protection in the south. Under Uzziah, Judah rose to independence and power. He regained possession of the coveted port of Elath, on the Gulf of Akaba, at the head of the Red Sea. He maintained a firm control over the tribes of Edom. One after another of the Philistine cities fell into his hands. Towers arose at exposed points round the capital: the walls, partly destroyed after his father's defeat, were restored and strengthened. The same energy was directed to the development of agriculture. On the highland tracts of sheep pasture he reared towers, and sunk wells for his great herds. Vineyards and

cornfields were spread over land that had fallen out of cultivation. So complete was the security of the kingdom that it seemed as if the ideal future of peace and righteousness must be close at hand. It was in the last year of Uzziah's reign that Isaiah first realised his prophetic call.\* The language in which he afterwards recorded it bears traces of a sense of failure in his mission, or, at least, of a consciousness of difficulties and a foresight of disasters which only forced themselves by degrees upon him. Such, at least, was not the tone of hopefulness awakened by the triumphs of Uzziah. An older contemporary of Isaiah beheld the word of Yahveh speed with swift flight over the land, far as Damascus and Hamath. The Philistine cities, still unsubdued, trembled, while Yahveh camped round about his sanctuary, which none could any more invade or overrun, and bade the city of his choice be glad, for the time of peace was at hand.

Rejoice greatly, daughter Zion, shout, daughter Jerusalem: behold thy king will come to thee, come righteous and victorious, lowly riding upon the ass, and upon the young she-ass's foal; then I exterminate chariots from Ephraim, and horses from Jerusalem; the battle bow is exterminated, and he will speak peace to the nations, ruling from sea to sea and from the River to the borders of the land.†

It was a bold prophecy. The traditional conception of Israel's dominion, to which the people clung, even when the larger part of their nation had disappeared through successive deportations, claimed for their sway the whole of the vast territory between the deserts of Egypt and the Euphrates or "the River." Egypt, Assyria, and Israel, were the three great nations of the world.‡ But "the River" was no longer to be the boundary of the mighty Asiatic power. Even already it had been crossed again and again. A century

\* Is. vi. 1.

† Zech. ix. 9, 10. Ewald's "Prophets of the Old Testament," i., p. 310.

‡ Zech. x. 10, 11; Is. xix. 23—25.

before, Shalmaneser II. had taken tribute from Jehu of Samaria, "bowls and cups and vessels of gold." Not all the glory of Jeroboam II. had availed to keep the armies of Vulnirari out of Syria. Damascus had fallen into his hands. He had marched along the valley of the Orontes, and swept down the Mediterranean shores. He had even, in 797 B.C., led his troops over the heights east of the Jordan as far as the territories of Manasseh. A quarter of a century later, the Assyrian troops again attacked the capital of Arām. It was clear that the land of Canaan could not hope to escape invasion. Nay, the prophets were ready to find in the distant conquerors the ministers of Yahveh's chastisement, and looked to their advent as the day of Israel's doom.

But the time had not yet come. It was not till the second half of the eighth century that the danger became really pressing. The accession of Tiglath Pileser, in 745 B.C., revived the glories of the Assyrian arms. Ere long he crossed the Euphrates, and in successive campaigns reduced the little kingdoms of Syria. First Arpad fell, then Calno, then Hamath.\* Damascus was as yet unsubdued, but its fate was sealed. The Assyrian supremacy was firmly established, and it was with the folly of madmen rushing on their ruin that the kings of Israel and Damascus chose this crisis for an attack on the southern kingdom of Judah. The only conceivable motive for the invasion must have been the hope of compelling Judah to join the coalition of Israel and Arām against their common enemy. But the attempt was hopelessly frustrated. The sovereign of Judah was powerless to deal with the difficulties of his time. He was no better than a "wilful boy"; Isaiah saw with grief that the real government lay with the women of the palace.† Their own personal safety was the first thing to be secured. At all hazards the invasion must be checked. So Ahaz threw himself into the arms of the very power from which the

\* 740—738 B.C. Comp. Is. x. 9.

† Is. iii. 12.

invading kings had sought to detach him, and sent an urgent entreaty for help to Tiglath Pileser. The Assyrian monarch was not slow in responding. In 734 he advanced once more into Syria. Rezin, defeated in the field, shut himself up in his capital. "Like a caged bird I enclosed him," says the conqueror, proudly; and while Damascus was invested, the whole southern country lay open to the victor's raids. The city held out for two years, but its fall could not be long delayed, and in 732 Tiglath Pileser entered it in triumph. A splendid court was held, which all the tributary kings were required to attend, and thither Ahaz submissively repaired, to meet the princes of Askelon, and Gaza, and Edom, his hereditary foes, now subject to the same yoke. The city was filled with the retinues of the chiefs, in charge of droves of camels, oxen, and sheep, bred on the upland pastures east of the Jordan. From the mines of Arabia came precious metals; the warehouses of Tyre sent their purple wool; the forests which had escaped the invader's axe gave up their timber; and "birds of the sky," the feathers of whose wings were of "shining violet," were stripped of their plumes for the ladies of the court at Nineveh.\*

The possession of Damascus left the way to Samaria quite clear. Tiglath Pileser did not push his victories further; but after his death a fresh descent was provoked, under Shalmaneser IV., by the rash revolt of King Hoshea. Submission was inevitable; but, with a resolve which no danger could tame, he sought the alliance of Egypt, and boldly withheld the Assyrian tribute. Shalmaneser was engaged in the blockade of Tyre, but he detached some of his troops to seize the rebel prince, and formally surrounded Samaria. The city lay on the summit of an isolated hill, in the midst of a valley sweeping westwards to the sea. Rising

\* See the inscriptions in Smith's "Eponym Canon," p. 150; "Records of the Past," v., p. 48.

above the vineyards which clothed the slopes, its ivory palaces stood out like the chaplet upon the brow of the reveller.\* The possession of the surrounding heights gave the conqueror no advantage in a siege which must be conducted by investment and assault, and the inhabitants kept the enemy at bay through two years. Shalmaneser died; but the troops were not withdrawn; indeed, the accession of a new sovereign, in the person of Sargon, only led to the display of fresh vigour. In the third year the proud city fell; large numbers of the people were deported into the north-eastern provinces of the empire; and the kingdom of Israel was at an end (B.C. 721).

But this was only the beginning of Sargon's victories. The annals of his reign reveal a prodigious energy of conquest. He crosses mighty forests; digs reservoirs in the hot depths of the valleys; "sweeps" through the land of Hamath "like a flood;" "in the anger of his heart" he invades countries "like a [raven];" "plunges" on hapless cities "like a storm;" or "bursts" over them "as a cloud." From province to province are sent long trains of captive populations, "pulled from their dwellings;" and spoil of all kinds pours into the royal treasury. In the face of dangers such as these, hereditary enmities were subdued. Philistia and Edom, which had loved to harass Judah in her hours of weakness, now knew that her foes were their own. A combination was formed, in which Ashdod seems to have taken the lead.† But even their united resistance, with the alliance of Egypt, was in vain. The armies of Sargon marched along the lowlands to the Philistine city, and the majesty of the great god Assur overwhelmed its king. The punishment of Ashdod was followed by the invasion of Judah; and though the fragmentary records of the reign of Hezekiah are silent, the great oracle of Isaiah x. 5—xii. 6, is referred by Mr. Cheyne to this event, and confirms the

\* Is. xxviii. 1.

† "Eponym Canon," p. 129.

somewhat broken witness of the Assyrian annals. At any rate, it is plain (from x. 11) that the invader was the captor of Samaria. The conqueror advanced with the proud expectation that Jerusalem and her images must yield, like Samaria, like Damascus, and the long list of vanquished "kingdoms of the not-gods." But the prophet took no heed of the invader's self-imposed function of "guarding the honour of Assur;" he had an eye only for his insolent defiance of Yahveh.

For he hath said, "By the strength of my hand have I done it; and by my wisdom, for I am discerning, and I removed the bounds of peoples, and their treasures I plundered, and brought down like a Mighty One those that sat (on thrones); and my hand reached as a nest the riches of peoples, and as a man gathereth forsaken eggs I have gathered all the earth, and there was none that fluttered a wing nor opened a beak, nor chirped." Is the axe to vaunt itself against him who heweth with it? Or the saw to brag against him who moveth it to and fro?\*

So the "rod of Yahveh's anger" was swung by a higher hand, which turned it back when the blow was most imminent; or, to use another of the prophet's metaphors, the crown of Assyria's foliage was suddenly lopped with a dreadful crash! At any rate, the city, the "Lion of God," escaped.

But the danger was only averted for a time. It revived with greater intensity under Sennacherib. The titles which the court annalists ascribed to him duly represented him as the faithful servant of the will of Heaven. He was "the King of the four regions, the appointed ruler, the worshipper of the Great God, guardian of right, lover of justice, maker of peace, going the right way, preserver of good."† The modern historian brushes away all these claims, and pronounces him "the typical Eastern monarch; all the vices of

\* Is. x. 13—15—transl. Cheyne.

† Smith, "Assyrian Discoveries," p. 296.



pride and arrogance, cruelty and lust of power, so conspicuous in Oriental sovereigns, were developed to excess in him." \* Sennacherib had come into power on the murder of his father, Sargon; and his first task was to pacify the empire by the reduction of Babylon, where Merodach Baladan had assumed the crown. The faintest symptom of relief of pressure in the West was followed as usual by a renewal of the efforts for independence. The people of Ekron deposed Padi, the Assyrian nominee, and sent him in chains to Jerusalem. Hezekiah was thus committed to the struggle. The danger of revolt became urgent, and in the spring of 701 the armies of Sennacherib crossed the Lebanon and marched along the coast. The Phœnician cities submitted at once. Askelon held out a little while, but could offer no permanent resistance; Ekron fell, and its rebellious princes and priests were massacred. Sennacherib himself pressed on towards Egypt to Lachish; and meanwhile sent a body of his troops to invade Judah. Jerusalem was summoned to surrender, and Padi was sent back to his Assyrian supporters. The Assyrian inscriptions claim the capture of forty-six cities, and with their usual imagery, represent Hezekiah as shut up in Jerusalem "like a bird in a cage." It is impossible here to essay any discussion of the serious difficulties which present themselves in a comparison of the Hebrew and Assyrian records of the subsequent events. Mr. Cheyne has collected all the available information; but not even his carefully guarded conjectures and skilful combinations leave a satisfactory impression of solid reality. There is evidence that Sennacherib was baffled in his attempts on Egypt. A battle was fought, in which he claimed the victory. But it was a victory which permitted no further advance, and was speedily followed by retreat. Meanwhile a portion of his army was yet before Jerusalem. With dauntless confidence Isaiah still defied the invader.

\* Smith, "History of Assyria," p. 126.

Vain were his rage and his recklessness ; the doom of the captive was already prepared for his insolence ; with a hook for his nostrils, and a bridle on his lips, Yahveh would turn him back by the way which he had come. The details of the catastrophe are veiled in Assyrian silence, and hidden under the emblems of Hebrew imagery. Late or soon, it would seem, a pestilence did its deadly work. Unable to reduce Jerusalem, unable to enter Egypt, Sennacherib found the chief objects of his expedition frustrated. The captured cities of Judah had been handed over to the tributary princes of Ashdod, Gaza, and Ekron ; a prodigious quantity of spoil, gold and silver, ivory thrones and buffalo skins, eunuchs and musicians for the harem, had been despatched to Nineveh. Here was material enough for a court historian to prepare a glowing narrative of the great campaign. But its omissions are not less significant than its recorded triumphs. It does not venture to relate a conquest of Jerusalem ; it refrains from the usual enumeration of the prisoners after the victory over the Egyptian forces ; and it hurries its hero-king back to his capital without a reason for so abrupt a change of plan. The discretion of the annalist, it has been shrewdly conjectured, conceals the intimations of disaster, if not of defeat, which the Hebrew tradition preserved. Through the dim memories of siege and despondency, of relief and thankfulness, the eye of faith saw the mystic figure of Yahveh's angel looming with dreadful mien. The Assyrian detachment before Jerusalem swelled into a mighty host, laid low in a night by the touch of death. The war was at an end ; the city was delivered ; there was nothing left for Sennacherib but to break up his camp, and march back to Nineveh. The "multitude of his chariots" passed across the wide plain to the Euphrates in diminished numbers, and for the last time. The great Assyrian invasions were over.

## ( II. )

Such, in rough outline, were the external events of the troubled period of Isaiah's prophetic ministry. The Assyrians could never be far out of his sight. The distant nations who composed their troops, the swiftness of their immense marches, the perfect discipline so that none was weary and there was no stumbler therein, the order which never unloosed the girdle nor allowed the thong of the shoes to be torn, the arrows sharpened and the bows all strung, the horses' hoofs solid as flint, and chariots fleet as the whirlwind,—all these were constantly present to his mind, and grew into a distinct place in his conception of the divine purposes. He beheld them summoned by Yahveh; the signal was lifted, the banner unfurled; and from the end of the earth came the awful response of the booted warriors' noisy tramp, till the fair fields and the gay cities of Israel and Judah were laid low beneath them. They came, then, to execute the chastisements of heaven: Asshur was the rod of Yahveh's anger, the staff with which he smote was no less than Yahveh's indignation. Deep must have been the crimes which merited a penalty so awful; and there is no need to read far into the reports of the prophet's discourses to learn what were the offences which drew down so great a woe.

The ministry of Isaiah fell at a time when the monotheism of Israel was struggling into clear and articulate expression. Another century must pass ere it could be definitely formulated in the language of the Deuteronomist. But its noblest minds had already grasped the idea of the spirituality, the universal presence, and the absolute holiness of Yahveh. The characteristics which appear to us inseparable from the unity of the Deity were not, perhaps, inconsistent in their view with the existence of other gods to whom the charge of alien nations might have been

allotted. These remote possibilities, however, did not affect the abomination of idolatries at home. Whatever might be the method of divine government for the ends of the earth, the sole right of Yahveh to the worship of the house of Israel was beyond dispute. With some of its popular forms the prophet had no quarrel. He tolerated the local sanctuaries; the high places on the summits of the hills, the devotion that had gathered round sacred trees and stones and wells, had to bear no interference from him. There is no evidence to connect him with the reform of the national cultus which Hezekiah began, but was unable permanently to complete. But though the centralisation of the worship of Yahveh, by the restriction of it to the temple at Jerusalem, does not seem to have presented itself to the prophet's mind as a necessary or even a desirable aim, it was indispensable that, wherever it was celebrated, that worship should be kept pure. The ancient Canaanite usages connected with it must be abandoned. The association of the emblems of Baal, of Ashêra (the goddess of fertility), with the altars of Yahveh, must be severed. The stone pillars of Baal, the wooden posts driven into the ground as symbols of Ashêra, the *chammanim* (or "sun images"),—all these could have no place in the true service of the Holy One of Israel. Nor could the costly idols, covered with plates of silver or gold, be tolerated in presence of his "excellent majesty." The intellectual scorn which Isaiah pours on the stupidity of the man who bows before the "not-gods" made for him to adore, and then throws them away in the day of terror, almost rivals his moral indignation with the sinful people who throng the Temple with guilty hands and corrupt hearts, in the hope of atoning by punctuality of sacrifice for wantonness and crime. The same perverseness led them to put a ready faith in any one but Yahveh. The necromancers and wizards had their eager crowds of followers, who proclaimed that nothing was more natural than

that the people should have resort to their Elohim,\* the living consult the dead. In critical seasons, it was with Death that they made their covenant for defence, with the powers of the under-world that they sought alliance.† Ready for every novelty, they caught at strange rites from the East, watched the clouds for omens like their neighbours the Philistines,‡ and Ahaz, after tendering his submission to Tiglath Pileser at Damascus, could not be satisfied without taking the pattern of a new altar for the Temple at Jerusalem.§ The weakness of Ahaz, and his ready response to fresh influences, secured for him the hateful distinction of being the first Hebrew king of whom it is recorded that he practised the horrible Molech worship, and, in the euphemistic language long afterwards current, “made his son to pass over by fire.”|| It was with terrible significance that Isaiah employed the imagery of the dreadful burning-place of the Tophet against Sennacherib. What better fate could be in reserve for him and his army than to perish in its ghastly flames! It was all prepared; it had been made deep and broad; the mighty pile needed only its victims and the touch of fire; and the prophet saw “the breath of Yahveh, like a torrent of brimstone,” ready to “kindle upon it.”¶

The disorganisation of religion had its natural counterpart in the corruption of morals. The arrogant defiance of Yahveh, expressed in the popular idolatries, took the form of haughtiness and self-indulgence within the circle of human relations. Under the young Ahaz, no better than a “wilful child,” ruled by the women of his palace, the exactions of the nobles became more tyrannical than ever. The ambi-

\* Is. viii. 19. I cannot think that Mr. Cheyne has done well in abandoning this interpretation (see “Isaiah Chronologically Arranged,” pp. 29, 33). Surely the parallelism makes it quite plain that the Elohim here are the spirits of the mighty dead, as in 1 Samuel xxviii. 19.

† Is. xxviii. 15.

‡ Is. ii. 6.

§ 2 Kings xvi. 10.

|| 2 Kings xvi. 3.

¶ Is. xxx. 33.

tion of increasing their estates could not be suppressed. Little by little the smaller proprietors were ejected: house was joined to house, field added to field, until the wealthy could look round upon the lands they had secured, and find that they "dwelt alone." As the rich became richer, the poor grew poorer. They could not resist extortion, and lay prostrate beneath open violence and secret bribery. Among the wealthy, luxury ran riot in dress and revelry. The great ladies of Jerusalem excited the prophet's indignation by their fineries; but baldness should fall upon their artificial curls; their delicate scents fade away in rottenness; their splendid state-dresses be exchanged for sackcloth.\* Through all classes ran the degradation of drunkenness. They began early in the morning; they continued far into the night. Not even the sacred orders of religion were exempt from it. That which had been the disgrace of Samaria became the infamy of Zion. Priest and prophet, even, were seen to "reel with strong drink;" they came, perhaps from the merrymakings of the sacrificial feasts, "swallowed up through wine, [staggering with strong drink." Nay, they did not shrink from undertaking in this state their most solemn duties; the seer "reeled in the vision," the priest-judge "tottered" as he gave judgment.† Was it, then, wonderful that the presence of a great danger should reduce the reckless citizens to despair, instead of quickening courage and resolve? When the troops of Sargon appeared beneath the walls, the people crowded to the housetops to see the sight; and the prophet sarcastically inquired what was the meaning of the uproar, the noise of joy. Yahveh called them to weeping, bade them mourn with sackcloth and shaven head; "but behold, joy and gladness, killing oxen and slaughtering sheep, eating flesh and drinking wine, 'Eat and drink, for to-morrow we die!'"‡ So, when the city that had been the home of righteousness was now the

\* Is. iii. 16, *seq.*

† xxviii. 7.

‡ xxii. 12.

lodging only of assassins, when its "law-makers" had become "law-breakers," the prophet summed up his "great arraignment" by hurling at them the bitter epithets, "Sodom judges," "Gomorrhah people." \*

What hearing could there be in store for the teacher of divine things amid a nation so corrupt and degraded? His words seemed so strange that they were received with stupefaction, though not this time of wine; men went away from his preaching "staggering, but not with strong drink."† Repetition of his warnings was met with mockery, they were no children, babes but just weaned, whom he addressed: it was always, they complained petulantly, "command upon command, command upon command, rule upon rule, rule upon rule, a little here, a little there."‡ Years after the great moment of his first call, the prophet recorded some of the experiences of his mission, as they moulded and modified his earliest hopes. "Go and say to this people," said the Divine Voice, "Hear ye indeed, but understand not, and see ye indeed, but perceive not. Make the heart of this people fat, and its ears heavy, and its eyes besmear, lest it should see with its eyes, and hear with its ears, and its heart should understand, and it should be converted and be healed."§ An awful mission, indeed, that should have this for its purpose!—awful enough that had it for its consequence. To have started with this expectation of failure must have taken all hope away at the outset. But nothing is more remarkable in the prophet's writings than the glow of anticipation which suffuses them. It is no blind trust in the inviolability of the sacred city. It is not only the conviction of Yahveh's care which enables him to face every danger in the certainty of deliverance. It is something more: it is the assurance that in the heart of Israel itself lies a store of true life which will still secure for it a noble future. Its iniquities must meet with their appointed doom:

\* Is. i. 10.

† xxix. 9.

‡ xxviii. 9, 10.

§ vi. 9, 10.

upon its sins must fall the allotted penalty; but these cannot wholly exhaust it: upon the remnant they will work with purifying power, and a new age shall begin. When first the prophet realised the stupefying effect which the resistance to his preaching was producing, he cried out, "How long, O Lord?" "Until the cities be waste without inhabitants, and houses without men, and the ground desolate," was the reply. But some should be left; they might be only a tenth; and this, again, might be exterminated: nevertheless, like the terebinth and the oak, which sent out fresh shoots when the trunk was felled and only the stump remained, there was still a seed of holiness, some faithful souls, from whom would spring forth a fresh growth of strength and beauty. Chastisement and purification, destruction and regeneration, these ideas recur again and again in Isaiah's utterances. Sometimes the one is more prominent, sometimes the other: but they are never far separated, and they are always closely connected with the immediate political anticipations of the time. Upon these are founded even the most brilliant of the delineations of the ideal future, which would be inaugurated with the "Day of Yahveh." The forms of this expectation were by no means always the same; let us attempt very briefly to show their relation to the external events and the internal circumstances of Israel's history during this period.

### ( III. )

That national sin must be followed by national punishment was no discovery of Isaiah's. It was already, perhaps, a common-place of the prophetic schools. It was founded on the essential idea of Israel's religion, the conception that Yahveh was holy, and that his people must be holy too. If they were not, they might be allowed for a season to prosper in their unfaithfulness: but a time would come when the



doom of Heaven would fall upon them. This was "Yahveh's Day." Vainly would a people already suffering for its guilt look to this for relief; "there is no brightness in it," said Amos sternly; as well might a man escaping from a lion fall in with a bear, or flee for refuge into the house, and there be bitten by a snake.\* The incidental manner in which the term is introduced by Amos, for the first time in prophetic literature, proves clearly enough that the expectation which it symbolised was no new one: but it was reserved for Isaiah to give to it a new force and range. It looms before him, now distant and now near; sometimes it seems as though it would dawn for Israel only, sometimes as though it would rise upon all the nations. As it is first dimly discerned, it will be the supreme manifestation of Yahveh's majesty. All that is proud and lofty will be brought low: not even the towers and fortresses so lately built by Uzziah and Jotham, or the stately Tarshish ships, can escape. The idols will be thrown to the moles and the bats, and their worshippers will creep into the rocky caves, hide themselves among the rents of the crags, away from the intolerable terror of his appearing. Nay, even the great forest-trees, which were so often made unhallowed sanctuaries; the mountain summits themselves, with their altars lifted so proudly to the sky, must be brought low. "Yahveh alone shall be exalted in that day; and the not-gods, the whole shall pass away."† But immorality must be punished as well as idolatry. So Yahveh will wash off the filth of the daughters of Zion, and cleanse the blood of Jerusalem from her midst; but it will be by the terrible agency of "a blast of judgment, and a blast of extermination." Some, indeed, shall be left; these shall be called holy, "written down for life." Over the divine abode in Zion shall be the solemn signs of his presence, in cloud by day and fire by night; while the very land shall bring forth

\* Amos vi. 18, 19.

† Is. 12—21.

more abundantly in "pride and adornment unto the escaped of Israel." \*

It is on these lines—the purification of worship, and the establishment of the supremacy of Yahveh, the reconstitution of society in righteousness, and the miraculous renovation of nature—that the picture of the ideal future, to be ushered in with Yahveh's Day, is drawn. To one prophecy, warning and denunciation give the prevailing tone: to another, comfort and hope. But the eye of the seer never travels far away from the immediate events before him; it might almost seem as if the greater and the more threatening the danger, the more sure was he that the divine judgment was close at hand, the more confident that the age of regeneration would set in at once. He chooses the very names of his children to express his convictions. One son he calls Shear-Yashub, "a remnant shall return"; another, when an Assyrian invasion is imminent, bears the ominous combination, Maher-shalal-hash-baz, "swift spoil, speedy prey." When Rezin and Pekah, at the head of their combined armies, are endeavouring to induce Ahaz by force to join the coalition against Assyria, the prophet declares to the trembling prince that he will be delivered from the two kings he fears before the babe who bears the significant name Immanuel, "God with us," † has learned

\* Is. iv. 2—6.

† Mr. Cheyne frankly recognises the difficulty of this passage. "There is no explanation," he observes, "which does not require us to make some assumption not directly sanctioned by the text. The only question is which assumption is most in harmony with Isaiah's early prophecies." He decides in favour of the theory, "that the 'young woman' is the mother of the Messiah, whose advent, as Ewald has well pointed out, was expected by Isaiah to synchronise with the Assyrian invasion." It is an obvious objection to this interpretation that nothing is said about Immanuel as a king or deliverer. He serves to mark a period of a few years, and then really disappears, for the use of the name in viii. 8, cf. 10, cannot establish for him a Messianic character. This Mr. Cheyne freely admits; but he suggests that this only adds probability to a suspicion founded on other circumstances that "Chap. vii. consists of an incomplete summary of Isaianic discourses;" or the prophecy is to be regarded "as the first rough sketch of the Messianic

to know right from wrong,—their lands shall be desolate, their peoples captive.\* But he does not stop there. The same power which overwhelms Syria and Ephraim will descend on Judah as well. The unhappy country will become the battle-field between Assyria and Egypt: the land will lapse out of cultivation; the only food will be milk from the few cattle turned out to wander on the mountains, and wild honey gathered from the holes in the cliffs. A little later, and the Assyrian flood is seen afar off, like the overflow of one of the great Mesopotamian rivers; it will come sweeping through the country, “overflowing and passing over,” so that nothing shall escape. The awful day will be nigh. Yahveh will show himself holy, a “rock of stumbling to the houses of Israel, a gin and a snare to the inhabitants of Jerusalem: and many shall stumble at it, and fall, and be broken, and snared, and taken.”† The baffled and bewildered people, unable to find deliverance through the wizards and necromancers, will curse their unavailing gods, and disappear in the darkness from which there is no dawn. But the prophecy does not end in gloom. Through the deep shade there shines a growing light. It breaks over the northern districts of Zebulun and Naphtali, which have been exposed again and again to cruel deportations at the conqueror’s hands. The people, reduced to the scantiest numbers, multiply with a divine power. The symbols of foreign bondage, the yoke, the taskmaster’s rod, are broken for ever. War is at an end, and the warrior’s boot, the blood-stained cloak, are cast into a mighty bonfire.

doctrine, to be filled up on subsequent opportunities.” I cannot say that this appears to me satisfactory. The nature or character of the child is of really no consequence. The whole stress of the prophecy falls on the shortness of the period within which the events are to be compressed. This is not measured numerically, but by the time required for an infant to arrive at years of discretion. When the time has gone by, and the events have come about, the truth of Yahveh’s word will be demonstrated, and the sign embodied in the boy will remain to convict unbelievers.

\* Is. vii. 14—16.

† viii. 14, 15.

The ideal King is at hand. "For a child is born unto us, a Son is given unto us, and the government resteth upon his back, and his name is called 'Wonder-Counsellor, God-Mighty-One, Everlasting-Father, Prince of Peace;' for the increase of the government, and for peace without end, upon the throne of David, and throughout his kingdom, in establishing and supporting it by justice and by righteousness, from henceforth even for ever." \*

The invasion took place. Damascus fell; Samaria fell; desolation settled over Ephraim; new tribes filled the homes of the old inhabitants; but the land yielded no miraculous increase, the soldier's tramp was heard as before, the yoke was pressed with a heavier burden, the staff was swung with more stinging power. The danger came nearer to Jerusalem as Sargon and his troops laid waste the cities of Judah, and threatened the capital. The prophet's hopes only rose the higher. Here was, in truth, the instrument of the divine chastisement, "the rod of Yahveh's anger."† Not for long should the Assyrian survey the land of Yahveh with his haughty eyes. The Light of Israel would break out in fire and his Holy One in flame; it would spread destruction through the conquering array as through a mighty forest, and a remnant of Israel should be saved and return to their true Lord. This is a "final work and decisive, overflowing with righteousness. For a final work and a decisive doth the Lord, Yahveh Sabaoth, execute within all the land."‡ The deliverance appears here as Yahveh's own doing: no "hero-God" stands forth as the divinely-appointed champion of Israel: the ideal King only comes upon the scene when the way is cleared, and the world is ready for the rule of righteousness. He springs from David's house, and he sits upon David's throne. The new society could be conceived

\* Is. ix. 6, 7. Cheyne's transl. But on the epithet "Everlasting-Father" see Hitzig's note in his recently published "Vorlesungen ueber Biblische Theologie und Messianische Weissagungen," ed. Kneucker, 1880, p. 207.

† x. 5.

‡ x. 22, 23 (Cheyne).

only as a kingdom, for it could not subsist without government ; and the sole regulating principle known was a monarchy established under the true religion. So the new monarch will be endowed with the clearness of insight, the courage in action, the reverence for the divine will, which will enable him to reorganise all human relations. Nature will undergo a like transformation. When the remaining guilty have been punished by the new ruler, and harmony is established among men by the extermination of the wicked, and the universal spread of the knowledge of Yahveh among the good, the animals will share the same gentle influence. The tyrant falls smitten, the ungodly perishes, by the mere breath of the monarch's lips ; but the lion and the bear need suffer no penalty, for their ferocity came not from unbelieving hearts : the sympathy pervading all created things suffices to bring them into accord with the general innocence and peace. But the blessings of this sovereignty cannot be confined to Israel's land. Through the wide circle to whose bounds its captive people had been carried, they would be felt with a restoring power. The signal of heaven would be lifted over the holy mountain : thither would the outcast flock from the remotest quarters of the earth : the old jealousies which had divided the nation would be forgotten : and a reunited people would be able to " pounce upon the shoulder of Philistia," " put forth their hand on Edom and Moab," and reduce into subjection all their hereditary foes. Well might Zion prepare herself for the song of triumph, for great within her was Israel's Holy One.\*

Such was the future which Isaiah beheld as city after city laid its submission at the feet of Sargon. But the " dreadful crash " with which the conqueror was to be brought low never came. Sargon retired in safety, and after a few years his successor Sennacherib resumed the western war. The peril of Judah became greater than ever, and still the daunt-

\* Is. xi., xii.

less confidence of the prophet promised deliverance. As in the previous invasion, no "Wonder-Counsellor" could avail: when the "Lion of God" was compassed with her enemies, God alone could rescue her. Micah might boldly denounce ruin against the very sanctuary, and turn its courts into a wild forest-thicket;\* but for Isaiah that sanctuary was inviolable. When the citizens of Jerusalem could do no more, the peal of Yahveh's voice would be heard; the staff of doom would be swung from heaven against the invader;† like a mighty bird, Yahveh would hover over the city to cover and save it; nay, he would even descend himself on Zion's hill and fight.‡ Once more, the ideal kingdom will be established; or rather, the existing sovereign and people will realise their opportunity, will know their high calling, and rise to fulfil it. "Righteously the king shall reign, and the princes justly shall they rule."§ All spiritual capacities shall be heightened; even stammering tongues shall speak plainly, and the heart of the hasty shall perceive distinctly. Around the monarch, perhaps around Hezekiah himself, shall gather a beauty wrought by the divine favour and inward purification, to which all eyes shall turn.|| The land will not be less blessed than its rulers. As Yahveh's enemies perish on the mountains they claimed for their own, fertilising streams will break forth; the moon shall grow bright as the sun, and the sun shall yield a sevenfold light; and so nature and man shall move together in a mystic harmony. The expectation of future conquest is subdued; the details of the picture are chastened; but its outlines remain the same as before. The change is at hand, near as Sennacherib's troops and their impending destruction.

Once only does the prophet throw the whole conception forward to an indefinite distance. A prophecy addressed to the women of Jerusalem, inserted among other oracles

\* Mic. iii. 12.    † Is. xxx. 30, 32.    ‡ xxxi. 4, 5.    § xxxii. 1.  
 || xxxiii. 17.

referring apparently to the later Assyrian invasion, appears to threaten an actual desolation of the capital itself. Thorns and briars will come up upon the joyous houses of the merry town. "The palace shall be forsaken, the hum of the city deserted, the mound and the watch-tower shall be instead of caves for ever, the joy of wild asses, the pasture of flocks."\* The term "mound," "Ophel," suggests the slope of the Temple hill which bore that name; and this identification converts the prediction from a general announcement of the ruin of whole towns and the captivity of their inhabitants† into a declaration of doom upon Jerusalem itself.‡ Be this as it may, it is noteworthy that a new power of renovation is brought in. The desolation will last "until the Spirit be poured out upon us from on high." The gifts of heaven will not be concentrated on the shoot of Jesse's stock. They will be spread over all. No need here for the hero-King to reorganise society. The great end will be effected spontaneously under the immediate influence of Yahveh's creative might. "Justice shall inhabit the pasture-country, and righteousness shall dwell in the garden-land, and the fruit of righteousness shall be peace, and the effect of righteousness, quietness, and confidence for ever; and my people shall inhabit a home of peace and dwellings of confidence, and easeful resting-places."§

From an ideal such as this in which spiritual force was the only agency, visions of conquest necessarily faded away. Revenge upon ancient enemies ceased to be desired. One of the oldest prophetic oracles, employed by both Isaiah and Micah, had foretold the elevation of Yahveh's mountain

\* Is. xxxii. 14, 15.

† As in v. 8, 10; vi. 11—13.

‡ It does not, however, appear necessary. Mound and watch-tower are quite indefinite; and Ophel was not restricted to the slope of the Temple hill; it is used of a hill in or near Samaria, 2 Kings, v. 24. And the absence of allusion to the sanctuary seems to me a strong presumption that the Temple-hill was not intended.

§ xxxii. 15—18 (Cheyne).



above all other hills. Thither should the nations go up, to learn the ways of Jacob's God, and walk in his paths.\* With this declaration Isaiah had opened his first prophecies: in its spirit (if we may assign to him, xix. 23—25) he concluded his last.† He had already described the Ethiopians as bringing presents to Yahveh to Zion, "the place of his name," on occasion of the great Assyrian overthrow.‡ But what of Assyria itself, and Israel's other great oppressor, Egypt? With their vast dominions, their immense armies, their wealth, their civilisation, they represented all the known powers of the world, and they had used those powers with crushing force against Yahveh's people. In earlier days the prophet had been content to announce that on the fall of the Assyrian invaders a highway should be opened for the captives across the Euphrates, as in ancient days the Red Sea had parted for their forefathers on the march out of Egypt.§ But when the danger was over, he could not rest in the contemplation of the mighty empire laid low in the dust. The supremacy of Yahveh over the whole earth must secure him universal recognition. The idol countries must be smitten; but the blow would be followed by restoration: "Yahveh shall smite Egypt, smiting and healing; and when they return unto Yahveh, he shall receive their supplications and shall heal them." So, between the two great empires, stretching almost to the opposite ends of the earth, there shall be a highway, uniting all lands in a bond of peace. In the midst lay Israel, whose God they should both serve. "In that day shall Israel be a third to Egypt and to Assyria, even a

\* Is. ii. 2—4.

† With the caution which everywhere restrains Mr. Cheyne from pronouncing too decided judgments, he gives full weight to the arguments for a post-Isaianic or even a Maccabean origin of vv. 18—25. It is no doubt a case in which one is apt to be misled by a "personal estimate." But surely vv. 23—25 must belong to a period before the rivalry between Assyria and Egypt was over.

‡ xviii. 7.

§ x. 15—16.



blessing within the earth, forasmuch as Yahveh Sabaoth hath blessed him, saying, 'Blessed is my people Egypt, and the work of my hands Assyria, and mine inheritance Israel.' " \* A glorious vision, indeed, far nobler than that earlier hope of Israel's vengeance and supremacy. By what means the conversion should be effected, the prophet does not stay to reveal. The hero-King was never charged with the preacher's duty, nor is there as yet any hint of the great missionary function of Yahveh's people to the heathen. It is enough to declare the event ; Yahveh will himself provide the means.

The so-called Messianic expectation reached its climax in Isaiah's glowing oracles. But even these varied in tone, in the time set for the great change, in the instrument by which it must be accomplished. Other prophets took up the same theme, but hardly with the same exaltation. With the fall of Jerusalem, the overthrow of the kingdom, and the captivity of the people, the hope of the future could no longer retain the same form. During the sufferings and sorrows of the exile, the seers of Israel beheld for it a new destiny, and the hero-King vanished, and the Servant of Yahveh took his place. What is the relation between these two? Did they both appear to the same eyes? Mr. Cheyne's first volume does not supply his answer to this question. It is connected with the theory of prophecy as well as with literary criticism, and must be reserved for subsequent discussion.

J. ESTLIN CARPENTER.

\* Is. xix. 24—25 (Cheyne)

## GRÆCIA REDIVIVA.\*

"**T**IS Greece, but living Greece no more," sang Byron at the beginning of this century, when the Mussulman was still in the land. And yet a few years later he discerned at all events enough of the promise of life in that degenerate country to make him willing and able both to live and to die for its freedom.

The very last lines he wrote, on the 22nd of January, 1824, at Mesolongi, presage with a sad serenity his coming end.

Seek out—less often sought than found—  
A soldier's grave, for thee the best;  
There look around and choose thy ground,  
And take thy rest.

And though the soldier's grave was found where many another's has been, not upon the field of battle but on the bed of sickness, still of him as of another, it might well be said that nothing in his life became him like the leaving of it. His purse, his counsel, and his time were ever at the service

\* Έθνικὸν Ἡμερολόγιον τοῦ ἔτους 1871, ἐκδοθὲν ὑπὸ Μαρίνου Π. Βρετοῦ. Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus.

Πανελληνιον Ἡμερολόγιον 1880, ἐκδιδόμενον ὑπὸ Σωκράτους Α. Παρασυράκη. London: Williams and Norgate.

Greece and "The Times," by "Pierre Lestoile" in the *Minerva* for October, 1880. Rome: Office of *Minerva*.

Τραγούδια Ῥωμαϊκά: *Popularia Carmina Græciæ recentioris* edidit Arnoldus Passow. Leipzig: Trübner, 1860.

The "Statesman's Year Book" for 1875. London: Macmillan.

Selections from Modern Greek Writers. By C. C. Felton. London: Trübner, 1856.

"Νάθαν ὁ σοφός," Lessing's "Nathan the Wise," translated by Angelos Vlachos. Athens, 1879.

of the Greeks. In the midst of failing health and civil discord, in reply to an invitation to retire to a more salubrious place of abode until his strength should be repaired, he wrote, "I cannot quit Greece while there is a chance of my being of any (even supposed) utility; there is a stake worth millions such as I am, and while I can stand at all I must stand by the cause." To the Provisional Government of the insurgents he writes:—

"You have fought gloriously; act honourably towards your fellow-citizens and the world, and it will then no more be said, as has been repeated for two thousand years, that Philopœmen was the last of the Grecians. Let not calumny itself compare the patriot Greek, when resting from his labours, to the Turkish Pasha, whom his victories have exterminated." In his dying words the names of his daughter and of Greece were the last upon his lips.

These closing scenes in the chequered and by no means spotless, but still in its final outcome not inglorious, career of one whom both as a man and as a poet posterity have begun to recognise as more sinned against than sinning, suggest the pertinent questions—What would Byron have thought could he have been living now? Would he in any measure have seen of the travail of his soul and been satisfied? Was Philopœmen, indeed, the last of the Grecians? Have the Greeks as a nation falsified the hopes that Byron entertained, or have they fulfilled his worst misgivings, and was even the generous commendation he bestowed on their first achievements in the war of independence but fulsome flattery?

To begin with the last inquiry. Most of us are too young to remember the Greek Insurrection of 1821—1829. We have all of us a vague notion that had it not been for the wholly unpremeditated battle of Navarino, the Greeks would never have attained the measure of independence that is theirs. But any one

who has taken the trouble to acquaint himself with the history of the times will see that really to the Greeks alone belongs the credit of their own deliverance. They fought single-handed, without encouragement—nay, in the teeth of positive discouragement on the part of the Great Powers of Europe—until it became evident that they would die sooner than return to slavery; and then not the Governments, but the peoples of Europe, demanded interference in their favour. As long as there was the least hope of the pacification of Greece there was not a Court or a Cabinet in Europe, from England to Russia, that would not gladly have seen them “pacified,” that is, crushed into submission. As a sample of their heroism, let a single instance suffice. Perhaps few but the readers of Spyridon Tricupes’ “History of the Greek Insurrection” are aware that there was a modern as well as an ancient battle in the Pass of Thermopylæ. In the first year of the insurrection, when the commanders of Eastern Greece heard of the approach of Omer-Pasha-Vrioni and the Vizier Kiuse-Mehmet-Pasha, they took up a position almost identical with that occupied by their illustrious ancestors who withstood to the bitter end the Persian invader Xerxes. One general, Panurgiās, held the monastery of Mustafa Bey with 600 Salonites, and the venerable Bishop Isaïas, son of Solon; a second leader, Dyoviniotes, with 400, took possession of the bridge of the Gorgopotamos; and Diakos, a latter-day Leonidas, occupied the bridge of the Spercheios, and the road that led towards the mountain Pass of Thermopylæ. The combined forces of Omer-Vrioni and Mehmet-Pasha attacked them in three several detachments so as to cut them off from aiding one another. Panurgiās and his soldiers were routed, and Diakos, seeing the danger of his troops upon the bridge, sent two of his officers, Kalyvas and Bakogiannes, to rally them, accompanied by only two private soldiers. But scarcely had they leapt upon the bridge when their com-

rades were dispersed, and these four intrepid men rushed into an inn opposite the bridge, shut the door, and kept up a fire on the foe in the vain hope of so decimating their forces that they might not have strength enough left to fall upon Diakos in the Pass. Meanwhile, his own followers wavered, and began to think their only safety lay in flight. Only Diakos himself and a few companions remembering how, on this very spot, Leonidas of old had perished, determined to stand their ground. Urged by his adopted son to save himself upon a horse which he held ready for his foster-father to mount, entreating him to think of the service he might hereafter render to his country, he replied like a true Laconian, "Diakos flies not." At this moment he is assailed at close quarters, his brother is slain before him, when with barely ten soldiers he retreats to some rugged rocks close to the Pass, and fights for an hour against fearful odds. At length all his comrades are slain, except his foster-son. He himself is wounded in his right shoulder, his gun falls to the ground, but still he keeps his foes at bay holding his pistol in his left hand, until he is recognised, surrounded, and taken bleeding, yet alive. His four friends inside the inn, seeing nothing more of Diakos or those about him, rush out, sword in hand, into the enemy's midst, and are found dead the following day, close to the spot where Diakos had been taken. At the close of this battle, in which three hundred Greeks had perished and many others had been wounded, Diakos, mounted on a mule, was brought to Zitouni, and examined concerning the insurrection. He fearlessly declared that all the Greeks were resolved to regain their freedom or to die. He himself was offered the choice of servitude or death, and instantly chose the latter, saying, "Greece has many another Diakos." On the following day, the 24th of April, 1821, the order was given that he should be impaled. The executioner placed the stake in his hands and bade him follow him to the place of torment. Indig-

nantly he flung it on the ground, and looking round on the Albanians present, "What!" he cried, "is there not one of you found to kill me? Why do you let the Anatolians torture me? I am no criminal." Then walking to the place of execution and casting his eyes upon the earth now smiling around him in all the freshness of the new-born spring, he repeated the popular couplet—

Γιὰ ἰδὲ καιρὸ ποῦ διάλεξε τὸ Χάρος νὰ μὲ πάρῃ·  
Τώρα πάνθ' ἔχουν τὰ κλαδιὰ καὶ βγάν' ἡ γῆ χορτάρι.

Behold! how Charon calls me hence in this his chosen hour,  
What time the grass is sprouting green, and buds are on the bower.

With these words, he went on his way to endure for three hours without a groan the agonies of a cruel and lingering death.

As the sequel showed, Greece had many another Diakos. He was but the type of a thousand, nay, of many a thousand, who, in more than two hundred battles—more than one hundred and fifty of which preceded all foreign intervention—fought for the freedom of Greece, not only of that Greece which finally was freed, but of that which (thanks to European diplomacy!) still remains in servitude.

Well might Byron say, "You have fought gloriously."

*Vixere fortes post Philopœmena,*

to adapt the Horatian line.

But, since the recovery of their independence, so far as they have recovered it, have the modern Greeks upon the whole justified the hopes and falsified the misgivings, or falsified the hopes and justified the misgivings of Byron? In other words, is modern Greece a success or a failure on the whole? I think I hear some cynic forestall the answer by the veritable "stock" rejoinder:—A State that not only does not pay off any portion of its national debt, but does not even pay the interest on its national debt, can hardly be

called a success, whatever else may be urged in its favour or its defence. The Greeks are an "interesting" people, according to an eminent statesman who shall be nameless, but the more of interest they excite the less of interest do they pay. Such I take to be the allegation. It is certainly somewhat stale, now that the Greeks have made a serious and earnest effort to pay their creditors. But had it any time the justice, to say nothing of the generosity which might be looked for from the great in dealing with the small? To be just before you are generous is a good old English maxim; but Englishmen to Greeks on the subject of finance have been often neither generous nor just. Not being a member of that political party whose "finance is its strong point," I do not pretend to be a financier; but when I was last in Athens, in 1879, I had the curiosity to ask a casual Greek acquaintance how he could excuse the various Governments of Greece for not having paid the interest on their national debt. His answer was very simple, and although not wholly satisfactory nor completely borne out by the facts, displayed considerably less ignorance of the subject than is shown by the vast majority of the glib defamers of Greece. He said, "The loans of 1824 and 1825 were negotiated on the understanding that Greece was to be free from Thessaly and Epirus to Crete. That expectation was falsified. Therefore the Greece that contracted the debt was not the Greece which repudiated it, and from its narrow confines could never hope to repay it, either in principal or interest. The debt of 1833 was contracted by Greece as it is at present (excepting the Ionian Islands), and on that debt the dividend has been regularly paid." It is quite true this is not the whole account of the matter. For the latter dividends have been paid, according to the "Statesman's Year-book," only from reserved funds of the loan itself in the first instance, and since then chiefly from the treasuries of the guaranteeing Powers, who are now therefore heavy

claimants upon the Greek Government. Still, the debt is acknowledged, and within the last year the whole matter has been placed on a more satisfactory footing. But, on the other hand, my Greek informant did not state his side of the case with half the force he might have used. Let Mr. Louis Sergeant, in the "*Panhellenic Annual*," page 175, supplement his defence as follows:—"It must be remembered in justice to the Greek nation that it never owned its liability for a considerable portion of these two unfortunate loans. It was not merely that the money was borrowed by the delegates of provinces whereof only a certain number were subsequently emancipated from the Turks, whilst the remainder were never included in the kingdom of Greece. It was not because the penniless borrowers were charged over 13 per cent. on what they received. The Greeks had other complaints to make. They were in the condition of a minor who borrows at an exorbitant rate on his expectations, and even then has to take a good deal of the 'accommodation' in worthless pictures and undrinkable wines. Much of the money went for ships that would not sail, for machinery that would not work, and for men that would not fight. In the case of a minor, a court of equity steps in and modifies his liability under the usurious bond. Ought not the same principle to apply in the case of the Greek patriotic loans? Mr. Luriottis sounded the first note of the objection which has been consistently made by Greece during more than half a century. 'How much of the moneys you have expended without our authority,' he wrote to Messrs. Ricardo, 'you will be entitled to consider as paid on account of our Government or of ourselves, will be matter for future deliberation and discussion.' Thus we find a protest entered at the very moment when the debt was being incurred. It is anything but just, after this, to talk of Greek repudiation in the sense in which that ugly word is applied to some other foreign States."



But Greek finance is positively imposing when compared with that of Turkey. Whilst Turkish Government paper has fallen to a twelfth of its nominal value, Greek Government paper is circulating freely at about 3 per cent. discount, or on rather better terms than the bank notes of the Italian kingdom; yet no one suggests that Italy, with her vastly greater resources, is "not a success." Then, too, the Turkish officials are months in arrear with their pay, whilst the Greek officials are as regularly paid as Englishmen or Germans. We will dismiss the question of modern Greek finance with the remark that, however great may have been, or may still be, its mismanagement, its resources have never been crippled by the profligacy and luxury of sovereign, courtiers, and great men. Greece is neither blessed nor cursed with an aristocracy, and the rapidity with which, within the last few months, she has been enabled to raise an army of 50,000 men, not counting the reserves, without borrowing a penny from the foreigner, speaks well, at all events, for the credit of the Greeks among themselves, the strength of the national sentiment, and the enthusiasm of the popular will.

"But Greece is infested with brigands," say her detractors. Greece is not infested with brigands, we reply, whatever she may have been. There are brigands in Albania and in Thessaly, who make occasional raids into Grecian territory; and this is one of the principal arguments twice recognised and allowed at Berlin for the annexation of a portion of those provinces to Greece. Italy and, still more, Sicily are infested by brigands, yet no one argues thence that Italy is "not a success." On the other hand, street assassinations are rarer in Greece than in England—far rarer than in Italy; life and property are more secure in Athens than in London or Liverpool, Paris or Cologne. I have been robbed in England, I have been robbed in honest Germany: I have never been robbed in Greece. Surely England might wait till she has

"suppressed" the burglars of the metropolis, the highway-men of Blackheath, the "corner men" of Liverpool, who are ready to kick a fellow-creature to death for the sake of "sixpence for a pot of beer," the "blundering blunder-busterers" of Clare and Mayo, before she casts in the teeth of Greece the unsuppressed brigandage of the unannexed provinces of Thessaly and Epirus.

One more charge, and I have done with rebutting accusations. Says the *Times* of October 15, 1880: "The Greeks claim Thessaly, Epirus, Crete, Cyprus, and who knows what else? But it cannot be said they have as yet fully vindicated Greece for the Greeks, inasmuch as they have not made the best or the most of that land which, for fifty years, has been indisputably their own;" and in the preceding paragraph: "There are in Asia Minor, in Roumelia, in Constantinople, and throughout Turkey, as well as in Italy, Germany, and even in this country, tens of thousands of Greeks whose love for Greece is purely Platonic, who not only never dream of bringing their household gods, their riches, industry and intelligence to add to the population, and thus to the importance of the little kingdom, but who contribute also very little, if anything, to lighten its burdens, to help it to meet its engagements, to keep up a credit which is every day sinking lower" (?). If the credit of Greece is every day sinking lower, how comes it that within the course of the last year her *chargé d'affaires* in London, Mr. Gennadios, succeeded in coming to an arrangement with the English Council of Foreign Bondholders, after the failure of all previous attempts? As to the "Platonic love" of Greeks for their country, what shall be said of the hundreds and thousands of "Platonic" Germans, Dutchmen, Englishmen, Frenchmen who live in foreign parts and contribute little, if anything, to lighten the burdens of the mother-country? True, England, if not Germany, but scarcely Holland and France, suffer from over-population,

which Greece does not ; but on the other hand, if all the "tens of thousands" of Greeks who are now making their fortunes in various parts of Europe were to transfer themselves *en masse* to "the little kingdom," it would be assuredly too small, if not to hold them, at all events, to give scope for their commercial energies. But the Greeks are not unmindful of their country. The handsome edifices which adorn the modern capital, the school of the brothers Rizáres, the orphanage of Chatzes Kostas, the girls' orphanage, the ophthalmic hospital, the infirmary, the almshouse, the children's asylum, the Arsakeion or high school for girls, and the foreign school (both founded by the Educational Society), a third institution for "mutual improvement," on the Bell and Lancaster principles (due to the initiative of the same society), the model infant school, the National University, whose professors *do* lecture, and lecture well, to several thousand students, the National library, the numismatical museum, the archæological museum of Bernadákis, the Lyceum of Varvákis, the observatory of G. Sinas, the academy, named from the same benefactor, the Polytechnion of Sturnáres, the industrial exhibition hall of Evángéles Zappas, are so many monuments of the munificence and liberality of these "Platonic" Greeks, some of whom sacrificed their entire fortunes for their erection and endowment. A full account of these institutions may be found on pp. 403—441 of the *Ἑθνικὸν Ἡμερολόγιον* for 1871. Since then others of the "Platonic" crew have erected stately mansions and warehouses in the streets of Athens, the population of which capital has increased since I knew it first in 1868 from about 40,000 to over 100,000. The same "Platonic" enterprise has converted the few boatmen's and fishermen's huts of the Piræus into a kind of miniature Manchester and Liverpool knocked into one, where some thirty factory chimneys are now sending up their smoke to a sky which renders a better

and clearer account of it than that of Lancashire. The railway connecting the Piræus with the City (alas! the only one in Greece) is said to pay its shareholders from ten to sixteen per cent. Is there another town in Europe which can exhibit the like progress within so short a time? Nay, is there another in the world? And yet modern Greece is not a success.

I have done with rebutting charges and yet I have not done. For although I have disposed of serious allegations, I have yet to remark on a flippant taunt, which, did it not proceed from an American humorist of repute, I should not deign to notice. American humour has this peculiar charm, that it is often impossible to tell whether it is humorous or not, whether it is a clumsy joke or a piece of ridiculous earnest. It is sometimes like the farmer's horse that had only two faults. In the first place, it was very hard to catch, and, in the second, it was no good when it was caught. Mr. Mark Twain, in his "*New Pilgrim's Progress*,"\* after a glowing and no less beautiful than truthful description of the loveliness of modern Athens beneath a moonlit sky, proceeds to recount how he and his companions made their way back to the Piræus through the vine-trellised olive-groves that lie between town and harbour. The grapes were not sour—very much the reverse; and the "pilgrims" pillaged the vineyards at their own sweet will. For this they were remonstrated with by various "troublesome brigands," as the writer has the calm impudence to call the vineyard-keepers. Mr. Twain's comment on this little transaction surpasses, for arrogant effrontery, anything I have ever read. "This shows what sort of a country modern Attica is—a community of questionable characters. These men were not there to guard their possessions against strangers, but against each other;

\* *The New Pilgrim's Progress*. By Mark Twain. London: Ward, Lock, and Tyler.

for strangers seldom visit Athens and the Piræus, and when they do they go in daylight, and can buy all the grapes they want for a trifle. The modern inhabitants are confiscators and falsifiers of high repute, if gossip speaks truly concerning them, and I freely believe it does." A man who is so free with his fingers may well be free with his belief. I can only speak of the Greeks as I found them. Mr. Twain speaks of them as *they* found *him*, robbing their vineyards—not a very happy mode of introduction. Had the keepers been familiar with American dialect, they would probably have assured Mr. Twain that it was not against one other, but against just such "strangers" as himself, that they were keeping watch. A very different experience fell to my lot. On my last visit to Greece I had occasion, not to rob a vineyard, but to buy a newspaper in the street (the street of Hermes, by the way, the patron of light-fingered gentry). In pulling out a *δεκάρα* (ten of which make 8½d.), it seems I also dislodged from my pocket a bank-note, which fell upon the pavement. It was a Greek note, and therefore not to be confounded in the eyes of any Greek, however ignorant, with a worthless piece of paper. A little ragged boy, who had seen it fall, picked it up and brought it to me after my back was turned. I am glad it was he that found it, and not Mr. Twain.

There are, unfortunately, too many waifs and strays abroad in the streets of Athens. Most of them earn an honest, but precarious, livelihood as shoeblacks and newspaper boys. They are chiefly immigrants from the outlying provinces. I was amused at the laconic manner in which one of these shoeblacks, pointing at my boots, all covered with the dust of this most dusty of towns, ejaculated the dissyllabic interrogatory, "*θέλεις*;" a friend informed me that most of these shoeblacks actually came from Laconia. A society has been formed for gathering these waifs and strays in a night-school in the evenings, to which I had

the pleasure of paying a visit, and where I heard a reading lesson given. I was astonished and delighted by the way in which these boys not only read the somewhat high-flown Hellenic of their "primers," but gave equivalent Romaic for the less familiar words. This is just what, *mutatis mutandis*, English children in our Elementary—yes, even in our Board Schools—too often cannot do, too seldom are taught to do. I speak from some experience as a "manager" (ironical term!) of National and British Schools, and as a School Board visitor.

My readers will expect me to say something of the home-life of the Greeks. At many a household I was a welcome guest, and that for no other reason than that I was a stranger. Hospitable without ostentation, courteous without servility, as cordial and polite to one another as to myself, I always found the Greeks delightful company. The poorest student, or Government clerk, or shopkeeper's assistant that I met was as kind and attentive, according to his means, as the wealthy merchant, each and all in conformity with the old Homeric reverence for Zeus Xenios—

*χαριζόμενος παρεόντων,*

if it was only the cup of coffee brewed in my presence over a spirit lamp, or the cigarette that was offered at the corner of the street. One might argue from the crowded state of the restaurants that the Greeks are great "diners-out," and not much given to domestic bliss; but though the meals are often taken at an hotel (a great saving of expense and trouble where dwellings are small and servants few), the majority of loungers at these places are students at the University, soldiers and officers, lawyers without clients, and doctors without patients, and other bachelors who have their home yet to make. It is no uncommon thing for parents and married children, and unmarried children too, to live under the same roof in perfect amity, and nothing can be more delightful than the purity, the comfort, and the harmony of

such home-life. A Greek's house, however, unlike an Englishman's, is not his castle ; or if it is, it is one which is daily and hourly stormed without the slightest ceremony. The casual acquaintance is always dropping in, and his appearance never causes any flurry or fuss. He is usually regaled with coffee, sometimes with wine, almost always with marmalade or rose-jam. In the latter case the foreigner experiences some embarrassment, as I did the first time the lady or daughter of the house, I forget which it was, presented before my astonished eyes on a tray a jar of marmalade, a glass of water, and a small regiment of spoons ; but never a plate, or even an oyster-shell, whereon to deposit the luscious compound. Was I expected to put a lump of it upon my trousers' knee ? Fortunately, the friend who introduced me put me up in a whisper to what was expected from me as a man and a gentleman. I was to take one of the spoons, abstract a spoonful of marmalade, transfer the same to my mouth, and then deposit the spoon upon the tray, which was straightway handed to another guest.

The pride of promptitude, and swelling consciousness of knowing the "manner of the god of the land," with which on innumerable subsequent occasions I licked and put down my spoon, fully compensated me afterwards for that "bad quarter of a minute ;" but the anguish of nervous agitation which I endured when first confronted with that awfully enigmatical tray, that portentous jar of marmalade, that imposing array of spoons, combined with the utter platelessness of the entire situation, no pen of mortal man can ever adequately portray.

A very few words must suffice upon the religion of Greece. All religions are tolerated by the constitution, but proselytism is strictly forbidden. The American Missionary and Bible Society agent, Mr. Kalopothakes, and his associates, are regarded by the Greeks very much in the same light as Mr. Mark Twain and his companions were by the guardians

of the vineyards. "Preach your American theology to as many of your own way of thinking and your adopted country as you like," they say in effect; "but do not poach on our preserves."

There is not in Greece any general feeling for universality in religion. The Catholic maxim, "*Extra ecclesiam nulla salus*," is not the ground of the Greeks' objection to proselytism. In thorough Hellenic fashion they believe in the Orthodox faith as the great political bond of unity. Politics and religion go hand in hand together. If you want to be a Greek you must belong to the Greek Church, and if you belong to the Greek Church you are a Greek (unless you chance to be a Bulgarian or a Russian). The Christian Albanian is the Greek Albanian, the Mahommedan Albanian is the Turkish Albanian. To introduce new gods is as much a political crime in modern Athens as it was in the days of Socrates and Anaxagoras. We need not be surprised at the committee appointed with the sanction of the Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs giving a prize for a very excellent translation by Mr. Vlachos of Lessing's "*Nathan the Wise*," which, in spite of the freedom of its thought, distinctly enunciates the principle that it is only natural and right for each man to cling to the form of faith in which he has been brought up. Nothing is commoner than to hear the broadest views upon religious matters uttered by Greeks in conversation, and even an ecclesiastic who had studied in Germany, as hundreds do, was very eloquent in my presence on the distinction between "absolute" and "relative" truth in questions of theology, the latter alone, as he contended, being possible to man. It is plain, from these hints, where lies the future of a free theology in Greece,—within and not without the Orthodox Church. From all I saw and heard, I do not despair of seeing German philosophy and criticism entering gradually and slowly into friendly alliance with the gorgeous ceremonial of Byzantine



Christianity. The leaven in the lump is working. It only requires time.

I have left to the last the question, Has modern Greece a national literature? A very large proportion of what passes under that name is doubtless mere translation, or at least close imitation, either of ancient Greek or of modern European models. But nevertheless, the fact remains that in the popular ballad poetry of modern Greece, in the achievements of its klephts and *pallikaria*, and still more in the mythology, which has survived all the inroads of Christianity, there is abundant material for a really classical, because thoroughly national, literature. It only needs cultivation, and it is being cultivated, just as the language itself needs and receives cultivation. It is an entire mistake to suppose that modern Greek is an artificial creation of pedant grammarians. It is only Romaic purged of its foreign accretions and more obvious corruptions, and naturally adapted to the growing wants of the time. To show how thoroughly Greek the purest and, at the same time, the wholly vernacular Romaic is, and also what can be done with it by the hand of genius, I shall conclude this essay by a poem from an unknown pen, illustrative of that universal "solar myth" which meets us in so many countries and under so many forms. I append two versions, one in English and another in German, in the hope that some of the beauties of the original which have been sacrificed in the one may be preserved in the other. Few readers of the *Modern Review* will be offended by a German translation, for which, as for the English, I am responsible. It is needless, perhaps, to observe that *Ἀνθός* is a masculine personification of the neuter *ἄνθος*, a flower, and that *Ἀγρή*, with its diminutive *Ἀγροῦλα*, signifies the rays, properly of the rising, but here, also, of the setting sun. The "mother" is "mother-earth," and the tears on her face are the dew-drops.

‘Ο Ἀνθὸς καὶ ἡ Αὐγή.

‘Η Αὐγούλα πού νᾶναι ;  
Κοντενεῖ τὸ βράδυ  
Καὶ μαῦρο σκοτάδι  
Πλακώνει τὴν γῆ.  
Παγαίνει καὶ πούναι  
Μακρὸ κυπαρίσσι  
Παγαίνει στὴ βρύσι·  
Δέν εἶν’ οὐδὲ ‘κεῖ.

Στ’ ἀλῶνι, στ’ ἀμπέλι  
Στὸ δρόμο κυττάζει  
Καὶ τέλος φωνάζει·  
Αὐγούλα μ’, Αὐγή.  
Αὐγή μου συχνότατα  
Τοῦ βγῆκ’ ἀπ’ τὰ στήθη  
Κε’ Αὐγή μ’ ἀπεκρίθη  
Μιὰν ἄλλη φωνή.

Πὼς εἶν’ τῆς Αὐγούλας,  
‘Ο Ἀνθὸς ἐστοχάσθη,  
Καὶ πρόθυμ’ ἐβιάσθη  
Νὰ πάη νὰ τὴ βρῇ.  
‘Εγέρν’ ἀνίσχυος  
‘Ωσὰν περιστέρι  
Γιὰ νὰ βρῇ τὸ ταῖρι  
Καὶ δὲν τοῦ βολεῖ.

Καὶ τρέχει καὶ τρέχει,  
Κε’ ὀλοῦθε κυττάζει,  
Καὶ δίχως νὰ κράξη  
Δὲν μένει στιγμὴ.  
Τὴν εἶδε προβαίνοντας  
Στὴ μέση κέφωναξ’  
“Αὐγούλα μ’, ἐτρόμαξ’  
“‘Ο Ἀνθὸς σου πολύν.”

‘Ετοῦτα λαλῶντας  
Κοντὰ τῆς παγαίνει,  
‘Η Αὐγούλα σιωπᾷνει  
Καὶ δὲν τοῦ μιλεῖ.  
Προσκέφαλο κόκκινο  
Τῆς κεῖτ’ ἀπουκιάτου,  
Κρεββάτι θανάτου  
Στενὸ καὶ πικρὺ.

Oh ! where is Augúla ?  
The shadows are closing,  
Black darkness reposing  
Far and wide o’er the land.  
All vainly he seeks her  
Where the tall cypress  
waveth,  
Where the rivulet laveth  
The desolate strand.

By vineyard and wayside  
And threshing-floor gaz-  
ing,  
At length his voice raising,  
“Augúla !” amain,  
“Auge” times unnum-  
bered  
From his full heart he  
crieth ;  
And “Auge” replieth  
A far voice again.

Like the voice of Augúla  
To Anthos it sounded,  
And onward he bounded  
To find her full fain.  
All restless he sought her,  
As some forlorn dove flies  
To find where his love lies,  
And seeks her in vain.

Still onward he hastens,  
His eager eye straining,  
And ever complaining,  
No respite hath he.  
Hedescries her before him,  
And loudly entreateth,  
“ My heart anxious  
beateth,  
Augúla, for thee.”

Thus speaking, he nears  
her,  
But as o’er her he bends  
him,  
No answer she sends him,  
The dear lips are dumb.  
Oh ! hard narrow death-  
bed,  
Where lay the cold limbs  
on  
A cushion of crimson,  
All lifeless and numb.

Wo weilt die Augúla ?  
Auf Hügel und Auen  
Tief lagert das Grauen :  
Es schwindet der Tag  
Er sucht sie vergeblich,  
Wo sonst sie gesessen,  
Bei den schlanken Cypres-  
sen,  
Am rauschenden Bach.

Auf Weinberg und Tenne,  
Durch Strassen und Stege,  
Durch einsame Wege,  
Mit forschendem Blick.  
Laut endlich Augúla  
Er tausendmal stöhnte,  
Und “Auge” ertönte  
Die Antwort zurück.

“Das ist die Augúla”  
Meint Anthos und hastet,  
Und nimmermehr rastet ;  
Er eilet, er fliegt.  
So eilet und suchet  
Sein Liebchen die Taube  
Durch Dickicht und Laube.  
Und findet es nicht.

Immer fort ohne Still-  
stand  
Rechts, links schauend  
lief er,  
Und flehentlich rief er,  
Und nimmermehr schwieg.  
Jetzt erblickt er sie vor  
sich,  
Und ruft mit Schmerzen  
“Bang war mir im Herzen,  
Augúla, um dich !”

So redend er naht ihr  
Und zu ihr sich neiget  
Doch Augi, sie schweiget ;  
Kein Wörtchen sie spricht.  
Es stützt das Haupt ihr  
Ein Kissen ein rothes ;  
Auf dem Lager des Todes  
Eng gebettet sie liegt.

Θανάτου στεφάνι  
Τριγύρου στήν κόμη  
Εἶν, εὐμορφ' ἀκόμη  
Στήν ὄψι πολὺ.  
'Ο' Ἀγγελος ἰσως  
Ποὺ πέρνει τὸ μίλημ'  
Τῆς πῆρε μέ φίλημ'  
Γλυκὸ τὴν ψυχῇ.

A chaplet funereal  
Around her brow presses  
Her beautiful tresses,  
Still lovely in death.  
Peradventure the angel  
That of speech hath bereft  
her,  
Kissed her lips ere he left  
her,  
Sweetly stealing her  
breath.

Ein Todeskranz bindet  
Die lockigen Haare:  
Doch sieh! auf der Bahre  
Wie schön sie noch ist.  
Mich dünket der Engel  
Der so todstill sie machte,  
Hat die Lippen noch  
sachte  
Beim Scheiden geküsst.

Γιατ' ἔχει χαμόγελο  
Ἀκόμη στὸ στόμα,  
Ποὺ λὲς μὲς τὸ χάμα  
Δέν πρέπει νὰ μῆπῃ.  
"Δέν εἶν πεθαμμένη  
"Τὴν ὄψι τηράτε  
"Κοιμάται, κοιμάται  
"Εἰς ὕπνο βαθύ."

For around the fair mouth  
still  
A smile seems to hover;  
Oh! 'twere pity to cover  
Her thus with the ground.  
"Not dead is the maiden:  
"Close watch by her  
keeping,  
"Ye shall find she is  
sleeping  
"A slumber profound."

Denn es spielt noch ein  
Lächeln  
Ihr hold auf den Zügen  
O weh! wenn sie liegen  
Müsst' unter der Flur.  
"Sie ist nicht gestorben  
"Das Antlitz betrachtet;  
"Ja wohl auf sie achtet;  
"Sie schlummert ja nur!"

Τῆς πέρνει μέ χέρι  
Ἀργὸ τὸ στεφάνι.  
Τὸ βγάνει, τὸ βάνει  
Ἀπ' τὴν κεφαλῇ.  
"Ἡ Αὔγουλα κοιμάται,  
"Ἀλήθεια σοῦ λέγω.  
"Μὴν κλαῖς, γιατί κλαίγω,  
"Μαυοῦλα καὶ σύ.

Now slowly and sadly,  
With hesitant fingers,  
The wreath that yet lin-  
gers  
He takes from her brow.  
"Tis the truth that I tell  
thee;  
"Augúla is sleeping.  
"For all I am weeping,  
"Mother mine, weep not  
thou.

Den Todeskranz zögernd  
Dem Haupte entband er;  
Mit bebender Hand er  
Entfernte ihn fein.  
"Augúla, sie schlummert;  
"Wahr ist's was ich sage;  
"Klage nicht, weil ich  
klage;  
"Weine nicht, Mutter  
mein!

"Ἴδοὺ τὸ στεφάνι της.  
"Μὴν γίρνης στήν ἄλλη  
"Μερὶὰ τὸ κεφάλι  
"Τὰ μάτια μὴν κλῆς.  
"Σ' τ' ἀφίνω στὰ γόνατα  
"Κί' ἀκόμ' ἂν ἀργήσῃ  
"Ἡ Αὔγη νὰ ξυπνήσῃ,  
"Ἐμὲ τὸ φορεῖς."

"See, there is her chaplet;  
"Leave gently reposing  
"Her head, without clos-  
ing  
"The dear drooping eyn.  
"On thy knees take her  
garland;  
"The moments I number;  
"Should Auge long slum-  
ber,  
"That wreath must be  
mine."

"Sieh! da ist ihr Kränz-  
chen;  
"Lass das Haupt ihr nicht  
rücken;  
"Lass das Aug ihr nicht  
drücken:  
"Das Kränzchen behalt.  
"Auf den Schooss dir da  
leg' ich's.  
"Wozu? willst du fragen?  
"Ich selbst muss es tragen,  
"Wacht Augi nicht bald."

E. M. GELDART.

## FINAL CAUSES.\*

THE argument from design, which proved so fascinating a subject to writers on teleology of the last century, has been thought to have received its death-blow from Evolution.† This doctrine, as propounded by Mr. Darwin, has now “come of age,” and nearly coeval with that epoch has appeared probably the most elaborate work on *Final Causes* which has ever issued from the Press. It contains two books. The first treats of the Law of Finality, the second of the First Cause of Finality. This term is defined as follows: “It signifies the end (*finis*) for which one acts, or towards which one tends, and which may consequently be considered as a cause of action or of motion.”‡ Hence, it would seem that a sharp distinction should be drawn between *Finality* and *Causality*; that while every phenomenon demands a *cause* of some sort, it is only a certain number which have an *end*, this notion being “produced with an imperious and irresistible force.” Thus, for example, that a pebble should be round and smooth is a result of friction; but we see no “end” in its roundness or smoothness. The eye-ball is also round and smooth, and we rightly or wrongly *do* infer an end in its spherical form; for we recognise its use for rotation. This “imperiousness,” however, is not argument, and the question may be asked,

\* *Final Causes*. By Paul Janet, Member of the Institute, Professor at the Faculté des Lettres of Paris. Translated from the French by William Affleck, B.D., with Preface, by Robert Flint, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Divinity, University of Edinburgh. T. and T. Clark, Edinburgh. 1878.

† *Lay Sermons*. By T. H. Huxley. P. 330.

‡ P. 1.

How is any supposed end to be distinguished from a mere result?

The reply is, that in every case where an end is recognised, there is a multiplicity of coincidences which have by their mutual interaction brought about that end; while the probability of their occurring at haphazard, or as uncorrelated coincidences, and yet collectively producing such a structure as the eye, is one to infinity that such should be the case. It is on these grounds that the order of the planetary system, as well as the organs of animals and plants, imply ends; but we cannot recognise any end in the way a stream of lava pours down one side of a volcano rather than the other.

We may, however, here ask what degree of complexity is requisite to constitute or illustrate an end? If there is an indubitable end in the human eye, is there not a like end in a pigment cell attached to a nerve? or, if there is an end in the limbs of a vertebrate, is there no end in the shapeless pseudopodia of an *amæba*?

Now, the formation of pseudopodia may be claimed by the Positivists as illustrating the inherent properties of sarcode, and as such they are simply *results* and not *ends*.

Even sex, so obviously an end, as Janet thinks, if traced to elementary forms, is foreshadowed in the accidental fusion of two vegetative zoospores. Hence, although ends may seem very apparent in highly-organised beings, the organs exhibiting these ends may be traced back to states where those "ends," by a gradual process of minimisation, seem to pass into accidental "results," and so one cannot at last draw any sharp line between them.

Mr. Herbert Spencer, in tracing conduct from such random motions as are executed by pseudopodia, to the actions of higher animals, which seem to show definite ends, points out how the gradations are complete—say, from the swimming of an infusorium to the habits of a cephalopod,

or from those of an ascidian to an elephant. It is just this which renders the attempts to limit finality with any degree of precision so difficult a task.

This difficulty, if I mistake not, is scarcely brought out with sufficient precision by M. Janet. It may, therefore, indicate a line of objection to finality, as it undoubtedly would be to the old views of teleology.

In his sixth chapter of the first book on "Objections and Difficulties," Janet refers to M. Littré's view that "the property of matter of accommodating itself to ends—of *adjusting itself*, as he says—is one of the properties of organised matter. It is of the essence of this matter to adapt itself to ends, as it is of its essence to contract or expand, to move or to feel."\* Our author takes M. Littré to task for this expression.

There must be, however, an underlying truth in it. Otherwise the very existence of the animal and vegetable kingdoms, as they now are, cannot be accounted for. If Littré meant that animal matter, say, of some reptile, through some inherent properties of adaptation, developed wings instead of forelegs, and so produced a bird, such a description may sound absurd; yet every evidence yet discovered goes to prove it true, though the process may have been a gradual one, and only perfected through very many generations.

In fact, Evolution is based on the principle that protoplasm *has* an infinite potentiality of adaptation; and when our author objects to Littré's expression about organised matter having the power of adapting or adjusting itself, he does not refute it by saying, "Let men but think of it, and they will own that there does not exist a sort of entity called organised matter, endowed, one knows not why or how, with the property of attaining ends; what really exists is a totality of solids, liquids, tissues,

\* P. 221.

canals, hard parts and soft parts—in a word, an incalculable totality of second causes and blind agents, that all unite in a common action, which is life.”\* Now, this is true; but it is not one whit the less true that it is, so to say, a plastic whole; for, although when a creature is once born into the world, and has grown to maturity, it can rarely change its form much after that, any more than the leopard its spots; † yet, by its power of hereditary adaptability, it can impress upon its yet unborn offspring a form and structure different in some degree from itself; and so after several generations can produce new species and genera, abounding in so-called “ends,” which were not to be found in the original ancestral form.

It is, in fact, just this plasticity of organised matter (for want of a better expression), to which is due the marvellous results which, *per se*, have all the appearance of ends. Janet finally asks: “Wherein is it more absurd to admit in matter the property of healing itself than the property of adjusting itself to ends?” Neither one nor the other is absurd, for both are equally true. To the famous argument of the watch, it might be added that, if a watch could heal up an injury to its wheels, it would imply a vastly-increased skill in its artificer. But this is just what the highest kinds of organised matter *can* do, and *are* doing, every day!

Hence, if, on the one hand, a large class of phenomena do not instantly convey to our mind the idea of end, whereas another large class imperatively force it upon us, we must bear in mind that the doctrine of Evolution, without destroying that force as far as it acts *per se*, has proved that, in all instances, we can actually or presumedly pass from the highly-complex organ, or organism, so to say, *crammed*

\* P. 221.

† This expression, as symbolical of fixity, is singularly inappropriate, for the colour of the skin of even one and the same animal is extremely variable, according to circumstances, as is the case with trout, frogs, and, above all, the chameleon.

with ends, to a homogeneous lump of jelly, with, seemingly, none at all; and that by development, whether studied historically in palæontology or in embryology, we pass by many gradations from what we *à priori* call "results," to what we *à priori* call "ends." It is this discovery which has (it is supposed) given the death-blow to teleology. For tracking them up from below, who can say where "ends" begin? And we may therefore, and finally, ask, Is it not somewhat arbitrary to assert such or such a structure to be an end and not a result?

Before attempting to reply to this, let us return to our author. He gives, as another basis of finality, *the correlation of the end with the future*, which implies the existence of the future phenomenon as the efficient cause, and adopts the old illustration of the eye being fully developed in the womb, though the use of it is solely for the future.

It seems to me that a line of argument may be followed which will eliminate this dilemma. It is based on the fact that *function precedes structure*, by which I mean that functions, now performed by well-differentiated and specific organs, were undertaken by more generalised structures before these organs existed; just as, for example, the membrane of a sea-anemone performs functions of both digestion and respiration.

Again, when a new function is required by even a highly-organised being, that function is, so to say, undertaken for a time by some existing organ (of totally different function) until such modifications have occurred in successive generations as will ultimately enable the organ (thus metamorphosed into a new form) to execute its new functions exclusively. For example, the tendrils of *Naravelia* are foreshadowed in the sensitive climbing petioles of *Clematis*, and the seed-carrying expanded leaf of *Cycas* is preliminary to the ordinary closed seed-vessel, such as the pod of a pea.

Now, these principles of differentiation and metamorphosis



which run through the organised world, imply a universal *potentiality* of acquiring new functions, which, at the same time, proceeds to modify structure, and so gives rise to new organs.

May we not, then, legitimately pass from a consideration of finality in the actual organ to a finality in this very power and potency inherent in organised matter? Whence it comes is unsearchable and past finding out. All we can say is, that inorganic matter shows no signs of it whatever, whereas organised matter, or its ultimate elements, protoplasm and sarcode, would appear to have it to an infinite degree.

Grant finality in this marvellous power, and the whole question would seem to at once meet with its ultimate solution!

Further illustrations will not be unadvisable.

If one contemplates the eye as it is, without regard to its evolutionary history, the idea of finality, if not design, is very "imperious"; but by tracing that history from a mere pigment cell in contact with a nerve, and then by imagining almost microscopic improvements, so to say, to have taken place, the idea of finality seems frittered away, while the notion of design vanishes altogether.

But it seems to return again under the aspect now considered; for granting the pigment cell and a nerve, beyond which analysis is unable to proceed, and mere sensation as a result, "we maintain that, what occurs first as an *effect* takes thereupon the character of an *end*, by reason of the number and the complexity of the combinations which have rendered it possible;"\* and we may ask, Why should the more complex eye issue at all out of the simpler condition? Finality, as expressed by the inherent potentiality of protoplasm, seems to be the sole answer.

Again our author lays stress upon the sexes, as illus-

\* P. 39.

trating the most remarkable fact of co-ordination ; for it is not merely a case of adaptation of one organ to its function, but of one organ to another. Neither is one the effect of the other. "Those two organs are two distinct and independent effects, and yet they can only be explained the one by the other, which is precisely the relation of finality."\*

"It cannot be said," Janet observes, "that this adaptation has been made in course of time ; for as the species could not subsist without it, it would have perished before it had been formed."†

No doubt, existing species could not exist without their full amount of correlative structures ; but it is just because the sexes have been, as it is believed, differentiated in course of time, that the supposed finality becomes, like that of the eye, attenuated by being prolonged backwards into history ; for by travelling historically backwards we can theoretically, if not always practically, see species getting simpler and simpler, and more and more generalised, till in every organism the sexual process would be represented by a mere accidental fusion of two identically similar protoplasmic masses ; while one stage further brings us to an entire independence of such conjugations, and the being propagates by fission of its vegetative system only.

Instead, however, of thus eliminating by degrees every trace of finality in sexuality till we merge into merely mechanical results, is it not just as logical to say that the sexuality of mammalia and flowering plants was potentially visible in the conjugation of monera and plasmodia ? and that the "sexual idea" has reigned throughout, function ever dominating structure till the latter had conformed to the more complete function by becoming specialised more and more ; or, in the words of Janet, "The agreement of several phenomena, bound together with a future deter-

\* P. 52.

† P. 53.

minate phenomenon, supposes a cause in which that future phenomenon is ideally represented, and the probability of this presumption increases with the complexity of the concordant phenomena, and the number of the relations which unite them to the final phenomenon." \*

M. Janet devotes the second chapter to an elaborate investigation of the structure of the eye, ear, tooth, &c., and sees finality in all, just as the older teleologists saw design, in "that when a complex combination of heterogeneous phenomena is found to agree with the possibility of a future act, which was not contained beforehand in any of these phenomena in particular, this agreement can only be comprehended by the human mind by a kind of pre-existence in an ideal form of the future act itself, which transforms it from a result into an end—that is to say, into a final cause." †

If this be a correct account of finality, then the inter-crossing of flowers would be a most pertinent illustration of it. For the conclusion Mr. Darwin and others have arrived at is, that plants, to be perpetuated, *must* be crossed at least occasionally, that nature "abhors perpetual self-fertilisation," that "self-fertilisation is injurious," &c., such being expressions to be found in Mr. Darwin's writings.‡ We have "a complex combination of phenomena" in the structure of the flower of an *orchis*. This structure is correlated to an insect which *must* convey the pollen-mass from one flower to another, or the seed will not be set. Here, then, is exactly what Janet defines as finality; for the structure is found to agree with the possibility—nay, necessity—of a future act, that performed by the insect, which was certainly not contained beforehand in the structure itself. Such, then, is clearly finality in the

\* P. 55.

† P. 85.

‡ As, for example, repeatedly in his work "Cross and Self-Fertilisation of Plants." I have given reasons elsewhere for dissenting strongly from these expressions.

structure of many flowers as they now exist. *How* their peculiar structures were obtained is another question, which we will not discuss at present.

One of the most patent facts in Darwin's expositions is that almost every detail of structure is presumed to have a use, excepting, of course, "rudimentary organs," whose use is now gone, as it is superseded by that of other organs, notably so in the structure of flowers; and he sets himself the task of discovering such use. This is an *à priori* conclusion which he then proceeds to test by trying to discover the use.\* His language could be very appropriately adopted by a teleologist; but we know he does not believe in direct design. All the minute details of structure which seem so "imperiously" to force finality, if not design, upon the mind, have been acquired, according to Mr. Darwin, by the unintentional acts of natural selection. All the characters by which a specific form is known he compares to chance fragments of stone, broken from a mountain rock, but of which natural selection has picked out and preserved those most suited to render the creature the fittest to survive; just as a man may select stones of different shapes wherewith to build his house, without having previously shaped them himself. These are his words:—"The fragments of stone, though indispensable to the architect, bear to the edifice built by him the same relation which the fluctuating variations of each organic being bear to the varied and admirable structures ultimately acquired by its modified descendants."†

There has always seemed to me to be a strange oblivion underlying this simile. What sort of a house, much less a palace or cathedral, *could* possibly be constructed out of unhewn and unworked stones, if the architect were merely

\* See, for example, his remarks on "*Momordae Ignea*" in "*Fertilisation of Orchids*," p. 249; First Ed.

† "*Animals and Plants under Domestication*," vol. ii., p. 430.

to content himself with the rough fragments with which the weather or accident supplied him ?

The exquisite details of structure of a flower of the field, like to which Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed, is much more comparable to a highly-finished and beautifully-designed architectural pile than to such a rough building as that to which Darwin would have us liken it. If it be necessary to *intentionally* prepare each stone for its future position in the structure, so by analogy it might be reasoned that Nature had intentionally caused each detail to develop with the ultimate end of forming "a complex heterogeneous whole." No doubt Darwin's simile is correctly apposite to *his* theory of unlimited variations, out of which natural selection takes the best ; but, as already stated, naturalists are by no means at one in adopting that view. Another is that variations do not occur until external conditions have incited them to appear ; and that when they do, it is in response to, and they are then consequently correlated with, the environment ; in other words, the organism becomes more and more adapted to the environment, so that natural selection has little or nothing to do.

Mr. Darwin would seem to lay much more stress upon the inherent, spontaneous powers of variation than upon the environment as an inciting cause ; for he expresses himself as inclined "to lay less weight on the direct action of the surrounding conditions than on a tendency to vary, due to causes of which we are quite ignorant." \*

I have always adhered to the opposite view, and regarded the environment as by far the most important "cause" of variation, in that it influences the organism which, by its inherent but latent power to vary, responds to the external stimulus, and then varies accordingly.

This view has lately been very strongly insisted upon by Dr. Aug. Weismann, who thus speaks :—"A species is only

\* "Origin of Species," p. 107 ; Sixth Ed. ; 1878.

caused to change through the influence of changing external conditions of life, this change being in a fixed direction which entirely depends on the physical nature of the varying organism, and is different in different species, or even in the two sexes of the same species. According to my view, transmutation by purely internal causes is not to be entertained. If we could absolutely suspend the changes of the external conditions of life, existing species would remain stationary. The action of external inciting causes in the widest sense of the word is alone able to produce modifications." Mr. Alfred R. Wallace, who quotes the preceding in his review of Dr. Weismann's work, "Studies in the Theory of Descent," says that he "has arrived at almost exactly similar conclusions to these."\*

Whichever theory be adopted, the outcome is, of course, the same—viz., structures which *per se* imperiously suggest finality or design. But since the special creation hypothesis is out of court, and Evolution of some sort only accepted, design may be excluded, and the question stands, Does finality remain? If Janet's definition be accepted, then as "ends" abound everywhere in organism, finality is also *passim*. We are not concerned, be it remembered, at present with the investigation as to *how* the complex correlated structures *do* arise in response to either an external or internal stimulus.

Now, assuming finality to be recognised in Nature, it must be either intentional or not. In the First Book Janet does not concern himself with intentionality. He does not therein raise the question as to how the first cause acts, but whether the second causes, as they are given to us in experience, act for ends or not. Within these limits, then, is the analogy between the industry of man and that of nature legitimate?

Taking as a starting point the consciousness of personal

\* *Nature*, vol. xxii., p. 141.

finality in ourselves, we infer by analogy a similar finality in other men; "from finality in the industrious actions of other men, we pass to finality in the industrious actions of animals, whether these actions present the appearance of some foresight and reflection, or appear to us absolutely automatic. We have now to pass from the external actions of the animal, which are called its *instincts*, to its internal operations, which are called its *functions*. This is the kernel of our whole deduction." \*

In tracking finality thus downwards, the reader will at once perceive that the author considers finality as equally characteristic of the voluntary and the automatic acts of man, as well as the acts of all other animals, whether external and instinctive, or internal and functional.

He notices a "profound difference between functional industry and human—namely, that artificial industry constructs the machines it has need of to perform its operations, while the animal functions are only the operations of machines already constructed. The man makes pumps, but the animal has received from nature a natural pump, the heart. . . . Whatever be the cause that has constructed it . . . is of little consequence; in any case, this cause in constructing this machine has performed a series of operations entirely resembling those of a workman constructing analogous machines." †

The author then pertinently asks, "How could the same machine be considered here as a collection of means and ends, there as a simple coincidence of causes and effects?" Why is a spider's web a mere effect, but a fishing-net an end? "Can we thus assign two absolutely opposite causes to two absolutely identical actions?" And Janet redefines finality under this comparison, observing that "in both cases there is a twofold common character:—1st, the relation of the parts to the whole; 2nd, the relation of the

\* P. 97.

† P. 99.

whole to the external medium. . . . There is no part which has not its reason in the whole. . . . Now, is not that the essential and distinctive character of finality? It is not, then, the more or less of internal activity or of spontaneity that is here in question; it is that *pre-established harmony* of the part and the whole, which, common at once to the works of art and to the works of nature, confers upon them, on the one as on the other, an incontestable character of finality.”\*

The two words I have italicised in this quotation may possibly give rise to a misconception; for whatever “pre-established harmony” may be seemingly present in the correlation of organic structures, Evolution will not permit of any correlated structures having been made in *anticipation* of fulfilling a want. They may be made so now in the development of existing species—say the eye in a foetus—but when originally differentiated, it was in accordance with *immediate* wants, or, as I believe, in response to external stimuli—*e.g.*, light in this case.† But once formed, it becomes hereditary, and *then* ever afterwards will be formed in apparent anticipation.

Finality is certainly not destroyed, whether we believe organs to have been developed by evolution, or to have been created in some analogous manner to the fabrication of a steam-engine by man. For my own part, I still hold to the theory that *uses* cause *adaptations*, on the principle that *function precedes structure*. Thus as a graminivorous animal has its food already (so to say) cut up into slices in grass-blades, it does not require scissors to reduce it to small pieces in order to make a convenient mouthful. But a carnivorous animal has a large lump of flesh in the

\* P. 101.

† If total darkness causes eyes to atrophy, as in fishes, &c., in caves, light is evidently essential to keep the structure of the eye in its normal state. Hence it is legitimately to be inferred that light has “caused” them.



shape of a carcass. It requires to cut it up. The action of biting in order to do this, previous to masticating, has converted its teeth into scissor-like carnassials, and as it can no longer masticate it bolts the pieces whole.

So, too, man would never have thought of making scissors unless he had had something that he wanted to cut up. The object induced the manufacture, "Necessity being the mother of invention." The parallel is complete; only, in the one case it is spontaneously effected by the plasticity and adaptability of living matter; in the other it is artificially produced by the consciousness and skill of man.

Not only, then, do we recognise finality in the functions of the completed organs, but in the very formations of the organs themselves.

But now asks Janet, "Is this analogy between human industry and the industry of nature, though justified by theory, also justified by science?" According to the older methods of interpretation, the form of the organs was supposed to imply their function. But at the present day we have reason to believe the reverse, or, as I have expressed it, that *function precedes structure*. In generalised animals different functions are often executed by one and the same organ; and it is not till later—*i.e.*, higher in the scale of life—that differentiation of a common structure into special organs occurs, each organ now taking on its special function, according to the principle of the division of labour.

The present method of investigation does not limit itself to organs, but presses on to the ultimate analysis, till it reaches the fundamental and physical basis of life, or the protoplasmic cell; and science declares that this analysis leaves no room for ends, but can find nothing but causes and effects. Hence once more do we ultimately arrive at the *Potentiality of Protoplasm*, and all we claim is, that, given certain, nay, almost any, combinations of conditions of the

environment, protoplasm will do such or such a work, the outcome of which is an organ adapted to its environment, and finally an organism which then "imperiously" asserts to us its finality.

We thus arrive at the last question, Whence comes this potentiality of protoplasm? or, How is it that orderly differentiation comes out, and not perpetually changing states of chaos? As a fact, the more differentiation has set in, the more wonderful are the structures produced; so that, casting the eye back through the vista of past ages, from the *Eozoon* to man, we see nothing but ascending series in every direction.

Science knows nothing of "must." All that we can say is, that such or such organs do grow in an embryo, and that collectively they do make an organism, but they may at any time make a monster instead.

Thus normally the tissue of a leaf-bud is formed in a certain way; but a *cynips* punctures it and deposits an egg within. The tissues *now* grow abnormally and produce a gall. The inner layers of this contain nutritive food suitable for the grub, and upon which it lives. If the nourishment were not specially provided by the tree, the grub could not live. This is a case which shows how the gall is apparently nothing but an effect or result of a mechanical injury caused by the puncture. But looking at the gall *per se*, we find it furnishes board and residence for the *cynips*. Hence there are at least two "ends" in the structure; and why may we, then, not regard it as one of those "imperious" cases of finality? Yet the whole structure was simply an outgrowth in "response" to, or a "result" of, a minute injury.

This case would seem to furnish a good illustrative example of many others, of which the only interpretation would seem to be that protoplasm is endowed with the property of producing tissues in response to stimuli, and that when

the organ composed of those tissues is completed, it has all the appearance of having had an end in view during its entire structure. And what is true of single organs is true for their totality or a living being.

I have dwelt upon this potentiality of protoplasm, because, contrary to Janet's opinion, it seems to me that it affords the only true resting-ground upon which to base the doctrine of finality. It is an objective fact which is indisputable. Recognise it as such, and then all forms of finality will flow from it.

Having pretty well exhausted the subject of finality as apparent in organs, Janet observes that as animals and plants cannot live without a suitable environment to furnish them with adequate food, "We are thus brought to the notion of *external* or *relative* finality." "It is strange," he adds, in speaking of external finality, "that it did not strike Kant from this point of view that internal finality is in reality inseparable from external, and cannot be understood without it. The organised being, in fact, is not self-sufficient, and it only exists by means of the medium in which it lives. Nature, then, would have done an absurd thing if, in preparing an organism, it had not, at the same time, prepared besides the means necessary for that organism to subsist."\*

But is he not here inverting the process? Nature did not prepare grass *for* herbivorous cattle, nor did she develop herbivorous cattle *for* the carnivora. Every organism was, of course, independent of all others that came into existence after it, as they entered the world in an ever-ascending scale; though each one is *now* dependent upon some other or others if regarded in the reverse order. Thus the lamb was not made for the wolf, but the wolf's teeth have been secured to it as the best adapted for tearing flesh of some kind. Teeth are an internal finality,

\* P. 157.

but the lamb cannot be regarded as external finality for the teeth.

The oak-gall produced specially by and for the cynips would seem to be a much better case of external finality; or again, the honey of flowers for insects. Organic internal finality is the result of adaptation to the environment, but the environment cannot adapt itself to the organism.

The eleventh chapter is devoted to the consideration of various forms of objections which the author describes with his usual acumen. He shows, for example, that when Descartes objects because, as he says, we cannot find out God's ends, he confounds *absolute* with *relative* ends. The former, he observes, may well be beyond our reach, but the latter are matters for investigation, and come within the region of experience.

The objection of Maupertuis, quoted as follows by Janet, is based upon *the conditions of existence*, and is singularly like Darwinism:—"Might it not be said," he writes, "that in the fortuitous combination of the productions of nature, as it was only those in which certain relations of convenience were found that could exist, it is not wonderful that this convenience is found in all the species that actually exist? Chance, it might be said, had produced an innumerable multitude of individuals; a small number were found constructed so that the parts of the animal could satisfy their wants; in an infinitely greater number there was neither convenience nor order; all these last have perished.

"This hypothesis of a groping of nature, and of a period of disordered parturition, said to have preceded rational productions such as we see them now, is contrary to all that we know of the processes of nature. No trace subsists of this period of chaos, and everything leads to the belief that, if nature had begun by chaos, it would never have come out of it."\*

\* Pp. 205, 206.

His idea appears to have been general in ancient cosmogonies, that as long as a chaotic state of things existed, nothing but monstrous beings could be or were produced. Hence, the strange beings described by Berosus :—" There was a time in which all was darkness and water, and in these were generated monstrous creatures having mixed forms. Men were born with two and some with four wings, bulls were produced having human heads, and dogs with four bodies having fishes' tails. . . and horses with dogs' heads, and other creatures having the shape of all sorts of beasts," &c.\*

But this is only a concrete ideal representation of a fundamental conception, that *order* is incompatible with chaos or chance—*i.e.*, the undesigned and undirected clashing of nature's forces. And although expressed in so quaint a form, it undeniably involves a great truth, which was early grasped by the mind of man.

Darwinism is essentially a similar theory, though in a very different dress. The reader will detect a similar ring in the following tones :—" Of tens and hundreds of thousands of intermediate forms we know nothing by direct observation. They have perished as better fitted forms ousted them in the never-ending conflict." †

The *idea* underlying these words is closely akin to that of Berosus—*viz.*, "intermediate forms unfitted to survive."

The Planetary system furnishes another illustration, and seems ever to have been taken as indicating order. The following is from the fifth tablet of the creation discovered by Mr. G. Smith. In the sixth and seventh lines we read—  
He marked the positions of the wandering stars to shine in their courses,  
That they may not do injury and may not trouble any one.

Just as chaos and disorder, or their spiritual representative,

\* Quoted from Max Müller's "Lectures on the Science of Religion," p. 50.

† "Degeneration," by E. Ray Lankester, p. 17.

the great dragon of the sea, are considered as the source of evil, so where *order* reigns no harm follows. Psalm cxxi. 6, 7, has a somewhat similar idea—"The sun shall not smite thee by day, nor the moon by night. The Lord shall preserve thee from all evil: He shall preserve thy soul."

It seems to me that the same problem is offered both by chaos and by Darwinism—namely, How can order and admirable adjustment issue out of either chaos on the one hand, or out of innumerable chance variations on the other? If, however, we recognise in protoplasm (as we must) a power of development in conformity or in adaptation to a changeable environment, *the change in the right direction being set up by the environment*, then the difficulty of the "tens or hundreds of thousands of intermediate forms" vanishes; for they were but the creation of the brain—not of nature.

And we may carry the problem further back, and observe with Janet that "It still remains to explain how a conflict of forces can, at a given moment, have brought about a result so complicated, and requiring so appropriate a mechanism, as life."\* "Everything leads to the belief that if nature had begun by chaos, it would never have come out of it."†

Janet does not seem to be a palæontologist, or probably he would not have misunderstood the expression that "fossils are embryos of actual species," or have said of Aristotle's remark—"the animal is an unfinished man"—"as a metaphorical and hyperbolic expression, this is an admirable thought; as an exact theory, it is very disputable."‡ Every naturalist will recognise the author's difficulty, which leads him into false inferences; for he says: "No doubt the inferior species have imperfect forms in relation to the superior. It is better to have the wings of the bird than the flaps of reptiles; the brain of man than that of the

\* P. 207.

† P. 206.

‡ P. 209.

oyster." Such is, however, *not better if taken alone*. With the conditions of life required by the oyster or the reptile, brains and wings respectively would be utterly useless and superfluous. He is more accurate when he says: "Every being that lives, being even thereby organised to live, be that life humble or powerful, contains relations of finality and design [?]; between this being, however humble, and a purely fortuitous product, a freak of nature, there is already an abyss, and the latter can never have served as a transition to the former. In the polyp I see finality as well as in the vertebrates, and the tentacles by which it siezes its prey are as appropriate to their use as the claws of the tiger or the hand of man." \*

Janet next considers Spinoza's objections. The latter "explains the belief in final causes as he explains the belief in liberty—*i.e.*, by ignorance of causes. When we act without knowing what determines us to act, we think ourselves the masters of our actions, and we say that we act freely. So when we do not know how nature acts, we suppose that it acts voluntarily, and in order to be useful to us." †

No doubt an enormous percentage of our acts are automatic, even though we should know—*if we thought about them*—the cause, in many instances; yet we do these acts spontaneously. But—and this appears to me to lie at the root of so-called free will—we *can make any motive an object of thought*; and so far as we do so, we are *not* ignorant of the cause, as in all cases of deliberate choice. A selection between two acts may be purely automatic, and we may call it unconscious natural selection, and we act purely and simply in obedience to the strongest motive, and we are then automata. But we *can* bring motives to bear upon the question by a determined reflection, and not merely through automatic memory. We then make the selection *an object of deliberate thought*. This is volition, or free will.

\* P. 209.

† P. 211.

Conscious of this, we can, by analogy, infer it in finality.

Spinoza's objection, moreover, would prove too much, for, as Janet observes, "There are thousands of phenomena whose causes are unknown, and which are by no means, therefore, given as examples of finality, such as showers of meteors, volcanoes, &c."

The author next notices M. Littré's objection to finality:—"The property of accommodating itself to ends," \* to which I have already alluded. . . . "In another writing, M. Littré had opposed with eloquent vivacity the *vis medicatrix* of the school of Hippocrates, Wherein is it more absurd to admit in matter the property of healing itself than the property of adjusting itself to ends?" †

As long as we merely investigate the structure of organised matter—say, protoplasm, or sarcode, which certainly "does exist,"—and record our observations upon *what it can do*, apart from all considerations of finality, it is impossible to escape from either the *vis medicatrix*, or some equivalent expression, or from Littré's "property of adjusting;" for we find a seemingly homogeneous mass of jelly capable of secreting the most beautifully symmetrical shells conceivable, as in the case of the *Radiolaria*, *Diatomaceæ*, and others; and when we contemplate a complicated organism, such as one of the Vertebrates, it is simply a highly-differentiated mass of sarcode, every atom of which has furnished its individual quota towards the complex structure of the whole. As the whole is an organism adjusted to its environment in all its organs, so are its organs, and so on, till we have dissected out its ultimate elements of cells and fibres, and come at last to the physical basis of life itself. Nothing is more remarkable in the analogy between nature's organism and man's works, than that whereas the latter cannot spontaneously repair an injury, the former can; hence the final question of Janet seems singularly inappropriate, for it is just the pro-

\* P. 221.

† P. 222.



perty of healing itself residing in a living organism—at least in the animal kingdom—that stands out as so complete a contrast to the powerlessness of human works of art to repair an injury.

Rudimentary organs, so abundant in nature including man himself, difficult as they are to reconcile with any argument of direct design, are discussed by Janet with ability, and are considered by him as affording no objection to finality, rather the reverse; for they were of use formerly, but have become rudimentary through disuse, other uses having superseded them. "Nothing conforms more to the theory of finality than the gradual disappearance of useless complications."

Lastly, the production of monsters calls for some attention as bearing upon finality.

The existence of monsters raises no great problem when we consider the *relatively perfect state* in which every organism finds its existence to be.

Were every environment absolutely and perfectly adapted to a being's welfare, and were every condition for the development of a perfect being secured to the parents, then monsters would be impossible. Since, however, under existing circumstances, such a Utopian idea cannot be realised, monsters and abnormal growths of all kinds, as well as diseases, are simply the outcome of the clash of accidentally conflicting forces. They are "errors of nature," caused, as Janet observes, "by the predominance of the laws of nature in general over the interests of living nature." This was Plato's view, and Aristotle explained evil in the same way. And if men would but clearly distinguish between moral evil (*i.e.*, conscious abuse of nature's laws) and physical evil (*i.e.*, the production of effects which man—chiefly—dislikes), there would not have been so many attempts to prove a separate author of "evil" from that of "good" in the world.

In the Second Book the author addresses himself to solve

the question whether there is a first cause of finality. Finality being a law of nature, what is the first cause of that law? The reply has ever been, Intelligence. Is this conclusion legitimate?

The old teleological argument has ever been met by the Epicurean view of chances. Atoms have an eternal motion; their fortuitous concourses must have already exhausted infinite combinations, so that the one which now exists is simply one of them. But this theory requires *infinite time* for its accomplishment, and the most modern views of the period spent in elaborating the universe from nebulous matter still make it finite. But, further, we are told that the existence of such combinations of atoms fortuitously as exist is possible, *because it is*. This is obviously to beg the whole question, for the theory assumes that the universe is possible without an intelligent cause. Janet justly remarks, "This picture is possible, because it is; it has, therefore, had no painter"—is just as logical. Logical possibility and real possibility are confounded.

The whole argument is, however, antiquated, and so may be dismissed. The modern form of the objection is that raised by Kant and other metaphysicians, who point out that the argument of analogy cannot do more than suggest an *architect*, but not a *creator*. It cannot rise beyond suggesting a relatively wise, skilful, or powerful cause, but not an absolute one. This, however, implies, observes Janet, that only the form of things is contingent, and that *matter* is not so. "If matter is not contingent, that means that it is necessary,—it exists of itself, it has in itself the reason of its existence; . . . for the same reason we must suppose the cause that gives the form to be necessary on the same ground as the matter itself, and that it is self-existent. How, in short, can it be admitted that a non-necessary cause would have the power to act on a necessary matter and to give it orders? . . . The *processus in infinitum*

would here avail nothing, for by hypothesis the matter supposed necessary is also a last term; therefore, on the other hand, the cause must likewise be a last term." \*

This argument strikes one as irrefragable, and the conclusion is obvious, that the organising cause of the world is a cause of itself or an absolute cause.

Kant's second objection falls with the first, namely, that "from a contingent world we cannot rise to an absolute cause." "But the first objection," says our author, "by the hypothesis of a pre-existent—that is, necessary—matter, furnishes the material of the absolute idea of which I have need. If the first cause is absolute, it will be so in all its attributes: being by hypothesis intelligent, it will be omniscient; being powerful, it will be omnipotent; being good, it will be perfectly good, and so on." †

These two objections of Kant, however, do not touch the very essence of the argument that order implies intelligence.

Three solutions have been offered to account for the existence of finality: the hypothesis of *subjective* finality, that of *immanent*, and that of *unconscious* finality.

The first is the doctrine of Kant, and Janet fully admits "that there is something subjective in this doctrine, namely, the part that is insusceptible of demonstration and verification, and also the unknown part that goes on always increasing in proportion as we approach the very source of the creative activity. But then, again, the same doctrine is objective where it represents facts; it is real on the same ground as all induction that rises from what is seen to what is not seen." ‡

That finality is *internal* or *immanent* is perfectly admissible, "but this *relative immanence* of natural finality does not imply an *absolute immanence*, and, on the contrary, can only be comprehended by its relation to a transcendent terminus. These two difficulties overcome, we are now face to face with the true problem: Is the supreme cause

\* P. 335.

† P. 336.

‡ Pp. 352-3.

of finality an intelligent cause—a *Mind*? This will be the object of our last inquiries.”\*

Hegel says that finality is not merely immanent, it is *unconscious*. A striking illustration of unconscious finality is seen in the instincts of animals.

An unconscious finality, says Frauenstadt, is no contradiction of terms, just as “the Aristotelian opposition between the efficient and final cause is in no way identical with the opposition between the unconscious and the intelligent cause. For the final cause itself may be unconscious.”†

“To attribute to nature an *instinctive* activity is to say that nature acts like bees and the ant in place of acting like man; it is *zoomorphism* substituted for *anthropomorphism*. We see no advantage in it.

“In fact, the true difficulty, the profound difficulty, in this question is that we can only explain the creative activity of nature by comparing it to something that is in nature itself—that is to say, which is precisely one of the effects of that activity. . . . The true difficulty evidently applies to the hypothesis of a primitive instinct quite as well as to that of a primitive intelligence.”‡

Still we have not reached the primary activity yet: the source, perhaps common, both of instinct in animals and intelligence in man. Janet says that what is called Inspiration perhaps comes nearest to our conception of a creative intelligence, or the inventing at once both the means and the end, by a single thought, in which foresight may be regarded as identical with immediate conception; as, for example, the entire air dominates the very first notes of a musical composition. Janet considers the products of a genius as vastly superior to the unconscious products of instinct. He says, “The soul inspired by sentiment is not a blind activity. It is conscious of itself; it has a vivid and profound intuition of its end; it is quite full of it; and it is precisely this vivid sentiment of the end that evokes in it its

\* P. 375.

† P. 377.

‡ P. 379.

own realisation. Instinct, on the other hand, not only is ignorant of the means, but of the end." \*

Is not our author here adducing what is *accidental* to man as grounds for regarding genius as essentially and *per se* intelligent? I cannot help thinking that Janet does not attribute enough to the wonderful powers of the automatic properties of the brain. "Calculating boys" can give no *rationale* of the marvellous feats performed by their own brains. A half-idiotic person may be an extraordinary musical performer, like the negro, "Blind Tom," who used to play in public some fifteen years ago. Remarkable powers of improvisation are perfectly spontaneous and automatic, often enkindled by artificial means, which specially excite the automatic action of the brain. It would seem very difficult to separate flights of genius from pure instinct, when we put aside the *consciousness* of man and his powers, and the *knowledge* that he can cultivate and improve those powers. It was pure instinct that led Mozart, when four years old, to compose a piece of music far too difficult to be played, but perfectly correct in harmony.†

While, therefore, I should lay less stress on man's genius than Janet does as implying great intelligence, I would see in it the highest concrete manifestation of the infinite genius of the Immanent Worker of Nature, so that whereas different forms and varieties of genius are exhibited in different men, I would regard them collectively as the common characteristics of the *power* which underlies nature itself, and which thus shines through those favoured human beings whom we call geniuses.

Then, what of Intelligence? This is not identical with genius. Perhaps one definition of intelligence is the power to distinguish *means* from *ends*, and thus to prepare the means with the view of accomplishing the ends. Thus,

\* P. 394.

† I quote the story from memory, not remembering where I read it.

intelligence is distinct from *tendencies*. "Hunger, for instance, is a tendency. It is not the same thing as the industry that finds food."\* But both are really equally automatic, and I do not see that our author clears up the difficulty, when he asks finally, "Is there not something that represents what we should call foresight, if the divine act were translated into human language? This is the question."† After discussing the nature of human foresight trammelled by accident, Janet compares it with God's "foresight," which means complete vision of present and future at once, as "The act that perceives the end, and the act that distinguishes the means."

"Thus, the doctrine of the *Noûs*, or of intentional finality, has for us no other meaning than this—that intelligence is the highest and most approximate cause we can conceive of a world of order."‡

"The doctrine of final causes, however, cannot escape, as it would seem, a final problem. If each of the things of the universe, taken separately, has been produced for another, for what, and to what end, have they, taken together, been made?"§ To be brief, the sole explanation is in the doctrine of divine love. "It is by goodness that Plato, as well as Christianity, explains the production of things."|| Knowledge is not the absolute end of the universe; but, as Kant says, the end is found in morality or a Moral Being—*i.e.*, Man. "The end of nature is, therefore, to realise in itself the absolute as far as possible, or, if you will, it is to render possible the realisation of the absolute in the world. This is brought about by morality. . . . Morality is, therefore, at once the accomplishment and the ultimate proof of the law of finality."¶ Man is the *only moral being* upon earth. All others are *non-moral*.

GEORGE HENSLOW.

\* P. 408. † P. 410. ‡ P. 415. § P. 443. || P. 447. ¶ P. 455.

## THE OBLIGATIONS OF DOCTRINAL SUBSCRIPTION :

### A DISCUSSION.

THE secession of the Rev Stopford A. Brooke from the Church of England, on the ground that he has ceased to be in doctrinal agreement with it, having arrived at conclusions "equivalent to an assertion of the incredibility of miracle and to a denial of the exclusive authority of the Church or of the Bible," has called very serious and direct attention to the position of what is ordinarily and with sufficient clearness called the "Broad Church" party. Some regard Mr. Brooke's secession not only as an honourable, but a noble act, entitling him to rank among these who "have made a good confession;" others condemn it as the running away from a post at which a prophet would have firmly stood, and almost indignantly ask, "What would not Savonarola or Luther have given to be in your position—to be allowed to remain, to be tolerated, until time and truth, not the Pope or the Inquisition, established or crushed them?"\* A third set of critics admit that Mr. Brooke himself had no moral choice; but, within the limits which he has passed, claim liberty of thought, and protest that the great creeds of the Churches of England and Scotland ought not to "fetter the Christian intellect," even of those who have subscribed them.

It is difficult to state the precise question raised in terms

\* *Vide* Letter of Rev. H. R. Haweis, M.A., to the *Daily News*, Sep. 29, 1880

that do not involve some pre-judgment of the point at issue. If it be asked whether a clergyman, who has subscribed to the authorised standards of his Church, is bound by their provisions, all parties to the controversy will answer in the affirmative. Behind such a question lies the deeper one, whether all the demands Subscription can fairly be supposed to make are not satisfied by adhesion to the general doctrine of a Church, although certain specific articles of its creed may be denied.

In other words, given a Church with articles of faith and creeds as its historic inheritance, what is implied by the act of subscription? Does it involve a definite belief in each doctrine the articles of the Church may logically be held to contain, or may some of those articles be rejected while others are accepted, as individual judgment may dictate?

The Church of England, for example, has thirty-nine Articles of Religion. Does Subscription, as it is practised in that Church, mean that a clergyman may select thirty-eight, or thirty-seven, or thirty-six, or any lesser number of those articles, as the articles of his own faith, and dismiss the others as unworthy of credence? Should this prove to be the case, it must further be asked, Is there any limit to this liberty of denial? and, if so, by what standard can it be determined? Every person licensed to preach the Gospel in the Church of Scotland has to subscribe to a formula, of which the following is a part:—

I, \_\_\_\_\_, do hereby declare that I do sincerely own and believe the whole doctrine contained in the Confession of Faith . . . to be the truths of God; and I do own the same as the Confession of my faith. . . . And I promise that I shall follow no divisive course from the present establishment in this Church; renouncing all doctrines, tenets, and opinions whatsoever, contrary to, or inconsistent with, the said doctrine, worship, discipline, or government of this Church.

Can Subscription to this formula be held to indicate



merely a general adhesion to the Church, or does it carry with it the responsibility of upholding all the specific dogmas elaborated in the Confession of Faith?

If the subscriber may deny any one of the "truths" of the Confession, by what principle is his liberty to be regulated, and to what extent may it be carried?

The discussion, it need scarcely be said, involves no personal element. No one can doubt that those clergymen between whose teachings and the dogmas of Articles and Confessions there seems the widest gulf, are perfectly true to their own conviction as to what Subscription imports, and are actuated by the highest motives in continuing their connection with the Church whose boundaries they so strenuously labour to extend. The Christian Church can number among its ministers none more worthy of respect for the depth of their piety as for the breadth of their thoughts, than the Broad Church divines of the nineteenth century.

A Church which presents a standard of theological belief for the acceptance of its ministers does not exist for the purpose of teaching religious truth *in the abstract*. By the very fact that it demands adhesion to a summary of what has to be taught, it abandons that high position. Contrast the position of a conforming minister and that of a professor of science, and this becomes evident. A professor has signed no statement as to the nature of the Astronomy, or the Chemistry, or the Geology he accepts as the condition of holding his chair. No man, however, can become a clergyman of the Established Church without declaring his assent to certain articles of religion. This declaration is the condition under which he holds his office. Unless he consent to make it, he can receive no appointment. He occupies his post, to the exclusion of some other person, because he accepts certain regulations. On entering office he does not say, "I am prepared to teach what I believe to

be true, subject to such limits as the Church may define," but he makes a personal declaration of his own belief; and because the Church regards this as consistent with its standards, it receives him as its servant. The form submitted is an inquiry into his own individual opinions, and on the ground of those opinions an engagement is made. A claim for liberty on any doctrine not mentioned or vaguely defined in the Articles and Book of Common Prayer, is eminently justified. A bond is a bond, and anything not contained in it cannot be held obligatory; but within its own limits, questions of interpretation are the only ones that can possibly come into court.

What, then, is the bond into which the clergyman of the Church of England enters? It runs as follows, according to the Act 28 and 29 Vict. c. 122:—

I, A. B., do solemnly make the following declaration:—

I assent to the Thirty-nine Articles of Religion and to the Book of Common Prayer; and of the Ordering of Bishops, Priests, and Deacons; I believe the doctrine of the United Church of England and Ireland, as therein set forth, to be agreeable to the Word of God; and in Public Prayer and Administration of the Sacraments, I will use the form in the said book prescribed, and none other, except so far as shall be ordered by lawful authority.

When certain articles of agreement—and this declaration is an article of agreement preliminary to an engagement for clerical work—are proposed in a common business transaction, or in the course of a legal dispute, or in a treaty between nation and nation, and the answer given is, "*I assent*," it certainly is not generally understood that the assenting party reserves to himself the right of setting aside any one of the articles, as he may privately choose.

I submit that the ordinary language of life, when carried into ecclesiastical affairs, does not lose its meaning; and that to say, "I assent to the Thirty-nine Articles of

Religion," is not equivalent to saying, "I accept some of them, but not others."

Dean Stanley argues that when the present Declaration was substituted in 1865, on the recommendation of the Royal Commissioners, for the one previously imposed, the word "*doctrine*" rather than "*doctrines*" was deliberately adopted, "in order to make it evident that the candidate no longer professed his belief in any particular opinion set forth, but only in the general doctrine. The particular assent to all the expressions in the formularies was done away with in order that henceforth no one might feel his conscience pledged to any of the numerous and at times contradictory propositions contained in those documents."\*

I fail to see the relief to conscience over which Dean Stanley so naturally exults.

The withholding of assent to all the "*expressions*" in the formularies can hardly lighten the far more grievous burden of "*contradictory propositions*."

"*Doctrine*" must be made up of particular propositions.

It is impossible to receive the general doctrine of the Church apart from belief in particular opinions. When the phrase "*I believe the doctrine*" of the Church of England is used, it must mean the sum-total of the particular opinions that make up "*The doctrine*." What these particular opinions are is indicated with perfect clearness in the first clause of the Declaration itself—they are the opinions to be found in the Thirty-nine Articles and the Book of Common Prayer. In a trial for heresy the Court could only ask what particular statements the accused had controverted; and the Articles and Prayer Book could alone furnish the statements which would have any relevancy in an action at law. The charge of denying one of the doctrines of the Church could hardly be met by the plea that "*the doctrine*" had been upheld.

\* Letter to the *Northern Echo*, Sep. 21, 1880.

Dean Stanley's employment of the second clause of the Declaration as a limitation of the first, does not, I think, accord with its actual significance. The second clause adds a new condition to the first instead of subtracting from its force. Far more is demanded than (to quote Dean Stanley's words) "a brief assent to the doctrine of the Church of England as contained in the Book of Common Prayer and the Articles." Assent is *not* demanded vaguely for "the doctrine," but for the Articles; and *in addition to this*, it is stipulated that the doctrine "as therein set forth," must be believed to be "agreeable to the Word of God."

The phrase "the Word of God" undoubtedly refers to the Bible; and one part of the doctrine of the Church is that "it is not lawful for the Church to ordain anything that is contrary to God's Word written, neither may it expound one place of Scripture that it be repugnant to another." (Art. XX.)

Whoever makes the declaration required by the Church of England ought, therefore, to be solemnly convinced that no part of the doctrine set forth in the Thirty-nine Articles and the Prayer Book is at variance with any portion of the Bible.

In order (writes Mr. Sedley Taylor) that we may give a solemn assent to a particular proposition on the strength of its being agreeable to the statements of a specified book, we must be convinced of two things—that the book contains an assertion of the proposition; and that all the statements of the book which have any bearing on the subject of the proposition are true. Thus in the case before us the subscriber has to satisfy himself of the truth of the following propositions:—(1) The Bible supports the statements of the Articles and Liturgy; (2) Every statement of the Bible which in any way bears on the subject-matter of these statements is true.\*

So far, therefore, from finding that the law of Subscrip-

\*The System of Clerical Subscription in the Church of England. By Sedley Taylor, M.A., late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. Macmillan and Co. P. 4.

tion has been so effectually altered "as to leave but a hair's-breadth of difference from its entire abolition,"\* we find that it is specific in its demands. The Thirty-nine Articles retain their authority unabridged ; and distinct propositions regarding the Bible are definitely asserted.

If in the English Church the "assent" and belief required of its ministers must be taken as seriously referring to certain specific and specified doctrines, still more is this the case in the Church of Scotland. Those who have declared that they "sincerely own and believe the *whole doctrine* contained in the Confession of Faith" as the "truths of God," and have renounced "all doctrines, tenets, and opinions whatsoever, contrary to, or inconsistent with, the said doctrine," can scarcely be regarded as consistent when they doubt any definite proposition the Westminster Confession contains.

But why be consistent? Admitting the existence of a gulf more or less broad between the statements of the Creeds and the opinions of the clergyman, is not Subscription justifiable?

In an ordinary engagement between man and man, or between an institution and an agent, beyond all question the precise terms agreed upon should be respected. No one would defend the mutilation of a definite arrangement in civil affairs. How can it be defended in matters ecclesiastical?

It is pleaded that a distinction must be drawn between the Law and its administration. The liberal clergy declare (according to one of the most eminent of their number, the Rev. H. R. Haweis) that the limits of their freedom of opinion in doctrine and in practice are defined "not by the Law (which no party in the Church attempts to keep consistently), but by the administration of the Law, to which all alike must conform or retire."

\* *Vide* Essays on Church and State, by Dean Stanley, p. 221.

In this plea the following points appear to me entirely overlooked :—(1.) The fact that no party in the Church attempts to keep the Law may be a strong ground for cherishing a policy of peace among the rival schools existing within its own boundaries ;—civil war, under such circumstances, is a dangerous game to play. It does not touch, however, the position of those who, as citizens of the nation to which the Church belongs, ask that its public engagements should be strictly observed.

(2.) The declaration required of a clergyman is an expression of his own personal opinions. The words are “ *I assent to* ” and “ *I believe.* ” The subscriber does not declare merely that he will submit to the verdict of an administrative body ; he states what his own religious convictions are ; and *because that statement is accepted as satisfactory*, receives his appointment.

(3.) When an office is held under specified conditions, those who administer the Law to which it may be subject, are neither solely nor chiefly responsible for the fulfilment of these conditions. A man’s own conscience must be permitted to give a verdict. An officer of any service is bound to ask himself whether he is discharging the duties for which he was appointed. An “ administration ” may have scant means of detecting the doings of its servants ; and the more confidential those duties are the less will they be capable of being watched. The Church cannot send spies into every place of worship, and is bound largely to trust to the faithfulness of its ministers to their Ordination vows.

In no department of life can the plea that legal measures have never been taken against us, absolve us from our personal responsibilities.

(4.) If in no case a clergyman who cares to teach what he believes to be true religion need leave the Established Church until he is compelled—and this is the avowed result

of the doctrine I am criticising—it follows that men may irreverently assent to articles which in set terms they deny.\*

A disbeliever in the bodily resurrection of Christ may be a devout teacher of religion. According to this view of Subscription he may say, "*I assent*" to the proposition that, "Christ did truly rise again from death and took again his body with flesh, bones, and all things appertaining to the perfection of man's nature!" A Unitarian preacher may say, "*I assent*" to the statement in Article II., that Christ is "very God and very man!" A believer in the Lord's tender mercy may say, "*I assent*" to Article XVIII. and pronounce those "accursed" who presume to say, "That every man shall be saved by the law or sect which he professeth, so that he be diligent to frame his life according to that law and the light of nature!"

What is to become of the Church (it is asked) if men are to be strictly bound down to the Articles of its Creed? Will it not lose its intellectual and its spiritual power? Will not all chance of widening its boundaries be gone?

I object to such appeals as irrelevant to the question at issue. The first point to be decided is one of personal responsibility. For myself, I dare not say, "*I assent* to the Thirty-nine Articles and the Book of Common Prayer," when many statements they contain seem to me untrue; and I dare not say, "*I believe*" the doctrine "as therein set forth agreeable to the Word of God," when the propositions involved in this statement appear to me more than doubtful.

Without challenging the motives of any one, and with the profoundest reverence for many of those who do not regard the act of Subscription in the same light as I do, I ask consideration for the position, that when a Church

\* "*But in no case need a clergyman who cares for true religion and who cares to teach what he believes to be true religion, leave the National Church.*" Vide letter of Rev. H. R. Haweis, M.A., to *Daily News*, as above.

has an authorised theological standard, only those who strictly conform to that standard should accept the tests it imposes, and enter into its ministry.

It is no reply to say that if this be done, the Church will suffer. Perchance, it ought to suffer. All the resources of the great Ruler of the world are not confined within its boundaries. Out of the very stones He may raise up children unto Abraham.

Judging from the past, the great epochs of the world's spiritual history have not been determined by conformists to existing institutions. The burden of Subscription will never be removed by those who subscribe, even although they protest against their own act. When men refuse in sufficient numbers to submit to Subscription, then, and not until then, will a non-subscribing Church be established. Whether the present Church of England, or one outside of its pale, will be that Church, is a secondary question.

At the present moment Subscription presents the greatest of all obstacles to the existence of a broad, generous, and comprehensive Church in this country.

It perplexes the consciences of young men and drives many of the ablest away from the ministry. It is a life-long trouble and torment to the most delicately conscientious souls, who, having placed themselves beneath its yoke, can see no way of escape and know not what to do.

It checks the free study of theology, restricting, as it does, the pursuit of that sum of all sciences by conditions which neither astronomer, nor chemist, nor any other student of nature, would for one moment accept.

The spiritual power of Christianity suffers from the frequency and intensity of the dogmatic disputes which the practice of Subscription to articles of faith always generates.

I may be charged with placing too much stress upon this one feature of the constitution of the Church. The Church



is far more to many men, it is said, than the Thirty-nine Articles and the Athanasian Creed. It is the home of their life-long culture.\*

Without doubt, it is so ; but when a specific demand like that for Subscription is made, it must be judged on its own merits.

In olden times idols were to many far more than works of a graver's art. They could not be dissociated from reverent memories and solemn prayers. Not without a pang would many an early Christian decline to offer a libation to his ancient gods.

The Catholic Church in the fierce age of the Reformation was far more to many Protestants than a dispute about Transubstantiation. Through its mystic rites they had sought and found a living communion with the Unknown God.

There were, at least, six formulæ in which the doctrine of the Real Presence could be expressed, offering a large choice to subtle and ingenious minds. Nevertheless, the Reformation was accomplished because men were found who refused to call that Flesh which they knew to be Bread, and that Blood which they knew to be the juice of the Grape.

HENRY W. CROSSKEY.

IN following the Rev. H. W. Crosskey on this interesting subject of Subscription, I feel very much like Balaam when called upon to curse the Israelites. Instead of opposing him, as I might have been expected to do, I feel constrained to endorse nearly every word he has said, and to heap malediction on a system which has proved as futile for its purpose as it is radically iniquitous. Nevertheless, as the question before the world just now is unfortunately

\* *Vide Fraser's Magazine*, November, 1880, p. 760.

not as to how the evil of Subscription may be abolished, but how a particular section of the clergy ought to act under existing circumstances, I see a great deal to be said which has not been stated in the foregoing paper. Mr. Crosskey's view of the principle of Subscription *as it ought to be* is perfectly sound and good, and the warning he gives to would-be candidates for Holy Orders is a righteous one. In fact, many conscientious men in our age have refused to make declarations of assent to propositions which they believed to be false, and consequently the Church has lost some of the best-qualified men who could have served her.

But the main question suggested by the Rev. Stopford A. Brooke's secession, put into plain words, is this: Is it right for clergymen who hold views like his to retain their offices in the Established Church?

And here it is necessary to state that this question is so entirely one for individual consciences to decide, that we have no right to decide it for them. If a man feels that he ought to go, and yet remains, he is to that extent unconscientious, and especially in a minister of religion this is a grave delinquency. But if he feels it to be his duty to stay and do his best, no one should dare to impugn his integrity on the ground of some abstract theory which is upset by actually existing conditions.

It is to the candid examination of these conditions that I desire to invite the reader; for I dispute the alleged parallel between the engagement undertaken by a clergyman and an ordinary contract in secular things.

In the *first* place, it makes a great difference that the formularies to which assent is required are not now propounded for the first time, are not the product of the age in which we live, but are three centuries old, and retain their place to-day only because it is so extremely difficult as to be all but impossible to remove or reform them.

*Secondly*, the formularies when carefully examined are

found to be, in many places and on vital subjects, hopelessly contradictory. Had the fact been otherwise, the existence of at least four parties or schools within the Church would have been impossible. To illustrate this, we find the High Church theory of the Sacraments maintained in the Liturgy but denied in the Articles; the Low Church School cannot reconcile the Articles on which they take their stand with the references in the Liturgy to priestly absolution. That party was not so long ago divided into those who believed and those who openly denied the doctrine of Election and Predestination. In the Articles this dogma is manifest if not predominant, yet, as a rule, neither High nor Low Churchmen have taught it for the last thirty years. The Broad Church School have likewise their justification in the contradictions which abound—*e.g.*, the presence in the Creeds and Articles of both Monotheism and Tritheism. The Church may endeavour to neutralise the one or the other, or both, but she can only do so by statements which, to the human mind, are simply unmeaning and unintelligible. She has distinctly declared Monotheism, and as distinctly condemned Tritheism, and yet has given ground for the Tritheist to insist on his Tritheism, and has done this in propositions from which the human reason cannot fail to draw conclusions at once Monotheistic and Tritheistic. Were space allowed me, I could afford your readers considerable amusement by the juxtaposition of the numerous contradictory propositions in the legal formularies. From all which the inference is obvious that no one clergyman ever did or ever could really assent to all those formularies, or was ever able to make his teaching absolutely in harmony with the whole doctrine of the Church.

*Thirdly*, the nature of the "assent" given in such a case as this must be modified by the *animus imponentis*. Every Bishop who has thought at all on the question knows per-

fectly well that to demand an absolute agreement would be monstrous, because it would be impossible to give it. I myself was ordained Deacon and Priest under the old and exceedingly stringent Subscription in vogue thirty years ago. Thomas Musgrave, then Archbishop of York, was made fully acquainted with my then heretical views, and listened most kindly to my objections to the terms of Subscription. But he wisely and truly affirmed that no man living could make, or could be expected to make, such a declaration without reserve. Accepting me for my character, my earnestness to become a minister, and my readiness to serve the Church without any stipend, he ordained me without any hesitation; and I believe that in doing so, he served God better than many another in the present day whose dogmatism is the more exacting in proportion to the shallowness of his observation.

Many of my contemporaries in Holy Orders no doubt entered the Church under similar conditions to mine, having their scruples silenced by the assurance of their Bishops that, as it was impossible to assent to all that the Church required, the Subscription was to be taken in a non-literal sense.

*Fourthly*, as we are considering the position of the Broad Church School, it will be only fair to point to a very significant fact. They alone are singled out for suspicion and for want of honesty in retaining their offices. Let us suppose that this is because they are more inclined to Theism than the other schools are. Now nothing can be more unfair than this. Contrast them for a moment with the Ritualistic (or Romanising) School. The latter are trying to re-introduce doctrines and practices against which the Thirty-nine Articles were framed as a deliberate and solemn protest. They have denounced the Reformers as "rogues and scoundrels," and Protestantism as a "crime." The Broad Churchmen, on the other hand, have proclivities towards doctrines upon

which the Articles are either altogether silent or have said something at least in their favour.

Taken at their worst, these doctrines were not opposed by the framers of the Articles, because they were not anticipated. Surely, then, the departure of the Broad School from the Church standards is not to be compared with the glaring nonconformity of the Ritualists, who not only go in the very teeth of the Protestant Articles, but openly denounce and abuse them.

Surely there is some justification for the refusal of the Broad Church to depart until at least the Ritualists have set the example.

*Fifthly*, just as we find hopeless contradictions between one part of the legal formularies and another, so do we find another hopeless contradiction between the terms of Subscription and the far more solemn and binding oath taken in the Service of Ordination. The Bishop asks the candidate for Priesthood, "Are you determined, out of the said Scriptures, to instruct the people committed to your charge, and to teach nothing, as required of necessity to eternal salvation, but *that which you shall be persuaded* may be concluded and proved by the Scripture?"

To this the answer is made:

"I am so persuaded, and have so determined by God's grace."

Speaking for myself, I can honestly declare that I have never broken that solemn vow even to this day. What greater liberty could any one desire than that afforded by this large licence—to teach *only* as necessary to salvation what the priest himself is persuaded may be proved by the Scripture? Nay, it is not merely a licence granted to him, but a solemn duty imposed upon him, and which he voluntarily undertakes and promises to perform.

The priest, furthermore, promises "to be ready with all diligence to banish and drive away all erroneous and strange

doctrine contrary to God's Word," and he reads in the Articles that Churches generally, and his own Church, too, may err "not only in their living and ceremonies, but also in matters of faith." As charity begins at home, he is, therefore, justified in banishing and driving away, first of all, erroneous doctrine from his own Church, and should not be subject to pains and penalties for keeping the vows of his Ordination. These vows I regard as the most important, if not the whole, of a clergyman's obligations, while the written assent to the legal formularies amounts to nothing more than a promise not to contradict them.

So long as I retained my benefice, I took good care to keep strictly within legal restraints. I look back with a glow of a little pardonable vanity to the day when Sir John (now Lord Chief Justice) Coleridge admitted before the Privy Council that I "had only affirmed what the Articles do not deny, and had only denied what the Articles do not affirm." And though all this ingenuity is sadly out of place in religious matters, and the necessity for it is most deeply to be deplored, yet when all the history of the past and the conditions of the present of the Church of England are duly considered, we can only come to the conclusion that the *legal* is the measure of the *moral* obligation in the matter of conformity to the standards. On that ground, I may go the length of saying what may sound an absurdity, but is nevertheless hard and invulnerable truth, viz., that if I was deprived of my benefice for preaching a religion which could dispense with the intervention of Jesus Christ [and yet I could and did do so without verbal contradiction of a single line in the legal formularies], then the Archbishop of Canterbury and several other bishops ought, *à fortiori*, to be deprived for heresy, inasmuch as they have gone far beyond me in publicly contravening the Eighth Article, which says that "Athanasius's Creed ought thoroughly to be received and believed." The Bishops referred to said it ought *not*.

Until justice is satisfied by the legal expulsion of these highest functionaries, it seems a stretch of scruple to expect the Broad Church school to expel themselves.

I finish as I began, by denouncing the system of Subscription as iniquitous as well as futile, and shall welcome the day when the clergy of the dear old Church of England (which God preserve!) shall be entirely free from the slightest fetter upon the utterance of their real convictions.

CHARLES VOYSEY.

MR. CROSSKEY and Mr. Voysey take it for granted that any system of Subscription to Creeds or Articles is in itself immoral, "radically iniquitous, and futile." Mr. Crosskey's arguments, however, are almost entirely, and Mr. Voysey's are quite, confined to the consideration of the degree of culpability of subscribers who disbelieve the doctrines to which they have assented. Mr. Crosskey makes the sweeping assertion that "A Church which presents a standard of theological belief for the acceptance of its ministers does not exist for the purpose of teaching religious truth *in the abstract*. By the very fact that it demands adhesion to a summary of what has to be taught, it abandons that high position." But Mr. Crosskey's arguments are directed against the immorality of clergymen who assent to articles which they believe to be untrue. Mr. Voysey apologises for Broad Churchmen on the ground that they are no more insincere than the High and Low. I, although a "Broad Churchman" who wish to see the Subscription to the Articles abolished, cannot submit to Mr. Voysey's apology any more than to Mr. Crosskey's imputation. If three parties, and not merely one as Mr. Crosskey suggests, were immoral in the Subscription, the evil would be intensified threefold. The Church to me would be triply

abominable. I urge that these two gentlemen mistake a general feeling that many of the Articles have ceased to touch what, in the present age, is vital and prominent truth, for a belief that they contain false and pernicious teaching.\* When these discussions crop up, as they must occasionally, one has an uneasy sort of feeling that one may have subscribed in careless youth to something very dreadful. Thirty-nine is an alarming number; but, after reading through the Articles once more before writing this paper, I again feel sure that the assumption is an altogether mistaken one.

The Articles are not a "summary" of our Faith, they are rather directions for our guidance. I could not stand up in public worship day by day, and say, "I believe them," as I can in the Creeds say, "I believe in God the Father, and in Jesus Christ, and in the Holy Spirit." And the Church does not ask for this from the clergy. She merely asks that at certain important crises in their lives they shall assent to the Articles and express their belief that the doctrine of them is agreeable to the Word of God.

Now, I do not mean to say for a moment, because the act of Subscription may only take place once or twice in a lifetime, that it is any less binding than if it were a daily occurrence; but I do contend that the assent is different *in kind* from the assertion of belief in God and in the great facts whereon our religion is based which we make constantly in worship. In the one we assert our personal belief in vital truth; in the other we accept and assent to certain guiding principles (articles and lines of thought); we express our belief that they are agreeable to God's Word. A glance at the Thirty-nine Articles will show that assent to them must professedly and avowedly be different in kind from the act of moral adhesion and Subscription which is involved in

\*I think Mr. Haweis, in the remarks quoted by Mr. Crosskey, represents very few Broad Church clergymen.



the recital of a creed. These Articles refer us from themselves to certain "standards" and "summaries" (to use the words by which Mr. Crosskey inaccurately describes the Articles)—viz., the Creeds which Article VIII. says "ought thoroughly to be received and believed; for they may be proved by most certain warrants of Holy Scripture." The wording of the Articles shows the nature of the assent asked for to them—*e.g.*, compare what I have just said with Article XXXV. It says: "The Second Book of Homilies, the several titles whereof we have joined under this Article, doth contain a godly and wholesome doctrine, and necessary for these times . . . and therefore we judge them to be read in churches by the ministers, diligently and distinctly, that they may be understood of the people." So, too, in the next Article the writers say: "We decree." Thus I am not wriggling out of, or minimising, the literal and intended meaning of the Articles, when I say that Subscription to them is merely assent to certain directions and guiding lines laid down for us by others, and is not of the nature of that heartfelt expression of belief which is involved in the recital of Articles prefaced by the assertion "I believe." If this be so, then the alarming demands upon the clergy which Mr. Crosskey sets forth are read into the Articles by him and not made by them. If we were committed by our Subscription to all that Mr. Crosskey, with his pitiless logic, commits us to, I should perfectly agree with him as to the immorality of our position. I should only disagree with him in that charitable paragraph in which he attributes "the highest motives" to any who see the gulf he sees between their teaching and the dogmas to which they have subscribed. I should deprecate "the piety" which could so blind us to our insincerity.

I think I shall best present my refutation of Mr. Crosskey's view of our obligations by stating some popular dogmas to which the clergy are not committed by the

Articles. Mr. Crosskey says "distinct propositions regarding the Bible are definitely asserted." I deny this. The one proposition about the "Holy Scriptures"—the Articles nowhere use that, to modern ears, fallacious expression "The Bible"—is most carefully and guardedly indefinite. It is evidently aimed at those who laid heavy burdens upon Christians—like Tetzel's indulgences or other people's assurances—for which there was no warrant in the writings to which reference was universally made. It says, "Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation, so that whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man. . . ." Then the names of the "books" are recorded. "And the other books (as Hierome saith) the Church doth read for example of life and instruction of manners, but yet doth it not apply them to establish any doctrine;" these are the Apocryphal books. Now, considering how carelessly and loosely most religious people hold the Bible to be a single book dictated word by word from heaven, it is a matter deserving of notice and much thankfulness that the Articles clearly call attention to the variety of authorship and date of the several books, and to the fact that they are writings selected out of many. Article XX., quoted by Mr. Crosskey, has evidently the same purpose, when it says that "it is not lawful for the Church to ordain anything that is contrary to God's Word written." Thus the framers of the Articles seem to have *avoided* these "distinct propositions," which Mr. Crosskey laboriously evolves as "definitely asserted." We should *a priori* have expected that the clergy were pledged to a belief in what is carelessly called "the infallibility of the Bible." But it is not so. "The sufficiency of the Holy Scriptures" is all that they are committed to.

The Church is also forbidden (Article XX.) to "expound one place of Scripture that it be repugnant to another." Mr. Voysey says that had he space he could afford

us "considerable amusement by the juxtaposition of the numerous contradictory propositions in the legal formularies." I wish he had given one instance. I really do not know where to lay my hand on one. I should, however, expect apparent contradictions. The highest truth is often only expressible in two parts of a contradictory couplet, in paradox. Take as a simple and unsectarian instance the two lines of thought illustrated by our Lord in the saying: "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and His righteousness, and all these things" (the abundant food and beautiful raiment) "shall be added unto you." And "How hardly shall they that have riches enter into the kingdom of heaven." We believe that worldly prosperity is in the long run for the righteous. We also believe that it is enormously difficult for the prosperous, the successful of all kinds, to enter into the realm of divine sympathy with the weak and struggling, the kingdom of God on earth. How are we to express the whole of the Christian teaching on this important subject except in a contradictory couplet? And so I have no doubt that, logically followed out, some of the "propositions" of the Articles are contradictory, and the compilers acted wisely when they enjoined that the Church had no right to expound one part of divine truth so as to be repugnant, antagonistical instead of antithetical, to another.

What I have said above seems to me also to meet Mr. Crosskey's statement that by this Article XX. we are pledged "to be solemnly convinced that no part of the doctrine" of the Prayer Book "is at variance with any portion of the Bible." Here would be a serious difficulty for us if we were pledged to any infallible dictation or verbal inspiration theory of the Bible. But we are not. We do not take the Bible to be an epitome of doctrine which has to be put together like a Chinese puzzle. It contains writings of our venerable saints, not one of which professes to be a complete *résumé* of Divine truth, most of which are on the face of

them casual productions. Yet they are so numerous and discursive that we can gather from them the articles of universal faith in the early Church.

To say that nothing we teach "is at variance with any part of the Bible" would be a statement in itself absurd and carelessly fallacious, for the Bible contains the words of all sorts of people, in conversation and in every style of utterance. What the Article states that the Church has no authority to do is to "expound" or "decree" or "ordain" anything from one place of Scripture contrary to what may be expounded from another place. The man whose genius it is to preach the gospel of faith is not to build up anything that attacks him whose mission it is to declare the gospel of good works. There is room for each party within the Church so long as each declares its portion of Divine truth, and does not attack and seek to destroy antithetical portions. Other popular dogmas which liberal theologians reject are conspicuous by their absence.

The vulgar doctrine of the substitution of Christ—that God's vengeance was satisfied by seeing Christ suffer the torments due to mankind—is not taught in Article II., nor anywhere else.

The doctrine of everlasting punishment finds no place in the Articles. We are left to interpret rationally those words in the Athanasian Creed, which at first sight seem to teach this horrible doctrine. We may not interpret them so as to be repugnant to the doctrine of final universal restitution. Perishing everlastingly and going into eternal fire may be taken, by those who will take them so, to mean perishing to the life of the Eternal, going into the purifying, consuming fire of the Eternal.

Once (and we cannot, as Mr. Voysey well says, shut our ears to the voice of the history of our Church) there was for ten years, commencing in 1552, an article as follows:—"All men shall not be saved at the length."—"They also

are worthy of condemnation, who endeavour at this time to restore the dangerous opinion that all men, be they never so ungodly, shall at length be saved, when they have suffered pains for their sins a certain time appointed by God's justice." It is a noteworthy fact that the Church of England quickly expunged this Article. Again, the commonly received notions as to original sin are not countenanced in the Article on that subject. I confidently repeat, the Articles are not narrowing and enslaving. They are rather a protest against the careless and false theology of the majority of living, professing Christians. The chief reason for wishing them abandoned is that with the new circumstances which three hundred years have brought about, theology has shifted its drift, and these Articles rather beat the air.

But Mr. Crosskey will say, "There are Thirty-nine Articles—are you sure that there is no out-of-the-way opinion expressed by the compilers of them, with which you cannot be said to agree? *E.g.*, Are you sure, with Article XXI., that 'general councils may not be gathered together without the commandment and will of princes'?" Here I must fall back on history. I am quite sure that the Reformers did well to declare that the Pope had not the right to ignore nationalities, and that it was for each nation to consent to councils, and not to be over-ridden by any council the Pope chose to declare a "general" one.

I have tried to show that the assent avowedly asked for to the Articles is not of the *kind* implied in the recital of a creed. Unfortunately for the purposes of discussion on an abstract question, the Church of England has a long history, and is a great and comprehensive society. The Articles are not for the laity, but for students who are supposed to know something of the history of their Church. Is it to go for nothing with these students that the Church has deliberately changed the form of declaration from one of "unfeigned

assent and consent" to simple "assent," and asks for an expression of belief that the general "doctrine," and no longer the separate "doctrines," is agreeable to the Word of God? If the fact that this change has been made is to go for *anything*, it is surely a *formal permission and command* to the clergy to take a broad view of the obligations of subscription, and not to torture their consciences, or abuse their opponents, over details in the Articles.

Moreover, room must be found for what Mr. Voysey calls the *animus imponentis*, which, according to the Church's system, is not so much, as he puts it, to "modify" as to be an indispensable element in the interpretation of the assent which the Church demands of the candidates for ordination. Mr. Crosskey says the subscriber "states what his own religious convictions are, and *because that statement is accepted as satisfactory* receives his appointment." If the Church had not provided that he should have to deal not merely with written formularies, but with a living man, the scruples of the candidate would be multiplied and more often irremovable. But the Church does not say "go to an office and subscribe that document," but "go to your bishop and make your assent intelligible to him." Mr. Voysey's interesting account of the admirable relations between him and his bishop at ordination illustrates not what lax bishops *may* do, but what, on any reasonable theory, bishops exist for the purpose of doing. If we had no administrative institution of living men and representatives of the living Church, Mr. Crosskey's objections to Subscription would be unanswerable.

I fear I have little space for the defence of Subscription *on principle*. Mr. Crosskey's only argument against it is contained in the contrast which he points between the position of a conforming minister and that of a professor of science. But the clergy are not professors of comparative theology. They are ministers to witness on behalf of

Christians, for Christ, to the world. They have to lead the worship and the work of the Christian society. Why does this society cohere? On what is it based? On anything of the nature of fact, on anything beyond the exalted aspirations of those who compose it? If we come together to worship God, if we work in His Name amongst men, it must be because we believe something about Him. It is for purposes of worship and on educational grounds desirable that we should clear ourselves as to what we do believe about Him which binds us together. How is the truth that we do hold essential to be taught to others except through some forms? How are we likely to arrive at higher truth except when we often set before ourselves the truth at which we have arrived? How is the moral power of the truth we hold to brace and sway us, unless in our worship we remind ourselves and one another of it, and bow before the Most High and Holy?

If Christianity, in the broadest conception of the term, contain the supply of man's deepest and most permanent needs, it must be desirable that Christians should be agreed as to the essential elements of it.

Who will deny that it would be a manifest scientific gain if we could formulate that as to which all who profess and call themselves Christians can subscribe? Are we prepared to admit that there is nothing we can lay down as fact on this most absorbing of themes? If people believe anything definite, it must be well both for themselves and for the truth's sake that they should say what it is. It seems to me fairer to assert that creeds force all people to think more or less than that they hamper thought. So much as a defence for some creed, and, therefore, for some Subscription either implied or expressed. It matters little whether a formal declaration is made, or merely implied, when you are arguing as to the sincerity of the adherent.

But how do I defend Subscription to so large an extent as

even the Apostles' Creed (to which, *for the present distress*, I should wish to see compulsory Subscription limited)? It is to me, indeed, a bitter pang that the National Church should lose Mr. Stopford Brooke and others. Still, the interests of the highest truth seem to me to be best served when pressure is put upon Churches to say what they believe. The truth is more likely to be evolved if each set of people who cohere for work and worship formulate what for them is vital universal truth. This will assist arrival at the truth, as it were, by natural selection. The Christian Spirit will more and more lead people to seek for union in worship, and there will be a healthy disposition and tendency in each body to drop what unnecessarily hinders union.

This is not the occasion to defend the items of a creed. And yet the justification of Subscription must chiefly depend on the tendency of the facts asserted in the creed subscribed to. If the dogmas have a tendency to check freedom of thought, and to intensify dogmatic disputes, as Mr. Crosskey assumes they must, then Subscription to them is altogether to be condemned. I maintain that the central doctrines of our Church are essentially and radically qualified to stimulate human thought in all its branches and to inspire universal charity.

God can only be known through the humanity which Jesus Christ has taken and glorified. God in Christ has identified Himself with every human being. If we want to learn of God, we must learn through all men. All ignorance is ignorance of God. "All holy desires, all good counsels, all just works" *in every human being* "proceed from Him," to use the words of one of our daily collects. We can only serve God by serving humanity. In the risen and ascended Christ we see the first-fruits and the predestination of all humanity. Such are some of the beliefs to which we are immediately pledged by our faith in the Incarnation.



When we subscribe to this doctrine we pledge ourselves against all intolerance, all contempt of God's word through whomsoever it may come to us. The much-abused Athanasian Creed, which I, as a radical and freethinker, love, bids us believe that God the Father is "immensus," God the Son "immensus," God the Holy Ghost "immensus," illimitable. Who, believing this, dare limit the range of thought? Who that knows the narrowness of his own heart would not hesitate to reject beliefs so fundamentally reconciling and uniting for humanity? Such Subscription is, indeed, as Mr. Maurice said, "*no bondage*."

I know that we are terribly prone to insincerity, and that subscription gives us one more opportunity of being false to the Most High and to one another. But, on the other hand, it may force the careless to question their own sincerity. I have no doubt many a philosopher could prove that Mr. Crosskey and Mr. Voysey and I would be guilty of insincere compromise and gross pandering to superstition if we knelt down to say the Lord's Prayer together, and stood up to sing the Evening Hymn,—unless first we subscribed to certain Articles agreeing as to what we did mean and what we did not mean by our actions and words.

In conclusion, I ask to be allowed to protest that it is from no feeling of Pharisaic superiority of any kind to my reverend predecessors in this discussion that I cling to some minimum of definite Subscription which I know they must reject. I have, in my narrowness, at least subscribed to that which warns me that their faith in God and Christ may be purer than mine, and that if I would receive the full revelation of God in Christ, I must humbly seek to learn of them. I cling to this ancient symbol of faith, in the hope that, with it or without it, but, at any rate, through the witness it has borne, their children and my children, as members of One Holy Catholic Church, may be drawn into a closer union than our generation has attained to, with one another

and with their forefathers, who, though separated on earth, are now, and always were, one in the Heart of the Most High.

GEORGE SARSON.

THE present writer proposes to limit himself almost wholly, in the few pages at his disposal, to some general discussion of Subscription as a basis of Church fellowship, leaving it to others to deal with the subtle question of the obligations implied in the concrete case of Subscription to the Church of England Articles. He will thus address himself chiefly to a consideration of the last three or four pages of Mr. Sarson's very interesting contribution to this friendly debate.

Mr. Voysey attacks the principle of Subscription, while defending the Broad Churchman in a free interpretation of the obligations thereof. Mr. Sarson, while he will admit no apology for insincere conformity, upholds Subscription to some formulary or other, if only the Apostles' Creed, as the essential condition of a strongly cohering Church. It is here that I fail to follow him.

Mr. Sarson justly observes that in this connection "it matters little whether a formal declaration is made or only implied;" and sees clearly that the repetition of a Creed, and the setting of the hand to a document in "assent" to it, are based on the same principle. So also is the compulsory use of fixed liturgical forms. The principle is that it is desirable to secure and to express unity of intellectual apprehension among those who constitute a Church.

For, asks Mr. Sarson, on what is such a society based? "On anything of the nature of fact? On anything beyond the exalted aspirations of those who compose it?" I reply that it certainly is, or should be, based on something of the nature of fact, and, indeed, should have for its bases—first,

the profoundest fact in the nature of Man; and secondly, the profoundest fact known to us in the nature of God. The first of these two facts is that man craves for intercourse with God; the second, that God enters into communion with man. A true Church exists that such communion may be carried out by men massed together in a fellowship which is found, on man's side, to intensify and vivify that communion by sympathy.

Now we shall all agree that if such be the facts on which true churchmanship is based, the wider the fellowship that can be secured, and the fewer the good men sincerely desiring to worship God that shall find themselves by express condition, or through scruple of their own, excluded from the Church, the more effective that Church must be. Nothing, then, should be done, if it can in any way fairly be avoided, to narrow the communion of worshippers or to cut up into sections the ideal Church of all who desire to worship God. That these will, according to their habits of mind and spirit, divide off into groups often having little mutual sympathy, we must indeed expect; but it is a wanton dereliction from the highest aims of the Church unnecessarily to accelerate that process. But this is precisely what the drawing up of articles, creeds, standards, and even fixed and rigid forms of prayer effects. Mr. Sarson regards this dividing of the Church Universal into sections, each with its formulated Creed, as a kind of "natural selection." On the contrary, this is *artificial* selection. Artificial selection is the interference by man with the natural working of things in order to produce some type which he cannot trust nature (or God) to produce unaided. Creed and Subscription interfere with the natural groupings of churchmanship in order to draw men towards some one standard of doctrine, wide or narrow, wise or foolish, true or false, but in any case, and in Protestant Churches acknowledged to be, *fallible*; whereas the natural groupings of churchmanship are quite as much

round special ideas in the method of worship—for example pomp or Puritanism and other things—as round particular doctrines. Natural selection would leave these groupings to shape themselves according to the tendencies actually existing in men.

Most heartily do I agree with Mr. Sarson when he writes —“It is for purposes of worship, and on educational grounds, desirable that we should clear ourselves as to what we do believe” on religious matters. That is so. Every one of us should strive thus clearly to present to himself from time to time what he believes, what he disbelieves, and what he neither believes nor disbelieves. But the very value of such a habit to you is that you may, with unhampered freedom and undimmed candour, if reason and the Holy Spirit so shall lead you, revise your judgments and shift the boundaries of your belief or disbelief. The deepening, exalting, purifying, and developing of your doctrinal belief is the very aim and end of such mental reviews. But they who recommend to us fixed formularies of faith must either confess that such reviews may very possibly result in a man’s finding himself outside their boundaries, or else beg the question by assuming that such revision will always land him within their terms. “How,” asks Mr. Sarson, “are we likely to arrive at higher truth except when we often set before ourselves the truth at which we have arrived?” How, indeed? But does not this pertinent and momentous question itself imply that we are to go on from reach to reach of truth, or of what shall seem truth to us, and so, even if our minds have started well within the formularies laid down for us by the great and thoughtful dead, run daily risk of finding ourselves transcending them, or at least outside them? If the formularies have any effect whatever on our mental habits, must it not be then to check our eager search for higher truth?

“How,” again asks Mr. Sarson, “is the truth that we do hold essential to be taught to others except through

some forms?" Forms: yes. But the question is, shall those forms be fluid and adaptable to change and development of thought, or shall they be fixed so that all thought must hew itself to their mould? Shall they be clothes which a man may change, or shall they be gyves which he must wear though they cut him to the bone?

It is, thinks Mr. Sarson, desirable that we should be agreed, and that "pressure" should be "put on churches to say what they believe." Agreement, fairly obtained, is good; but will Subscription make men agree? The Apostles' Creed is suggested as a standard of reconciliation, and there are doubtless some who would press into a Church of which this was the only standard, who yet are kept far aloof from the Church of England as it is;—and that is the widest concession which the friends of Subscription have ever proposed. But has Mr. Sarson no wish to join in spiritual communion with such men as his predecessors in this discussion? It is clear from the picture he has drawn near the end of his paper that such communion would be grateful to his wide and Christian sympathies. Yet neither they, I suppose, nor hosts of other good men whose craving for fellowship in prayer, whose natural good churchmanship, are as strong as theirs, believe, for example, that Christ descended into hell or in the resurrection of the body. Subscription to the Apostles' Creed, then, if it be more than a form, must keep them out. But what does the Church, as a religious communion, gain by keeping them out? Would it not rather gain by breaking down barriers and drawing to itself by "natural selection" all such as sympathy and aspiration might win into its cathedrals and parish churches?

The less you make Subscription to mean, the more futile and useless is it; the more you make it to mean, the more injurious is it to the Church itself and to all whom it includes or excludes. The true basis of Church fellowship

is not Creed but common aspiration and spiritual sympathy.

Finally, turning back to Mr. Crosskey's contention with those insincere subscribers whom Mr. Sarson does not defend, but others do, I would earnestly endorse the warning Mr. Crosskey utters. The people of Great Britain are not versed in subtleties of casuistry. Their healthy moral sense refuses to measure moral by legal obligation. They believe that the Established Churches of this country have bound themselves by certain standards clear enough in meaning to all plain men. They see increasing numbers of the clergy of those Churches, touched with the finer spirit of modern liberalism, gathering to theological positions far removed from those held by the men who fixed the standards of the two Establishments. They hold that Mr. Stopford Brooke has done the plain, clear, truthful thing. They cannot see that men who share his theology but hold back from his renunciation, are doing the plain, clear, truthful thing. It is of vital importance, for the sake of the community at large, that these men should either make that renunciation or show clearly that truthfulness does not demand it. It is of vital importance for this reason : that if the action of the teachers confounds the people's moral sense, then the teaching of those teachers must be vain in the people's ears.

A.

This Discussion will be concluded in the April Number of the MODERN REVIEW.—[ED.]

### JOHN MILTON.\*

THE completion of Professor Masson's "Life of John Milton: Narrated in Connection with the Political, Ecclesiastical, and Literary History of his Time," is an event worthy of grateful recognition by all liberal Englishmen. The first volume of the work was in our hands in December, 1858. The preface to the sixth volume is dated December, 1879. To those who welcomed the first volume the appearances of the others from time to time during a period of twenty-one years have afforded a series of literary pleasures of no common kind. Professor Masson has placed the whole of the events and circumstances of Milton's life before us in one work. The twenty-one years of publication must have been preceded by many years of labour in preparation and collection, in order to account for the large result. But it is such a result as could only be attained by the well-directed labours of a single mind. No "Milton Society" could have wrought a work like this; but the work itself may leave room for the operations of such a society. Although the Professor has reaped the whole field and carried the harvest, yet he may have left many dropped and scattered ears for the gleaners. Before long a Milton Society may perhaps be formed on some basis like that of the various Shakespeare and other societies. At present Milton has scarcely passed out of the sphere of party;—and while

\* The Life of John Milton: Narrated in Connection with the Political, Ecclesiastical, and Literary History of his Time. By David Masson, M.A., LL.D., Professor of Rhetoric and English Literature in the University of Edinburgh. 6 vols., 1859—1880. London: Macmillan and Co.

in such a sphere, sections of party will set up their peculiar claims to him. Some of our readers may have a recollection of the unsuccessful attempt some years ago to establish a Milton Club, which failed in consequence of a design to subject the membership to a kind of orthodox test. This experiment is not likely to be repeated. The influence of Milton's name can never be enlisted in favour of any scheme which does not rest upon the broadest grounds of personal liberty of both thought and action; and the time is fast approaching when an unlimited universality will be acknowledged as the only possible area for the exhibition of Milton's genius. As soon as he emerged from the strife of parties and the odium of the Restoration, his poetical genius was acknowledged on all sides, and his name placed second in the roll of English poets.

A century later, when men looked back to the English Commonwealth for the rise of the principles of civil and religious liberty, Milton's political writings attracted the attention they deserved. His collected prose works were first published in 1698, with Toland's *Biography* prefixed. These volumes are folios, and though bearing the name of Amsterdam on their title-pages, were really printed in London. Birch's editions followed in 1738 and 1753; and Dr. Symmons's edition, with a translation of the "*Defensio Secunda*" by Robert Fellowes, M.A., was published in 1806, in seven handsome 8vo volumes, with a life by Dr. Symmons, in many respects, and from a Whig-Revolution point of view, very admirable. A popular edition appeared in 1838 with a fine "*Introductory Review*," by Robert Fletcher; and now the whole of the prose works, including Bishop Sumner's translation of the "*Treatise on Christian Doctrine*," forms part of Bohn's Standard Library.

It may, therefore, be fairly said that the body of Milton's works—a literature in themselves—is in every library, and is an element in the intellectual life-blood of England.



Still, there is one characteristic feature of Milton's mind which removes him from the admiration and sympathy of a considerable section of the religious world. This is his rigid anti-sacerdotal spirit. Milton is essentially Protestant, and, therefore, repugnant to all ritualists, whether Roman or Anglican. Even our great statesman, whose Homeric studies have won for him a high place in literature, cannot give ungrudging welcome to Milton. Homer and Shakespeare claim universal homage without limitation or reserve. Milton is both a Puritan and a heretic, and draws from his countrymen a less complete, though perhaps an intenser, worship. Shakespeare was happy in filling the imagination of mankind with a flood of light unobscured by a cloud or even a transient vapour from the political and ecclesiastical turmoils of his age. So might it have been with the great poet of the seventeenth century, had he not fallen "on evil days."

In preparing for the work of his life as that of a poet in the highest sense, the purposes of Milton were so pure and so lofty that there can be no doubt he would, but for adverse circumstances, have shone as a luminary in literature without admixture of mundane things. Until his thirty-first year, Milton was only a son of the Muses. His stores of learning and observation, his aspiring genius, his chaste life and his devout spirit were being trained and directed into the sphere of the imagination for the production of works which should win an immortality of fame. It is difficult to conjecture what the results of his genius might have been without the interruptions of political conflict and the modifications of religious controversy. But surely no soaring spirit was ever so clogged and hindered by circumstances as that wandering student, who was drawn by events from the fields of Italy and the mountains of Greece to yoke Pegasus to the task of dragging his country out of the sloughs of despotism and anarchy

before he could be allowed to rise from the earth and traverse the "realms of gold." Thus it happens that there are two Miltons with whom we have to deal, and until both of them shall be completely presented to us we have a difficulty in estimating the whole man. Professor Masson has made this presentation, and in his volumes we have all the materials before us.

The difficulty of the work seems to have pressed itself on the mind of the biographer with especial force as soon as he had completed his first volume. This volume covers the period of Milton's life from his birth in 1608 until his thirty-first year, and is almost purely a narrative biography; and for this reason: that the disturbing influences of the poet's career did not begin until after his return, in the July of 1639, from his visit to the Continent. He would gladly have remained abroad much longer than he did; and, indeed, he intended to pursue his travels into Greece, and he would doubtless have spent more time in the cities and among the societies most congenial to his tastes and his lofty literary aims. When he was enjoying all the delights of foreign travel and society, he had already brought his education to a perfect maturity; and by his writings up to that time he had satisfied the best judges as well as himself of his powers and capacities for poetry. Nothing had been omitted or left incomplete in his work of self-culture and preparation. He had submitted himself to the judgment of the most learned and most noble of his contemporaries in England, France, Switzerland, and Italy, and had won from every quarter approval and encouragement. Grotius, Galileo, and Manso, and many other poets, scholars, and divines, received the young Englishman, and recognised his talent. His English poetry sounded with strains unheard since Shakespeare sang. "*L'Allegro*" and "*Il Penseroso*," "*Comus*" and "*Lycidas*," fell on the ears of his countrymen with a delight which none but the strains of the age of Spenser

could awaken. In Latin verse, and in the complimentary sonnets which he wrote in the Italian tongue, he had approved himself a master in the opinion of foreigners. It might seem that nothing remained but to wait for time to mature his mind for some supreme expression of his imagination which the world would not willingly let die. But the career he longed for and expected was suddenly checked, and it might have been for ever.

It is this change from an even tenor to an interrupted life which has led his biographer to adopt the method of placing the history of the times and the biography of his subject before the reader in such a way as to do full justice to both. The first volume, as we said, was out in December, 1858. The second volume came out in March, 1871; and in his Preface of that date, Professor Masson felt himself called upon to explain the plan of his work—a plan partly adopted in the first volume, but not so necessary to it as to the volumes which were to follow. He says:—

Now, while it is the right of the public to say what they want in the shape of a book, it is equally the right of an author to say what he means to offer; and accordingly I repeat that this work is not a Biography only, but a Biography together with a History. . . . No one can study the life of Milton as it ought to be studied without being obliged to study, extensively and intimately, the contemporary history of England and even, incidentally, of Scotland and Ireland too. Experience has confirmed my previous conviction that it must be so. Again and again in order to understand Milton, his position, his motives, his thoughts by himself, his public words to his countrymen and the probable effects of those words, I have had to stop in the mere Biography and range round largely and windingly in the History of his Time, not only as it is presented in well-known books, but as it had to be rediscovered by express and laborious investigation in original and forgotten records. Thus on the very compulsion, or at least by the suasion, of the Biography, a History grew on my hands.

With the plan of the author thus clearly indicated, we

have no right to complain that Professor Masson's six volumes are both a history and a biography; and when once we have discovered his method, we find it a very useful one. Milton's life and writings were so mixed up with public affairs that any adequate account of him implies what Masson describes as the "incessant connection of the History and the Biography—the History always sending me back more fully informed for the Biography, and the Biography again suggesting new tracks for the History." Nor are the intercalary portions of the work confined to the ordinary history of the period. In the first volume we have a comprehensive survey of British literature, giving a view of it generally at the time when Milton resolved to connect himself with it. And in the sixth volume a chapter of one hundred and thirty-two pages is devoted to a survey of the first seven years of the literature of the Restoration. From the second volume onwards we find every volume divided into "Books," and every book devoted to distinct portions of "History" and "Biography;" while the chapters into which the books are subdivided take the portions of the History and the Biography in the order of convenience; one book being divided into two or three chapters only, and another into as many as eight. Take, for instance, the second volume. The first Book is classified into "History—The Scottish Presbyterian Revolt," and "Biography—Milton Back in England." Chapter I. The Scottish Covenanters and the First Bishops' War. Chapter II. Milton Back in England—Old Friends—Epitaphium Damonis—Lodgings, &c.—Literary Projects, &c. Chapter III. returns to History, and is about Bishop Hall's "Episcopacy," "The Short Parliament and the Second Bishops' War." In the volume in question, one book is devoted to the History of English Presbyterianism and Independency up to 1643—a chapter by itself, but of great importance, and following immediately upon a very careful account of the Westminster Assembly

of Divines. If we regard Vol. II., as we have briefly described it, as a specimen of the whole work, we shall get an idea of the amount of labour bestowed in bringing together such a vast accumulation of materials. In fact, we have a minute biography and an elaborate history so arranged as to afford the advantages of each. We might further distribute the historical portions into civil, ecclesiastical, social, and literary history;—and for everything of interest in all of these departments the work will be consulted by students of each subject. What a well-furnished library could scarcely yield to the most diligent after a laborious search, the reader can now find within the compass of Masson's six volumes. A seventh with an index is promised, and is very much needed; and the more complete the apparatus, the better for future readers. Though we read the volumes as they came out, when we look into them again with the intention of giving some account of them, we cannot but feel dismayed at the extent of the field which lies open before us. It is impossible for us to do more than to invite others into the field, and to try to say a few words about the new interest in a great name which Mr. Masson has awakened.

We have referred to the change which the English Revolution effected in Milton's career; and we will endeavour to carry the thought further and to suppose that he had disregarded the call of duty which came to him while in Italy, and had made literature and especially poetry the sole work of his life. What poem, what "strains of an unknown strength," such as he promises in the "Epitaphium Damonis" if life should be spared him, and which should be read by the dwellers beside the English rivers, could even Milton have produced if his literary ambition had been the sole object of his life? In his "*Defensio Secunda*," he says:—

When I was preparing to pass over into Sicily and Greece, the

melancholy intelligence which I received of the civil commotions in England made me alter my purpose; for I thought it base to be travelling for amusement abroad while my fellow-citizens were fighting for liberty at home. . . . I returned to my native country when Charles was renewing the Episcopal War with the Scots, and the necessity of his affairs obliged him to convene a Parliament. I hired a spacious house in the city for myself and my books; where I again with rapture renewed my literary pursuits, and where I calmly awaited the issue of the contest. . . . I saw that a way was opening for the establishment of real liberty; that the foundation was laying for the deliverance of man from the yoke of slavery and superstition; that the principles of our religion which were the first objects of our care would exert a salutary influence on the manners and constitution of the republic; and as I had from my youth studied the distinctions between religious and civil rights, I perceived that if ever I wished to be of use, I ought at least not to be wanting to my country, to the Church, and to so many of my fellow-Christians, in a crisis of so much danger. I therefore determined to relinquish the other pursuits in which I was engaged and to transfer the whole force of my talents and my industry to this one important object.

To be deaf to this high calling, to be unprepared to respond to it, was not possible to a spirit like that of Milton. He who had from his youth studied "the distinctions between religious and civil rights" was already equipped for the fight in which he determined to engage. A life withdrawn from the public life of his country at such a time, and selfishly devoted to literary aims however high and praiseworthy in themselves, could not have issued in the production of "*Paradise Lost*," could at best but have produced an idle song even out of the legendary stories of Arthur and the Knights of the Round Table, and have added to the many forgotten epics of second-rate poets, whose utterances have no connection with the spirit of their own or any other age. From the beginning of the Long Parliament until the Restoration, Milton's pen was busy with the topics of the day or with the preparation of State papers

and popular vindications of the acts of the great statesmen and soldiers of the Commonwealth. An occasional sonnet, worthy of its origin from the stirred affections or noble admirations of their author, broke now and then from the heart of the poet. The pen was fertile in a series of contributions to the controversies of the time. His earliest publications were concerning reformation, prelatical episcopacy, and ecclesiastical government. It has been objected to many of these writings that they were disfigured by coarse personalities and undignified terms of abuse. But it is not by these portions of them that Milton's pamphlets ought to be judged. They contain passages of the noblest eloquence which must for ever be the comfort and encouragement of those who set pure religion above every attempt to degrade and enslave it. Anti-sacerdotalism is the key-note of Milton's first effort to warn and arm his fellow-citizens against the things that have hindered the cause of reformation in religion. Speaking of the acts of the priest party, he says: "They began to draw down all the divine intercourse betwixt God and the soul—yea, the very shape of God Himself—into an exterior and bodily form, urgently pretending a necessity and obligation of joining the body in a formal reverence, and worship circumscribed; they hallowed it, they fumed it, they sprinkled it, they bedecked it, not in robes of pure innocency, but of pure linen, with other deformed and fantastic dresses, in palls and mitres, gold and gew-gaws fetched from Aaron's old wardrobe or the flamens' vestry; then was the priest set to con his motions and his postures, his liturgies and his luries, till the soul by this means of overbodying herself, given up justly to fleshly delights, bated her wing apace downward; and finding the ease she had from her visible and sensuous colleague the body, in performance of religious duties, her pinions now broken and flagging, shifted off from herself the labour of high soaring any more, forgot her heavenly

flight, and left the dull and droiling carcass to plod on in the old road and drudging trade of conformity."

The Second Book of the "Treatise of Reformation" in England concludes with a passage which is too well known to render it necessary to quote it here. It is the promise of an offering of "high strains in new and lofty measures, to sing and celebrate the reign of Christ when He shall judge the kingdoms of the world, and distribute national honours and rewards to religious and just commonwealths." It is, in fact, a "high strain" of inspired poetry, and with a hundred others abounding in all of Milton's political writings, shows that the poet never wholly put off his singing robes, though the utterances were not clothed in verse, and were but the ornaments and exuberances of a controversial writer earnestly engaged in the pressing questions of the hour. The year 1641 saw the publication of the tracts already referred to, and of two other very important ones—"The Reason of Church Government urged against Prelaty," and "Animadversions upon the Remonstrants' Defence against Smectymnuus." The former of these contains Milton's high estimate of the office of the poet, and his "covenant with the knowing reader, by labour and intense study, which I take to be my portion in this life, joined with the strong propensity of nature, to leave something so written to after times as they should not willingly let it die." And if we ask what are the permanent portions of these early prose works which can interest us to-day, and whether anything can be drawn from them which shall suit our purposes in present controversies, we shall have no difficulty in finding such things in abundance. The ritualism of Laud is still active in our religious world; and the quotation made above from the tract on Reformation needs no modification to adapt it to the present time. Take also this passage, selected at random from the "Animadversions":—"It is the calling of God that makes a minister, and his own painful study and



diligence that manures and improves his ministerial gifts. In the primitive times many, before ever they had received ordination from the Apostles, had done the Church noble service. It is but an orderly form of receiving a man already fitted, and committing to him a particular charge ; the employment of preaching is as holy and far more excellent ; the care also and judgment to be used in the winning of souls is an ability above that which is required in ordination." It is impossible in a brief review to set forth the particular controversies of the years in which these pamphlets appeared, or even to give the names of those who engaged in them. The fight was sometimes a savage one, and the " Animadversions " are in some places rough, and even scurrilous, to a degree which would not now be tolerated. Our present object is to show that while engaged in them Milton never forgot the higher purposes of his life and study, and also that, from the earliest period of his public efforts, he laid hold on first principles which could have but one outcome—namely, the attainment of the highest ground, or, as we should say now, the most advanced ground, on which political and ecclesiastical liberty can rest. Consider the extract about ordination, and the essence of the ministerial function. We can add nothing to-day to the force of such a statement. With his thoughts so based on eternal principles, what could the doctrines of the Churches be to Milton, even at the beginning of his career as a public writer ? Episcopacy was being weighed in the scales of discussion, and Milton had long ago judged it. When Episcopacy had fallen, came the attempt to put Presbytery in its place. Milton's fourth pamphlet, as Mr. Masson points out, is in favour of Presbyterianism, but rather from the necessity of the argument than from anything else.

At the very outset of his pamphlet Milton declares the question respecting Church Government to be whether it ought to be presbyterial or prelatical ; nay, shortly afterwards he has

a sentence which shows that at this time there was little dream either in his mind, or in that of the people around him, of the possibility of any form of Church Government that should not be definable as one or the other of these two (Vol. II., p. 376).

But was there not an element in the question which for the time shut out the possibility of any other form? We mean "uniformity" in religion; and in deliberating on behalf of a national establishment, this element ruled in the minds of nearly all men. How earnestly the religious men who sat in the Long Parliament regarded "uniformity" as essential to national religion, we all know; and how much was expected from the Westminster Assembly of Divines we can learn more readily from Professor Masson's second volume than we could possibly learn elsewhere. If uniformity in religion was necessary, and was to be secured, Presbyterianism seemed the likeliest form it could take. A most interesting list of all the persons who were chosen to sit in the Westminster Assembly will be found on pages 515 to 524 of Masson, Vol. II. In view of Milton's ultimate choice of the principle of Independency, we will pursue this question, with Mr. Masson's assistance, a little more fully.

After describing the falling off or withdrawing of the Bishops and other adherents of Episcopacy from the Assembly, Professor Masson says:—"In respect of theological doctrine, for example, the Assembly, as it was then left, was perfectly unanimous. They were almost to a man Calvinists or Anti-Arminians, pledged by their antecedents to such a revision of the Articles as should make the national creed more distinctly Calvinistic than before. . . . On the question of Church Government the Assembly knew itself from the first to be divided into parties." This division became of the utmost importance, for on the result of the struggle between Presbyterianism and Independency depended the fate of England. Mr. Masson's section, entitled, "Presbyterianism and In-

dependency in July, 1643: their prospects in the Westminster Assembly," throws so much interest on this topic that we make no excuse for transcribing a portion of it:—

I regard the arrival of Roger Williams in London about Midsummer, 1643, as the importation into England of the very quintessence or last distillation of that notion of Church Independency which England had originated, but Holland and America had worked out. Our history of Independency in all its forms on to this quintessence or last distillation of it in the mind of a fervid Welsh New-Englander, who might now be seen, alone or in young Vane's company, hanging about the lobbies of the Houses of Parliament and the Westminster Assembly, has not been without preconceived and deliberate purpose. For, in most of our existing studies and accounts of England's great Revolution in the middle of the seventeenth century, I know not a blunder more fatal, more full of causes of misapprehension and unfair judgment, than that which consists in treating Independency as a sudden new phenomenon of 1643, or thereabouts, when the Westminster Assembly met. Not so, as we have seen. For sixty years before 1643 Independency had been a traditional form of Anti-Prelacy in the English popular mind, competing with the somewhat older Anti-Prelatic theory of Presbyterianism, and though not possessing the same respectability of numbers and of social weight, yet lodged inexpugnably in native depths, and intense with memories of pain and wrong. It did happen, in 1643, when Prelacy was removed from the nation, and the question was what was to be substituted, that this native tradition of Independency found itself dashed against the other tradition of Presbyterianism, in such conditions that Independency seemed the pretender and upstart, while Presbyterianism seemed the rightful heir. This arose partly from the fact that Presbyterianism had mass and respectability in her favour, was at home on the spot, and had her titles ready; whereas Independency had been a wanderer on the Continent and in the Colonies, had contracted an uncouth and sunburnt look, had been preceded by ugly reports of her behaviour in foreign parts, had changed her name several times, and was not at once prepared with her pedigree and vouchers. Partly, however, it arose from the omnipotence at that moment of Scottish example and advice in England. Anyhow, for the moment, Independency was at a disadvantage. She seemed even to doubt

her chance of obtaining a hearing. Nevertheless, she was to be heard, and fully, in the course of time. Not a form of Independency, not a variety in her development that has been described in the preceding narrative, from Brown's original English Separatism, on through Robinson's Congregationalism or Semi-Separatism antagonising Smyth's extreme Separatism and Se-Baptism in Holland, and so to the Consolidated Robinsonian Independency of the New England Church, with its outjets in Mrs. Hutchinson's Antinomianism and Roger Williams's absolute Individualism, but were to have their appearances or equivalents in the coming controversy in England, and to play into the current of English life (Vol. II., pp. 602—3).

This extract is enough for our present purpose, which is to show that very unexpected "developments" besides those suggested in our extract were to come into play. That Milton should break with the Assembly might be expected; but what actually did occur was a personal matter which is the most extraordinary circumstance in the whole of Milton's life. An unhappy marriage was the occasion of Milton's personal conflict with the ecclesiastical leaders of the time. When he became a "Divorcer" the whole weight of the religious indignation of England was against him, and he was driven into Independency by a kind of moral necessity, —a power sufficient for the purpose, even supposing that the progress of his inquiries and the turn of his mind had not been leading him in the same direction. The disturbance in Milton's imaginary career of pure contemplation and literary labour by political affairs is not a greater "interference" in his life than that which his marriage and its consequences produced. The elevated tone—we might almost say super-human or angelic character—of Milton's ideas in regard to the relations of the sexes, and his grand doctrine of "the sublime notion and high mystery" of personal purity—for the vindication whereof he deserves eternal honour—were put to a severe trial in his own unfortunate experience. In his thitry-fifth year, nine years after the production of "Comus," he went into Oxfordshire to visit the Powells, old

friends of his family, but strong Royalists, and he returned to London with a bride of seventeen—the girl Mary Powell, of whom we really know nothing personal as to her character or abilities, but about whom much may be inferred from the conduct of her husband and from unmistakable allusions in his writings. Professor Masson has given us the details with care and delicacy, and has brought out all the references which Milton's writings can be made to yield on the subject whether in prose or verse. Enough to say here, that Milton's ideas of the married state did not find themselves fulfilled in his experience, and that he did find the materials out of which to lay down new claims for personal liberty which found vent in his pamphlets on the subject of divorce. By these publications he broke altogether with the Presbyterian party; and at the same time, and during the publication of the divorce tracts, he defied the Ordinances of Parliament and the principles of the Assembly by the publication of the most magnificent of his prose works, the "*Areopagitica*, or speech for the liberty of unlicensed printing." In six years from the time of his return to England, Milton had placed himself ahead of Assemblies and Parliaments, and of the public opinion of his country. By the close of the year 1645 he had fought the battles of liberty in religion, in domestic life, and in public speaking and printing, and had gained a victory in every field as complete as that which Cromwell gained in the same year at Naseby over Episcopacy and absolute Monarchy. As Cromwell stood first in the rising Republic as the representative of statesmanship and military glory, Milton stood by his side as the representative of civil, social, and religious liberty. The effects of the publication of the "*Areopagitica*" are described by Masson in his third volume, and we borrow from it a passage which sums up Milton's position at the time of which we have just been speaking:—

On the whole, then, Milton's position among his countrymen

from the beginning of 1645 onwards may be defined most accurately by conceiving him to have been, in the special field of letters, or pamphleteering, very much what Cromwell was in the broader and harder field of Army action, and what the younger Vane was, in Cromwell's absence, in the House of Commons. While Cromwell was away in the army, or occasionally when he appeared in the House, and his presence was felt there in some new Independent motion, or some arrest of a Presbyterian motion, there was no man, outside of Parliament, who observed him more sympathetically than Milton, or would have been more ready to second him with tongue or with pen. Both were ranked among the Independents, as Vane also was, but this was less because they were partisans of any particular form of Church Government, than because they were agreed that, whatever form of Church Government should be established, there must be the largest possible liberty under it for nonconforming consciences. If this was Independency, it was a kind of large lay Independency; and of Independency in this sense Milton was, undoubtedly, the literary chief. Only when he was thought of by the Independents as one of their champions, it was always with a recollection that his championship of the common cause was qualified by a peculiar private crotchet. He figured in the list of the chiefs of Independency, if I may so express it, with an asterisk prefixed to his name. That asterisk was his Divorce Doctrine. He was an Independent, with the added peculiarity of being the head of the Sect of Miltonists or Divorcers (Vol. III., p. 434).

After Naseby there was a lull in the strife; and this seems to have been accompanied by a revival of interest in general literature. Milton took occasion of this to put before the world those higher claims to distinction which were never absent from his mind, and to show his countrymen that he was something more than a writer of pamphlets and a controversialist. Mr. Masson gives a very interesting account of Humphrey Moseley, the bookseller, whose judgment and taste in pure literature seem to have been of an unusual kind. Moseley looked out for the best poetry that could be found, and after publishing an edition of Waller's poems, considered perhaps as the best lyrical verses

of the time, he applied to Milton for his unpublished verses to be included in a volume with "*Comus*," which had been published by Lawes in 1637, and "*Lycidas*," which had appeared with other poetical pieces in a memorial volume printed at Cambridge in 1637—8. The result of this application was the appearance in 1645 of "*The Poems of Mr. John Milton, both English and Latin, compos'd at several times.*" Mr. Masson's remarks on this volume, which had the following Latin motto on the title-page—

Baccare frontem  
Cingite, ne vati noceat mala lingua futuro  
(VIRGIL, *Eclog.* vii.),

will give our readers great pleasure :—

Has the reader noticed the motto on the title-page from Virgil's seventh Eclogue? It is peculiarly significant of the mood in which the volume was published. Milton, who has called himself *Thyrsis* in the *Epitaphium Damonis*, here adopts in the happiest manner the words of the young poet-shepherd *Thyrsis* in Virgil's pastoral. *Thyrsis* there, contending with *Corydon* for the prize in poetry, begs from his brother shepherds, if not the ivy of perfectly approved excellence, at least

Some green thing round the brow,  
Lest ill tongues hurt the poet yet to be.

Could anything more gracefully express Milton's intention in the volume? This collection of his *Poems*, written between his sixteenth year and his thirty-eighth, was a smaller collection by much, he seems to own, than he had once hoped to have ready by that point in his manhood; but it might at least correct the impression of him common among those who knew him only as a prose pamphleteer. Something green round his brow for the present, were it only the sweet field spikenard, would attest that he had given his youth to Poesy, and would reannounce, amid the clamour of evil tongues which his polemical writings had raised, that he meant to return to Poesy before all was done, and to die, when he did die, a great Poet of England (Vol. III., p. 453).

The story of the portrait of Milton engraved for this edition of his poems by William Marshall, and of the trick



played upon the engraver by Milton in revenge for the badness of the likeness, is a very amusing one, and is pleasantly told in pp. 456—9 of Vol. III. It is curious to find the author of "*Il Penseroso*" engaged in a "practical joke."

The interval of "pure literature" was not a long one. A mightier wave of the Great Rebellion was rising with the conflicts between the Presbyterians and the Independents, and between the Parliament and the Army, which was to end in sweeping away the Monarch and the Monarchy, and to lay them in the dust with the Bishops and the Church. The history of the last two years and a-half of the reign of Charles I. occupies the fourth book of Vol. III. of Masson's History, and extends over nearly two hundred and forty pages. There are many things in this period which we should like particularly to notice; but one of the points most interesting to us is the Ordinance of Parliament of the 2nd of May, 1648, "For the preventing of the growth and spreading of Heresy and Blasphemy." This ordinance was directed against the Independents by the efforts of "a sudden influx of Presbyterians." It denounces death for heresies of doctrine concerning the Persons in the Godhead, or the canon of Scripture; and imprisonment for minor errors, such as "that man is bound to believe no more than by his reason he can comprehend," "that the baptizing of infants is unlawful," &c. "Imagine," says Professor Masson, "*that* going forth just as the second civil war had begun, as the will and ordinance of Parliament! One wonders that the concordat between the Parliament and the Army, arranged by Cromwell and the other army chiefs in the preceding November, was not snapped on the instant. One wonders that the Army did not wheel in mass round Westminster, haul the legislating idiots from their seats, and then undertake in their own name both the war and the general business of the nation. The



behaviour of the Army, however, was more patient and wise" (Vol. III., p. 601).

The ordinance might have been directed against Milton himself from what we know of his opinions subsequently published; and it shows in its impotent rage and intolerance that the Independents were already associated with heresy and free opinions by their opponents, who, on their part, must have begun to feel the breaking down of orthodox authority. Milton, at all events, was not afraid of the imputation of heresy, and was probably making an approach to those principles of toleration which he published twenty-five years later in his tract "Of true religion, heresy, &c." Indeed, both along the religious and along the political track, he was advancing with the times to an apprehension of the requirements and conditions of true liberty.

Milton's supreme political utterance is "The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates;" and its importance, so far as we know, has not hitherto been fully recognised. Professor Masson says of it:—

Milton was the first Englishman of mark, out of Parliament, that signified his unqualified adhesion to the Republic. This he did on the 13th of February, 1648—9, by publishing that pamphlet on which we saw him engaged in his house in High Holborn during the King's trial. . . . The new pamphlet, like most of its predecessors, was unlicensed. It was published exactly a fortnight after the King's death, and exactly a week after the Republic had been declared. The "Eikon Basilike," the supreme publication on the other side, had preceded it by four days. "The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates" is not equal in richness of literary interest to the best of Milton's previous pamphlets. It is, however, a strong, thoroughly Miltonic performance, falling with hammer-like force on the question discussed; and it must have been welcomed by the founders of the Commonwealth in their first hour of difficulty (Vol. IV., p. 64).

May we not call Milton the Prophet of the Nation at this critical hour, as he had been when Prelaty was under judg-

ment, and was to be, though fruitlessly, on the eve of the Restoration? As from the mouths of Hebrew Prophets, so from Milton's, some axioms of truth or deep moral principles break forth every now and then in the midst of argument and rebuke. Among the opening words of "The Tenure," he says, finely, "Indeed, none can love freedom heartily but good men;" and, near its close, he turns upon the Presbyterians and rebukes the Assembly with the words, "Let them be sorry that, being called to assemble about reforming the Church, they fell to propping and soliciting the Parliament, though they had renounced the name of Priests, for a new settling of their tithes and oblations." He saw wherein the failure of the ecclesiastical bigots and "forcers of conscience" lay, and he trusted in the righteousness which, as he believed, inspired the leaders who had ventured "to depose and put to death a tyrant or wicked king." We are not now entering on the argument of the right or the policy of the deposition and execution of Charles. It concerns us only to get, if possible, a glimpse of Milton's part in it as the courageous advocate of the most daring political act in modern history. He placed himself in the front on this occasion, and what he did now in February, 1648—9, together with what he had yet to do in his "Eikonoclastes" and his two Defences, must be accepted as his especial work in vindicating the act in question for his own countrymen, to all Europe, for his own time, and for all after ages. Without Milton's utterances, the "good cause," to be ever associated by all lovers of liberty with the Commonwealth of England, might not have been fully and honourably recognised as it ever has been; and the daring act of January, 1648—9, might have been regarded only as the Royalists regarded it—as the final deed of a wicked, though great, rebellion. Mr. Masson, in his sixth volume, gives some very interesting information about Milton's escape from being classed among the Regicides in consequence of the Com-

mittees having overlooked "The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates." He gives the Royal Proclamation for the seizing and burning "by the hand of the common hangman" certain books by John Milton and John Goodwin, and points out that, while the "Defensio" and the "Eikonoclastes" are mentioned, no mention is made of the "Tenure" (Vol. VI., p. 181). "Had a few passages from that book been read [in the Commons], or even only its full title, with recollection of the date of publication, the end might have been that Milton, as well as Peters, would have been flung among the totally excepted Regicides" (p. 178).

The whole of Masson's narrative concerning the doings of the Committees and of both Houses in the matter of the Indemnity Bill, including Prynne's malicious efforts to effect Milton's destruction, has quite a breathless interest. We can do no more than refer to it, and commend it to our readers as a narrative of a critical episode hitherto but imperfectly known in connection with Milton's personal history. Had Milton been only a regicide, he might have shared the fate of Peters—contempt and infamy—whether deservedly or not. Powerful interest in his favour was made, no doubt, and the Poet, fortunately for the glory of England and her literature, survived the Pamphleteer.

The fourth and fifth volumes of "Masson" cover the history from the death of Charles I. to the restoration of Charles II., and include Milton's principal public writings—the "Eikonoclastes" and the two Defences, with particulars of his employments in the service of the State. The subject of the "Eikon Basilike" has recently been ably discussed in this REVIEW,\* and we shall therefore not refer to it here. Nor will space permit us to go into any of the details of the "Commonwealth." We have seen Milton preparing to take his part in the reforms of the Church and

\* The Authorship of the "Eikon Basilike." MODERN REVIEW, July, 1880. By W. Blake Odgers, LL.D.

the State, and ultimately becoming the voice of England in her religious freedom and her Republican government. That the conflict between the Parliament and the Army resulted almost as a matter of necessity in a military tyranny which ultimately broke down, and the Parliamentary element along with it, as soon as the controlling power of the great Protector ceased with his death—we all know. In fact, there was no political power able to withstand the reaction which set in under Richard Cromwell's feeble Protectorate; and the army, although filled with patriotic and God-fearing soldiers such as no other State ever had the power to enlist in its service, had no choice but to hand over the country to the restored monarch and the enthusiastic Royalists who were to keep down the honour of England and all her liberties until the revival of the good cause in the Revolution of 1688.

During the reaction to which we have alluded, Milton lost no opportunity of attempting to recall his countrymen to the principles they were so soon to abandon. In 1651, in his First Defence, he had, as Professor Masson finely says, addressed the continental nations "as from the battlements of the British Island;" and in 1654 and 1655 his Second Defence and his Self-Defence rang in the ears of all the learned men of Europe. In 1659 and 1660 a few English pamphlets, ecclesiastical and political, were the last of his utterances on behalf of his countrymen. If the animosity of Prynne had been as powerful as it was malicious during the debates on the Indemnity Bill, Milton's biography would have ended with a grim paragraph of "hanging and quartering" at Charing Cross or Tyburn. The imagination shudders at the thought. But even if Milton's greater glory had never been manifested, his name would not have altogether perished. He had friends amongst the lovers of learning and poetry of all parties. The exquisite tenderness of the Elegist of King and Diodati would not have been forgotten, though the glory

of the Epic Poet had been quenched in blood. The author of "The Nymph's Complaint for her Fawn," and the "Drop of Dew" would have mourned the loss of his friend in verses only less sweet than Milton's own, instead of having the privilege a few years later of addressing "the poet blind yet bold" on the subject of "Paradise Lost." Perhaps Marvell did more than any other man to rescue his friend from the fate of the regicides. There is every reason to believe that he and other "lovers of the Muses," as well as some men high in favour with the new Government, interposed successfully to open the way for Milton's return to the great object and work of his life. How gratefully may all English-speaking peoples welcome his deliverance and his ascension to the realms of song !

At the age of fifty-two, with fourteen years of life yet before him, tried by experience, purified by trial, "troubled on every side, yet not distressed, persecuted but not forsaken, cast down but not destroyed," Milton found the work to do for which he had "covenanted with the knowing reader," and which he had ever regarded as his "portion in this life." He was always strong and vigorous, inspired with a divine fulness of life. Even his blindness, if properly regarded, cannot make him an object of pity. He could not but feel the loss of sight and deplore it ; but his complaints of that loss, for the most part expressed in the dramatic or poetic form, are not the wailings of misery, but the expression of his sense of the glory of sight, sometimes mingled with abounding gratitude for the "inner light" which was bestowed upon him in such large measure. His outward circumstances were adequate to the purposes of his life. If tried in temper, he was not tried in spirit by the cares and annoyances inseparable from his condition. He enjoyed the tender care of his wife, Elizabeth Minshall, and he delighted in the honour and reverence of many admiring friends. He laboured ever "as

under his great Taskmaster's eye," and devoted himself to his unceasing studies, or waited for the seasons of the influx of poetical inspiration, ever "content though blind."

We have no intention of describing the great Poems which make the name of Milton immortal. The Reformer and the Liberator appear in them also. It is the spirit of liberty that has made "*Paradise Lost*," "*Paradise Regained*," and "*Samson Agonistes*" dear to the English heart; though their popularity has been subject to variations. Hallam remarked in his "*Literary History*" "that the discovery of Milton's Arianism in this rigid generation has already impaired the sale of '*Paradise Lost*.'" Shelley, in his "*Defence of Poetry*," urged such claims for the moral superiority of Milton's Satan over God himself, as are more shocking to ordinary readers than the discovery of Arianism. The variations of popular acceptance are, however, but temporary. The time has come when the charge of Arianism against Milton ceases to carry the weight attributed to it by Hallam. Arianism and Socinianism are phases of Christian opinion, unlikely to be revived in any of their historical forms, though the first, as a general term, may be employed to represent a phase of transition from orthodoxy to free Christianity. And this leads us to bring this essay to a close with a few words about Milton's final theological position.

We have seen how his opinions widened with his sympathies in favour of the Independents and Sectaries. In 1673 he put forth his tract "*Of true religion, heresy, schism, toleration*," &c. In it he says of Socinians and Arminians that they may have some errors, but are no heretics. And again: "The Arian and Socinian are charged to dispute against the Trinity; they affirm to believe the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost according to the Scripture and the Apostolic creed: as for terms of Trinity, &c., they reject them as scholastic notions not to be found

in Scripture." These passages may prepare us for the theology of "Paradise Lost" and the "Treatise on Christian Doctrine." It is, however, of the latter only that we have left ourselves room to speak, and this very briefly; or we should have been glad to transfer to these pages some portions of Professor Masson's analysis of the work as well as some part of the entertaining story of the fate of the manuscript.

The "Treatise on Christian Doctrine" is a very important and very curious book. Had it been published while Milton was alive or shortly after his death, it would certainly have become notorious, and would probably have exerted very considerable influence on the course of English theological thought through the last two centuries as well as on the traditional reputation of Milton himself. As it is, though it has been fifty years before the world, it seems to have found few real readers (Vol. VI., p. 817).

The treatise is based wholly upon Scripture, and its tone, like its introductory greeting "to all everywhere on earth professing the Christian Faith," is apostolical. No doubt Milton regarded the work as a message to the Churches, setting forth, but not imposing on others, his final views of the Christian religion. We cannot help speculating about the effect the treatise might have had on the English Presbyterian and Arian communities—whether it might not have hastened and protracted the period of the prevalence of Arian doctrine in their Churches. But the speculation is idle. The work that might have founded a sect is awakened from its sleep of a hundred and fifty years in the State Paper Office, to be translated by a Bishop and regarded as a curiosity of literature! The progress of human thought with the march of time depends as much upon the living as the dead, and what Milton's Epistle was fated not to do was yet done by the influence of his mind in other ways. In brief, the Treatise shows that Milton's views of the nature of Christ were expressly and emphatically those of

high Arianism; and that he held opinions about adult baptism which ally him with the General Baptists, and ideas of an inner light approaching to those of the Friends. But he held the lawfulness of war, freedom of divorce, and the lawfulness of polygamy. Moreover, he was a strong anti-Sabbatarian. He regarded with favour the gaieties and ornaments of life, and the innocent refinements and elegancies of conversation. And yet, to close these remarks with the closing words of Professor Masson's noble Biography: "It would be a mistake to say of Milton, on any of these accounts, that he did not belong to the great Puritan body of his countrymen. . . . Only an unscholarly misconception of Puritanism, a total ignorance of the actual facts of its history, will ever seek, now or henceforward, to rob English Puritanism of Milton, or Milton of his title to be remembered as the genius of Puritan England" (Vol. VI., p. 840).

HERBERT NEW.



### WHAT WOULD THE ATHEIST HAVE?

WE ask this question with reference to what, by very many, is still felt to be a serious difficulty in the way of believing in God as One who is perfectly just and good and wise, or as One who is able to achieve what perfect justice and goodness and wisdom would desire. We wish to treat that difficulty, where it is seriously felt, with something more than respect. It may do for prosperous poets and happy preachers to sing of nothing but the joy of life and the goodness of God; but contact with the stern realities of life shows us the other side. An old English poet—poet, too, not of sorrow and shadows, but of gladness and sunshine—calls this the “isle of dreams,” and says,—

In this world, the isle of dreams,  
While we sit by sorrow's streams,  
Tears and terrors are our themes.

And, to a large extent, they are our themes, unless we are heartless and unobservant. Shakspeare, in his profoundest and sorrowfullest tragedies, adroitly introduces intervals of near-lying humour, little snatches of song, bright gleams of sunny-hearted delight, or pure unconsciousness of evil. And that is a picture of real life. The great tragedy is being enacted;—the sick are pining, the vicious are sinning, the lonely are mourning, the helpless are perishing, the young are drifting into their life of grinding toil, the old are drifting out by the way of a pauper's grave; and we hold our little merry-makings, enjoy our music, laugh or

sigh over our mimic mirth or pain, or jog on in the even tenor of our way, and only a thin partition or narrow street separates the bounding from the breaking heart, the wedding party from the funeral, the happy mother, with her new-found treasure, from the mother with the empty place in house if not in heart. In truth, the sins and sorrows of a great town would haunt us like a weird spectre, in bed or at board, at church or at business, if there were not so many things lying nearer to us to fill our eyes and engross our thoughts; and though these engrossing things be trivial, and some of them but little selfish things, they serve, like tiny fingers on our eyes, to blot out the tremendous spectacle.

Religious people are apt to say that it is the rebellious spirit which finds occasion for unbelief in these sorrowful sides of human life; but it is not so. It is too often the frivolous, the thoughtless, the selfish, who have the least doubt about God and His perfect goodness, and over whose contented spirits the wave of doubt, produced by the throb of sympathy, never passes. Happy themselves, and never troubling their heads about the miserable, except in some small way of "charity"; full themselves, and never hearing the cry of the hungry, they find it easy to cry "infidel" when some tender, receptive, sensitive soul, appalled at the extent of the world's sorrow, falters on what Tennyson calls—

The great world's altar-stairs  
That slope through darkness up to God.

For it is, as a rule, such a soul, grieved at the sight of so much evil, perplexed at the spectacle of the apparently savage and merciless side of Nature, that falters; or, in some moment of sharp agony, denies.

And yet, while allowing all this, admitting that there is around us enough of squalor, dirt, deformity, hunger, disease, and sin, to make us all wretched if we were nearer

to it, and less engrossed with our own affairs ; admitting, too, that they are not necessarily the most religious souls who most readily glorify God as good to all ; still, there are some sober, practical considerations which lie on the threshold that go very far to mitigate the seeming severity of the evils of life, and that even suggest the curious and instructive conclusion that, after all, the happiest half of the world is not perhaps the half where the money and the machinery for producing happiness are found.

It is certainly a fact that misery exists only in reference to habits of body and states of mind ; that what is misery to one would be tolerable to another, or even luxury to a third ; and that, therefore, an enormous proportion of the apparent misery of the world is either not misery at all, or is misery of a very different kind from that which we take it to be. John Stuart Mill's painful picture of life's misery is here a very instructive one. He himself supplies us with an illustration of the fact we noted above—that it is the character the very reverse of frivolous, selfish, or rebellious that is most deeply touched by the spectacle of the misery of the world, or that finds in it a reason for doubt or unbelief. It was his very goodness, his sympathy with his kind ; in fact, his natural piety, that led him to his state of mind. But, on the other hand, it was this very sensitiveness that made him see more than there was to see. His tender heart, for once, prevailed against his keen insight and clear head. He said that Nature did every day nearly all the things that men are imprisoned or hung for doing ; and that she did these things “with the most supercilious disregard both of mercy and justice.” He got, by an opposite road, to the old Puritanical conclusion—that this world is “a waste, howling wilderness.” But the exaggeration is manifest. The earth is not the scene of misery he pictures. As to the lower animals, it should be obvious that pain to them cannot be, in many cases, what pain is to us :

pain is relative to consciousness and thought ; but, whatever the nature of their sensations may be, we are perfectly safe in saying that the happiness, whether as to amount or intensity, must far outweigh the misery.

Then, in relation to the misery of human beings, we must begin, as we just now indicated, by taking off an enormous percentage, which is due purely to the state of mind of the observer. It is here that "things are not what they seem." A refined woman, if unaccustomed to the sight, might look with horror on any one of a hundred streets or lanes in a great town, and might be frightened to see how much earth could be made like hell. And, truly, it is pitiable enough ; but, as regards misery, she would utterly miscalculate. Those dirty, dingy little houses are havens of refuge to hundreds ; the food they eat is what they are used to, and like best—when they can get enough of it ; the smells are not noticeable, except by a few ; and as for that reeking den, called a public-house, it probably gives as much enjoyment as her husband's club. It is sad enough, even so ; but, as regards misery, her impression needs an enormous rectification. She might go home, with tears in her eyes, and a thrill of thankfulness in her heart, to look on her children there. But her sum would be all wrong ; her multiplication and subtraction alike inaccurate. The terrace-children seem to have all the multiplication, and the poor little gutter-children all the subtraction ; but, so far as mere conscious pleasure goes, it may be rather the other way ; for, after all, still confining our attention to mere animal enjoyment, it is very doubtful whether the nurseries of the world have given more pleasure than the streets. Nature—shall we say God?—is very good to her gutter-children. She teaches them to get out of the way of horses, where ours would infallibly be run over ; she gives them, by instinct, to know the way home, so that they may have the joy of following the band a mile, where our children can

hardly be trusted to leave the gate. She helps them to get for themselves strange joys out of a bit of string, a few chips, and some shells; while, with endless story-books and costly contrivances for giving delight, we often fail to keep ours "good." She makes them thrive on thick pieces of bread, when they can get it, while ours need the doctor on four meals a-day. So with the men and women who are fathers and mothers of these children. Troubles enough they have, it is true, but not in the way we imagine. True, they live in dreary lanes, with polluted air and narrow rooms and endless noises; many of them have no Sunday clothes, and they live from hand to mouth, and lay by nothing for an evil day. But all this is commonplace to them. "Familiarity" breeds more than "contempt." They get many pleasures, too, in their way,—cheap enough, and not ideally admirable, but producing in them the same thrills, and ministering to the same feelings, as those known in "higher circles." The little humble merrymakings of the poor, or the red-letter days of the squalid, give amazing delight; and not a few homely pleasures come along the dingy "tenor of their way."

Another consideration carries us to a deeper and entirely different view of life, in relation to the real sorrow that remains when all allowances are made. The mystery is not explained, indeed, but light is thrown upon it by the very suggestive fact that out of sorrow have sprung some of the most precious elements of human life, and some of the most lovely traits of human character. Sympathy itself seems conditioned by sorrow, and pathos could hardly exist without pain; and the best half of life's emotions, and the vast varieties of moods and feelings, with all the lights and shadows of hope and fear, and love and hate, and expectation and surprise, can hardly be imagined except in a world where something answering to sorrow is possible. The noblest things in human life, the sublimest creations of

literature and art, the grandest developments and manifestations of character, seem somehow vitally related to this mysterious creative agent. There could have been no heroes, if there had been nothing to dare and nothing to endure ; no poets, if life had all been an easy gliding with an endless placid tide ; no self-sacrifice, if there had been nothing to surrender and nothing to bear ; no Jesus, if there had been no cross ; no Shakspeare, if there had been no possible Ophelia, Cordelia, Hamlet, Lear.

Life, in other ways, is full of singular indications of the fact that pain and difficulty and failure are actually necessary factors in education and enjoyment. Pain, in a variety of forms, is the guardian angel which warns us of error and danger, or the sentinel which peremptorily orders us off ; and that, though disagreeable for a time, is truest mercy. Besides, how often is failure the very key of success—the most direct road to the surest kind of possession ! How frequently does loss teach us how to gain ! How continually does endurance train to hardy manhood ! What we call misfortune or defeat is often our best schoolmaster, to call out our dormant powers, to vitally educate us, to make victory really our own. In the class-room, it is the blunder that is pilloried by a laugh which covers with confusion that comes to a speedy and utter end ; and, in the workshop, it is by cutting himself and spoiling his material that the young workman soonest and most surely finds out how to handle his tools. It is so that men learn all they deeply know, and gain all they securely win.

In the life of a nation we may see the same thing—that nothing has been solidly won without previous defeat ; that failure brought experience ; that even the “ hope deferred ” which “ maketh the heart sick ” had its far-reaching uses ; that trial knit men’s hearts together ; and that, as a rule, the gravity or variety of its trials measured the extent of its freedom, its security, and its solidarity. Where the laws

are the most human and the best administered ; where institutions do not quickly change, but go on their steady way, unhasting but unresting, never going backward, but always onward to the perfect day ; where the liberties of a people are based on the surest foundations and secured by the safest guarantees ; where the rights of man are most respected, and the governing or administrating classes touch most nearly the "working" classes, with the fewest contentions and the soberest freedom for all, we find that the mighty structure has been reared through long, laborious centuries, and inch by inch ; and that not without bitter sorrow and suffering has freedom broadened "slowly down, from precedent to precedent." All the great political reforms of our own day, for the removal of abuses and the correction of mistakes that had rooted themselves in the public policy of the English people, were won only after sore struggle ; and we cannot reverse these reforms, simply because they *were* so won. We cannot go back to the political system of fifty years ago ; we cannot return to the discarded ideas and policy of Protection ; we cannot re-establish the old selfish monopolies ; we cannot restore the corrupt pocket boroughs ; we cannot re-impose the tax upon literature,—and all this, not only because the decisions come to on these matters were sound, but because these decisions came after failure and suffering and hard work which always drive away the chaff from the wheat, and then root the good seed in men's living hearts, tread it down, and make it bring forth fruit which all learn to value.

The triumphs of Science furnish another illustration of the same fact. How they are won, we know ; and what mistakes and sorrows pave the way for nearly all great achievements. The old astrologers and the alchemists of a bygone day were not mere babblers and quacks. What grand feelers after the truth were they ! The dream of astrology has become the reality of astronomy ; and the

fevered fancies of the alchemist have become the sublime discoveries of the chemist. Herschel was a lineal descendant of the feared or despised men who listened for "the music of the spheres" or felt after the subtle laws that bind worlds and systems in one mysterious mighty whole; and Faraday was related by every intellectual tie to him who first sought in his crucible and his ashes for the philosopher's stone. In other fields of experiment and achievement the same thing is true. The early engines burst or break down; the experimental ships are clumsy, and waste precious time or go to the bottom; and then men see at once what is wanted. Every failure leads to better ideas or better work, till at last all falsities and ignorances are eliminated, and the stern schoolmaster, suffering, gets the truth comprehended and obeyed. He, then, who complains of suffering, complains of his best discoverer, his best inventor, his best practical engineer, his stern but unerring guide.

We do not say that these considerations explain everything connected with the mystery of suffering; still less do we say that suffering has been palpably "ordained" for the sake of the results we have indicated, or that it is obviously a good and right thing that some people should be miserable in order that others should be made sympathetic, self-denying, successful, or heroic; but we do say that these considerations go a very long way towards relieving the Atheist's otherwise gloomy and miserable picture, and that they do connect struggle and sorrow in a very curious and impressive way with the best results of triumph and the noblest forms of joy.

It may be here objected that the "difficulty" nevertheless remains, because a good, wise, and powerful God could and would have called into being a race that would have had no need to go through all these dark and sorrowful stages on the road of life ere it could reach the goal.



Perhaps so, but that is not clear ; it is, indeed, scarcely conceivable. A race of animated chronometers, curiously constructed to go right from first to last, is hardly the same thing as a race of hoping, fearing, loving, hating, struggling, self-centred, educated, aspiring men and women ; and such a race of men and women could hardly have been called into existence, even by infinite power, without some such process as that we have been considering. We do not say that this is perfectly plain, or that we are warranted in affirming that this is palpably the best conceivable world for the growth and development of human beings ; but we may assuredly conclude that this is evidently the best *kind* of world for the growth and development of such beings. Another kind of world might have grown angels or automaton, but angels or automaton are not under discussion just now.

It may here be useful to take note of the fact that the doctrines and suggestions associated with the phrases "law of selection" and "survival of the fittest," have thus far not tended to lessen the difficulty felt by those who are sensitively alive to the pain and sorrow endured by living beings, even on the upward march. But we have yet much to learn here. In a state of society to which the name of "savage" would be given, the law of "the survival of the fittest" works itself out unchecked by few if any of the gracious moral rectifications and spiritual adjustments that come with the higher stages. There, as in the case of some of the lower animals, a maimed, old, or useless member of the group is frequently pitilessly destroyed. "Every one for himself" is the law of life in those low social latitudes. But, as civilisation advances, all kinds of subtle checks come in to modify or to positively reverse these first rough developments of the law of "the survival of the fittest ;" and the deeper fountains of the spirit are reached. It is found that muscle is not everything, that being an able fighter or hunter is not the highest qualification for a ruler,

that there is something, too, in poetry, in graciousness, in the laughter of little children, in the pathos of age, in the struggles of the weak and the sorrows of the unfortunate. It is perceived that weakness, and old age, and misfortune, and deformity, and ignorance, and lunacy, and crime, are not just things to sweep out of the way as hindrances, but things to take account of, to spend thought and pity and love upon ; and so the law of "the survival of the fittest" comes to have an entirely new meaning, in the survival of the fittest to think, and forecast, and plan, and pity, and love ; nay, possibly, the fittest to be thought about, to be provided for, to be pitied, and to be loved.

Can we not see here at least the dawn of light upon one of the darkest problems connected with the painful education of the race ? At the very worst, we see the unadapted giving place to the adapted, the incapable perishing before the capable. It is, perhaps, nothing higher or more merciful than the "competitive system ;" but there is nothing malignant in that. It is, at all events, a grand effort to find out the best, that it may be advanced and perpetuated. And surely, if we ponder that, we shall see that Nature is neither blind nor cruel ; nay, but the more we think about it, the more shall we hear the gentle voice behind the cloud, the more shall we feel the beating heart beyond the iron hand.

It is with man as it has been with the earth on which he lives his little day. That has been shaped into beauty and fashioned into grace by the multitudinous processes of myriads of ages. Like a submissive child, it lay in the hands of the great mother, and so grew "to the measure of the stature" of this glorious earth. And not always by tender processes : but by fire and water, by all-consuming heat and all-binding cold, by fierce convulsions and gentle erosions, by ice masses and lava streams, yet all orderly, gradual, progressive, beneficent, the earth has been fashioned into hill and dale, mountain and meadow, with rich minerals

in the cells beneath, and balanced clouds for use and beauty in the heavens above, and river channel and ocean bed for the traffic of the world.

It is the same with the hardier growths that spring from her fruitful surface. The tree is beaten by every wind that blows, but takes a faster grip of the soil beneath, for all that it endures above. It is drenched by spring rains, thundered at by winter storms, and burned with summer suns ; but the one roots it in the earth, the other wins it to spread its beauty to the heavens. But these are poor patient things that have no choice, that cannot help yielding to the divine musician, the glorious architect, the mighty builder of the universe. But man, tempest-tossed, weary, struggling man, has the fatal gift of will. He can rebel, he can hate, he can repine, he can make the worst of everything, he can make the light hurt him, he can make all things "work together for" harm. On the other hand, this very gift of will, which distinguishes him from the earth or the tree, endows him with power to rise far above the conditions that limit the growth and development of these. "Creature of circumstances" he may be, but he has the wondrous power of himself becoming the supreme, the dominant circumstance. The poor tree must always submit to its fate, but man seems to have a practically inexhaustible energy which only needs to be drawn upon by the will. Let the storm only blow hard enough, and the tree must yield ; but if a man will only will it, he can bend his head to every blast and be unconquered, and make all things "work together for good."

We have said that we desire to treat with more than respect the difficulty felt by many tender souls ; but that desire is occasionally somewhat tried by a class of objectors, with reference to whose demonstrative complaints we have been more particularly led to ask the question, "What would the Atheist have?" A case in point will be most useful here. Some time ago, there appeared in Mr. Bradlaugh's

Paper two articles written in a missionary, not to say a militant, spirit, whose writers seemed as anxious as any revivalist to convert us to their views, and to save us from our own. Their utterances, to persons not accustomed to literature of the kind, may appear extreme and unusual ; but they are by no means uncommon, and, in milder forms, are, in a sense, very prevalent. It is good, however, to have the "difficulty" in an outright form. These writers, in common with all who take their view, fall into a singular unfairness. They confine their attention to, or only take account of, that side of nature and life which looks dark and sorrowful ; and they exaggerate even here. They become a sort of "devil's advocate" even against the "Nature" they desire to set in the supreme place.

One of these writers goes so far as to affirm that the belief in God is itself "a fruitful source of misery." He not only concludes that because there is misery there can be no God, but he seems to attribute not a little of that misery to belief in Him. In any case, this is mournfully one-sided, leaving out of the reckoning as it does the mighty consolation the belief in God has been to millions of even the most miserable. We do not say that belief in God is proved to be well founded because it gives consolation ; but the Atheist has at most only as much or as little right to say that that belief is false because it has led to superstition, bigotry, and persecution. But the question, at this point, is, not whether belief in God is well or ill founded, but whether it makes the world miserable ; and what we note here is the ignoring of the undoubted fact that belief in God gives an enormous amount of the profoundest kind of happiness to the world. When a man who appears to be estimating the value of things says broadly, that "the belief in God has been a fruitful source of misery," and adds not a word about it as an infinitely more fruitful source of consolation, hope, and joy, he uses false weights and measures, and will only escape

the charge of suppressing the truth by pleading that, for the time being, he lost sight of it—in other words, that his animus was stronger than his attention.

This same writer affirms also that “the ‘God-idea’ has inspired few to noble action,” and that “it is a stumbling-block to progress;” a statement which, in one form or another, is frequently made by militant Atheists, but which will hardly pass unchallenged by unprejudiced students of history. “The God-idea” has not only consoled the mourner, helped the miserable, made years of sickness bearable if not blessed, kept poor men and women from being soured by their struggles and crushed by their burdens, and lit the path of the dying in the last gropings for dear life; but it has been the very life and soul of the noblest workers for humanity. “The Atheist,” says this writer, “is the pioneer of a coming and a better time: he pleads for the poor, he seeks a nobler estimate of man.” God help him! What have Theists and Christians been doing all this while? What lies, to this very hour, at the very heart of our charitable institutions for healing the sick, for housing the orphan, for educating the ignorant? What, but the love of man that has been cherished and fed by love of God? Who, until now, have been the first to plead for the poor? and by what accident has it happened that the emancipators of the slave and the pleaders for the poor have, as a rule, been those who declared that to believe in God was the very breath of their mental and moral being?

“A nobler estimate of man,” too, is promised by the new evangelist. Will it, then, be “a nobler estimate of man” to say that instead of being a glorious creature destined to an eternity of progress, his life and his education are alike limited to the present narrow, and, on his own showing, miserable scene? Will it be “a nobler estimate of man” to reduce him to the level of a superior beast of burden, who is only more knowing that he may be more wretched, and

who is only more capable that he may be more baffled and broken? Will it be "a nobler estimate of man" to tell him that he can love only to lose, that he can labour only to be worn out, that he can hope only to be disappointed, that he can aspire only to be blotted out, and that however much he may lift himself above the tyranny of circumstances, and educate, cultivate, and elevate himself, he is only decking himself for a funeral, and growing a glorious manhood for the grave? Right or wrong, it is overwhelmingly plain that the Theist or the Christian has, at all events, the noblest estimate of man; and it is sheer mockery to talk of Atheism improving upon it, by destroying every portion of the estimate that gave man hope of advancement beyond the accidents of life, beyond the incident called death.

"The Atheist," says this writer, "is in front of all great movements for political, social, and moral advancement." But that remains to be seen; for, assuredly, up to this moment, "all great movements" of every kind have been mainly in the hands of Theists or Christians; and it has yet to be shown what political, social, or moral improvements can be wrought by getting rid of faith in God. To say the least of it, the experiment has yet to be tried: to say the truth about it, the experiment has nothing winning about it, to make us wish to try it.

Assuredly, if there is no God, and if we are to know it; if the splendid conception of life and progress beyond the grave is only a vain imagination, we are not better off than we thought we were, but unspeakably worse. Surely that is something to sorrow over with grief unutterable; and surely an element in life has then disappeared which has done incalculable service to humanity in its hours of bitterest need. The Atheist offers us "emancipation," but, assuredly, if we have to embark upon the effort to live "without hope and without God in the world," with only Atheism at the helm, it will become us to do so with a

"*sad*, wise valour," as men who go to try a great and doubtful experiment, the like of which has never been tried, and the end of which no man can foresee.

The second of the two writers named well represents a class to whom we have already referred, a class by no means as limited as many imagine. He dwells exclusively upon what we have already admitted is, on the face of it, a formidable argument against the existence of a good, wise, and all-powerful God. But this writer is not merely sensitive to the difficulty we have already discussed; he revels in it, he presses it upon us in what we have called a missionary or militant spirit, and founds upon it a vehement argument against the existence of God. He says that if he were the maker and the governor of the world he should be ashamed of his handiwork. He bids us think of the deaths by fire, wars, epidemics, explosions, shipwrecks, and the like; and asks how the occurrence of these can be reconciled with the idea of the existence of a good, wise, and powerful God. In return, we ask him what he would have. As an outright Atheist he would be the first to scoff at miracle, and to pour contempt on the suggestion of any supernatural interference with "the laws of nature." He probably prefers science to prayer; but what science could there be in the absence of the catastrophes he deprecates? Perhaps he would like a world in which fire knew what to burn and what to let alone; in which gunpowder could be trusted to explode only on suitable occasions, and in which bad work did not tell in a bridge. If not, what would he have? Either "the laws of nature" must be repealed, or God must interfere to prevent mistakes or to avert the consequences of them. The Atheist covers with derision the old-fashioned preachers who see in a great disaster the interference of God, for judgment or warning; but how much better is he when he makes the non-interference of

God a reason for not believing in Him? Mr. Holyoake was wiser when he taught us that "Science is the Providence of life," and asserted the truth that "scientific pursuits once authorised, scientific habits come to be cultivated, facts assume a guiding importance. The thinker acquires confidence and courage in the resources of science; he perceives the predominance of reason, and he learns to trust it throughout." What is this but to "justify the ways of God to man," in permitting the sublime order to revolve, crush what it may? It is the child who wants to be saved at every moment from the consequences of its errors, or who expects to be safeguarded against all accidents. But Atheism professes to be exceptionally vigorous, courageous, independent, and manly. This world, then, is the very kind of world that Atheists ought to like, and God the very kind of God they ought to be glad to admire. He is as impartial as a scientific force, as veracious as a mathematical quantity. He never surprises us with trick or variability, and is not moved from the rock of law even by cries and tears,—wonderful, unchangeable, just.

But something else is true. If we admit that evil broods about us, like some hungry beast, seeking whom it may devour, it is also true that the good, working, throbbing, shining at the heart of all things, is never absent, is never conquered, is always conquering. The good is not only here, but it persists, it is master, it seems destined to finally prevail. The problem of the co-existence of these two forces may be surely postponed in presence of this hopeful fact: and, all the more because the struggling soul feels that evil is somehow a usurper, or only a stepping-stone, at best, to the good; all the more because it feels that the good is its rightful king, it beats against the bars of the fleshly cage, and longs for the beauty, the harmony, the sunlight,



and the love, of which it dreams, or which it sees or hears or feels.

One very suggestive fact may be helpful here—that the effect of misery upon the miserable is, as a rule, not that which the Atheist would lead us to look for. Atheism, as we have seen, justifies itself by pointing to the world's sorrow; but Theism has expressed itself most touchingly and tenderly when that sorrow has had to be endured. It may be a paradox, but it is a fact, that it is not the miserable who “curse God and die,” but the prosperous who do that for them. Sorrow has drawn out the soul to God in profoundest trusts and sweetest confidences and most unshaken love. It is as though the baffled soul never reasoned about it; as though, in the failing of flesh and heart, nothing was remembered but the need of an abiding refuge and an undying friend. Logic may say:—If God is almighty, He is responsible for your grief; or if He were good He would help you out of it; curse Him and die: but the heart persists in its yearning, and cries “My soul thirsteth for God, for the living God: when shall I come and appear before God? My tears have been my meat day and night, while they continually say unto me, Where is thy God? . . . But I shall yet praise Him, who is the health of my countenance, and my God.”

As a matter of fact, then, it is not the sorrowful who become Atheists: they take refuge from creation in the Creator; they treat the world as a desert through which they pass to the Father's house beyond; they “rest in the Lord, and wait patiently for Him.” There might, indeed, be compiled a literature of the trust of sorrowful souls; and how rich would be the prayers, how sweet the hymns, how pathetic the entreaty, how sublime the confidence, how exultant the praise! No! it is not sorrow that will kill faith in God; but if ever the evil day should come when the child-heart shall die out of the world, and the love of God be

dismissed as a detected dream, it will only be when life gets all the heroism and poetry taken out of it, when nature is regarded only as a provider of marketable commodities, when physical pleasures alone are included in the category of human delights, and when hard cynicism, or weary satiety, or insipid common-place, or animal selfishness takes the place of aspiration; and when, having ceased to strive or dream, men cease to love or hope. But that day will never come. Science and civilisation will only make God a greater necessity than ever; and, in a universe vaster than our fathers knew, we and those who come after us will find ever more and more to lead the soul to aspire, to wonder, and adore.

We are thus led to one thought more, with which we may fitly conclude, and which, indeed, is necessary to our argument, though it will carry us far beyond the Atheist and his difficulties or his refutations. There is a growing feeling that the converging lines which, in relation to so many subjects, all tend to the great central facts of development through struggle, and progress through suffering, tend also, and more and more luminously and manifestly, to the sublime thought that the end is not here and now,—that the development and progress of man do not end with this little scene, that life's account must be left open, and that we cannot yet strike the balance of life's profit or loss. Presently the arms of the great silent mother will open to receive the worn-out form: but what then? Will the mighty process which has been going on at every step end just when it seems to be well begun? Are the accumulations of a life to go for nothing? and is Nature such a spendthrift of her productions that she can afford to fling her choicest fruits away just when they begin to ripen? What does reason say to that? What does conscience say to that? What does the voiceful spirit say to that? That way victory lies, and not defeat; life, and not death.

There will come, indeed, a little hurried winter, a moment's tremor in the mysterious cold, a closing of the poor, worn eyes, a few kind drops on a new-made grave; but—

Though I stoop  
Into a tremendous sea of cloud,  
It is but for a time. I press God's lamp  
Close to my breast: its splendour, soon or late,  
Will pierce the gloom. I shall emerge somewhere.

J. PAGE HOPPS.

## FACTS AND FANCIES ABOUT FAUST.

### II.—THE LEGEND AND THE STAGE.

**B**IOGRAPHY, basing itself mainly upon tradition, and largely impregnated by fable, records the existence, in the second half of the fifteenth, and in the early years of the sixteenth century, of a Doctor Johann Faust, philosopher, scholar, magician, conjuror. This Doctor Faust was born, it is supposed, in Kundlingen, now called Knittlingen, in Würtemberg; left ordinary studies for that of the black science, which he mastered in Krakau, and there instructed in unlawful arts his *Famulus* (or servitor) and disciple, Wagner. Faust is said to have exercised his power of summoning to his aid the Evil One, and to have made a compact with the devil, in virtue of which the soul of the magician should become the property of the fiend in consideration of a period of twenty-four years of enjoyment of all desires, and of all the pleasures that the senses, that the lust of the eye and the pride of life, can yield. Faust was to have, for the fulfilment of his purposes, a certain devil (*Mephistopheles* by name) attached to his person and service, and always at his command. The Doctor travelled far and wide in Germany, with his attendant fiend; enjoyed himself to the uttermost, and set the world wondering at the feats that he could perform. At the end of the covenanted time, the inexorable Evil One claimed his bargain, and the unhappy Doctor was robbed of life, under circumstances of gross cruelty, at the village of Rimlich, between the hours (these are very precisely given) of twelve at night and one in

the morning. Meantime his fame for wonder-working and for the diabolic art had become great, and widely spread throughout all Germany, and even in other countries of Europe.

The priests were glad of so pregnant an example of the danger of meddling with those unholy arts which, though forbidden, were yet then generally believed in; the vulgar love of the wonderful and the horrible was deeply excited by the life, death, and adventures of this potent magician; and hence it came to pass that Doctor Faust became the property of popular credulity and awe; and that, within some few years after his terrible death, his name and fame were bruited through all the land. Narrative and drama, the book and the stage, laid hold of the dark Doctor; and such reputations speedily became the subjects of exaggeration. The life of Faust penetrated into the life of the people, and from many sides was found to be attractive, awful, and suggestive. The flames of Hell light up a huge fire upon earth. The sense of that dim unholy power which can command the services of demons, and which can, by such aid, enjoy years of the enjoyment of every earthly lust, lays hold of superstitious fancy, and the tragic end of such a man has an appalling grandeur which impresses and stirs the popular imagination. Poems, pantomimes, puppet plays, tragedies, upon the subject of the great conjuror, appeared in numbers. In 1599, Wiedemann published, in Hamburg, his *Wahrhaftige Historien von denen greulichen Sünden Dr. Joh. Faustens*. Printed at once in Cologne and in Nürnberg, but without date on the title-page, comes next *Des durch die ganze Welt verrufenen Erzscharz Künstler's und Zauberer's Dr. Faust mit dem Teufel aufgerichtetes Bündniss, abenteuerlicher Lebenswandel, und schreckliches Ende*.

Nay, the legend of Dr. Faust spread beyond Germany to other countries of Europe, and, before the end of the sixteenth century, Marlowe had produced in England his *Tragicall Historie of Dr. Faustus*. It would be impossible to enumerate here all the shapes which this most popular,

though intensely German legend, has taken in literature and in the drama. A direct product of its time, the tradition is yet full of vital, of perennial essence, whether of wonder only, or of wonder blent with superstitious fear. We no longer believe in the gods of Greece, but we still love the beauty of the myths that they represent, and the sculptural glory of the forms in which they were incarnated by human imagination, and in which they still exist in the ideality of the pure marble. Goethe found a most moving and picturesque tradition, a story known, at least, to every German, and susceptible, as he soon saw, of great art-treatment as the vehicle of the very deepest meanings. It attracted him in his poet youth; unhasting, but unresting, he worked out of it gradually during the long years of manhood his own dramatic version, and the completed work crowned his sovereign age with its brightest glory. Seldom, in the history of literature, has a great poet so wisely or so happily selected a subject which would exert his powers to the very top of their bent. The idea of *Faust* is now inseparably and distinctively associated with the name of Goethe; and he has made the old, old story immortal by enclosing its rude outline and essence in all the higher meanings, in all the deeper beauty, that *he* could add to it. Goethe, himself a magician in the divine sort, found noble material for his art in the mediæval legend of the black wizard, Faust.

The first part of Goethe's *Faust* was begun, probably, in or even before 1774. The execution of the poem spread itself slowly over some thirty years. It was worked upon gradually, in the intervals of much other work, at many times and in many places—one scene was written in the Borghese Gardens in Rome—and was first printed, in its complete form, in 1806; a perilous and distracted time, in which the French victory of Jena exposed Weimar to occupation by French troops, and caused the destruction of many German manuscripts—as, for instance, Herder's

posthumous manuscripts and Meyer's works. Goethe's own house was filled with soldiers, and, inspired by a dread of the possible destruction of the completed manuscript of his masterpiece, he at once sheltered it in the security of print.

This first part of *Faust* was first produced upon the stage on 19th January, 1829. The theatre to which this honour belongs is the *Hoftheater*, of Brunswick; and Herr Eduard Devrient, in his *Geschichte der Deutschen Schauspielkunst*, tells the story of the original adaptation of Goethe's infinite, but dramatic poem, for acting; and of its first presentation on the boards of a German theatre.

August Klingemann had long been the successful Director of the *National-Theater* in Brunswick; but when, in 1826, the young Duke Karl (he was then eighteen years of age) came to the Ducal throne, he evinced a lively interest in the drama. The æsthetic Duke's interference was not of unmixed advantage to the theatre. He paralysed the beneficial working of Klingemann, and he then appointed his Master of the Horse, Herr von Oeynhausen, to be *Intendant* of the theatre. Klingemann was not dismissed, but his excellent theatrical discipline was destroyed, and his efforts in the cause of true dramatic art were seriously let and hindered. The young Prince interfered personally with the management of the theatre; he attended rehearsals; he set aside Klingemann's excellent rules, and thwarted Klingemann's strenuous aims and objects. The result of princely interference was not productive of good. Many of the best actors left the theatre; and those who remained were demoralised by a system of capricious favouritism. Young princes who meddle with the management of theatres have a tendency to take an almost disproportionate interest in the representatives of female characters, and Duke Karl's theatrical activity was, in this, as in other respects, very injurious to the Brunswick *Hoftheater*.

One caprice, however, of the young Duke led to a most important result—to the production on the Brunswick

stage of Goethe's *Faust*. Klingemann was himself the author of a dramatic version of the old *Faust* legend; and this version, which seems to have had, in its day, a moderate stage success, Klingemann was fond of producing in the theatre which he so ably managed.

On some occasion on which Klingemann's *Faust* was presented, Duke Karl, who loved to tease and to thwart the great manager, asked Klingemann why he did not produce the *Faust* of Goethe; and the Duke intimated that Klingemann dreaded the rivalry of Goethe. Klingemann replied that he would not venture to compare his play with that of Goethe; but that Goethe had not written his poem for the stage, and that it might be difficult to adapt it for representation. This was surely a not unnatural idea, as things then stood, or were held to stand, on the part of the Director. The Duke persisted; he had, he said, looked through Goethe's play, and found it intrinsically dramatic and very possible for acting. The Duke, naturally enough, carried his point; Klingemann himself adapted, for the first time, Goethe's poem for actual representation; and the piece was performed, with enormous success, on 19th January, 1829.\*

\* The following is a copy of the playbill of the first performance, on any public stage, of Goethe's *Faust*:—

BRAUNSCHWEIG-HOF THEATER.

MONTAG, DEN 19 JANUAR, 1829.

Zum Erstenmal:

FAUST.

Tragödie in sechs Abtheilungen von Goethe, für die Bühne redigirt.

PERSONEN.

Faust . . . . .	Hr. Schütz.	Erster	Handwerks-	{ Hr. Feuerflacke.
Wazner, sein Famulus . . . . .	Hr. Senk.	Zweiter	bursche .	{ Hr. Küster.
Mephistopheles . . . . .	Hr. Marr.	Dritter		{ Hr. Fischer.
Der Erlgeist . . . . .	Hr. Dessoir.	Erster	Schüler . .	{ Hr. Berger.
Bäuer Geist . . . . .	Hr. Gossmann.	Zweiter		{ Hr. Fitzenhagen.
Ein Schüler . . . . .	Hr. Hübsch.	Erstes	Dienstmäd.	{ Dem. Solbrig.
Frosch . . . . .	Hr. Eggers.	Zweites	chen . . .	{ Elise Hambath.
Brander . . . . .	Hr. Gunther.	Erstes	Bürgermäd.	{ Mad. Grösser.
Siebel . . . . .	Hr. Moller.	Zweites	chen . . .	{ Dem. Höpfner.
Altmayer . . . . .	Hr. Scholz.	Erster		{ Hr. Gerard.
Eine Hexe . . . . .	Mad. Lay.	Zweiter	Bürger . .	{ Hr. Clarpus.
Margarethe, ein Bürgermädchen . . . . .	Mad. Berger.	Dritter		{ Hr. Haars.
Valentin, ihr Bruder, Soldat . . . . .	Hr. Kettel.	Eine alte Wahrsagerin		{ Mad. Heoser.
Frau Marthe, ihre Nachbarin . . . . .	Mad. Klingemann.	Soldaten, Volk, Erscheinungen und Geister.		

Der Anfang ist um 6 Uhr, und das Ende nach halb 10 Uhr.  
Die Casse wird um 5 Uhr geöffnet.



Klingemann, to whom the credit of the first dramatic production of *Faust* is to be ascribed, died in 1831.

The next appearance of Goethe's *Faust* on the German stage occurred on 27th August, 1829, at Dresden. The Dresden Theatre was then under the brilliant and intellectual management of Ludwig Tieck, who naturally desired to add the German masterpiece to his long and glorious *répertoire*. Tieck hesitated, at first, from some fear that Goethe's wonderful poem would suffer when brought into contact with the realism of the scene; but the Dresden public demanded its production, and Tieck was not willing to remain behind when Klingemann had shown the way. It seems tolerably clear that the version then played at Dresden was arranged by Tieck himself. Indeed, it is highly probable that at least slight differences exist even yet between the various versions of *Faust* played in the different leading theatres of Germany. Each director takes his own view; and has power, within his own province, to translate his view into action. Each leading theatre in Germany possesses certainly its own acting copy of Goethe's *Faust*; though some slight modification may possibly be allowed when a great star—as Seydelmann or Emil Devrient—travels about with his *Gastrollen*, and plays Mephistopheles or Faust with the arrangement which, as the actor thinks, best suits his own style, or his own means of producing effect in the play. The star-actor is, in Germany, as great and as dogmatic a potentate as he is elsewhere in Europe. The actor is the despot of the stage.

Of all parts in the drama, Goethe's Mephistopheles would seem to be almost the most difficult character that an actor could undertake; difficult to conceive; almost more difficult to execute: for Goethe's fiend is an unearthly being. At times we shudder at, and shrink from, this mystic being, who is not of our order, who cannot be touched with a sympathy with our feelings or with our infirmities. It will

be of interest to us to consider the actor—Seydelmann—who is renowned in Germany as the most notable Mephistopheles, and to analyse a little his conception and his rendering of the great part : but it should be borne in mind that, apart from the character to be represented, apart from the due relations of that character to the play, apart even from the reverence due to the poet's conception, there is a great art of abstract acting ; an art which, by tones, looks, gestures, by living dramatically a powerful situation, by embodying moving passion, may be most highly effective, as acting ; and which may yet be wanting in consideration for the dramatist's intentions. This abstract art of acting may produce a vital effect out of a poor play ; or may find its opportunity of displaying itself without a scrupulous regard to the ideas of the author of the drama.

Mephistopheles is mainly modern in conception ; nay, it may be said that Goethe's fiend could only exist in a world which had known Voltaire. Goethe tells Eckermann of the great influence which Voltaire exercised upon his youthful thinkings ; and, long after any teaching of Voltaire had ceased to impel Goethe, this influence survived into his age in the form of his knowledge of the tone of thought which he attributes to Mephisto. In taking human form, in mingling with human action, the fiend loses much of the grandiose mystery with which the pious abhorrence of earlier and of simpler ages had surrounded him. Goethe evidently does not believe—at least, in the ruder and more objective sense—in the fiend ; nor does he tremble before Lucifer. If he had believed, he would have had more reverence for Satan ; but Goethe shows *persiflage* in his very treatment of the mocking spirit. The sneer of Mephistopheles is as the sneer of Voltaire ; as bitter and as barren : for Voltaire's withering mockery was rendered intense by his close contact with *L'Infâme* ; and Mephistopheles, in his futile activity, in his negative knowledge, and in his frustrated malignity,

suggests to us a spirit which has outlived the times in which men believed in him. The dramatic usefulness of Mephisto as the symbol of a spirit of evil is, nevertheless, as great, or, perhaps, greater, than it would have been in days of infernal faith. That earnestness of ideal belief in a personal Evil Spirit which inspires Milton's vision of Satan was wanting in a day which still tingled with cold laughter at the irony of Voltaire, and at the scepticism of the eighteenth century. Goethe was too unconsciously genuine to depict a demon of much more ideal elevation than one who should combine the costume of the Middle Ages with the tone of the modern master of mockery.

Shakspeare does not genuinely believe in the supernatural. His intellect denies that in which his imagination revels. Note the immense difference between his real awe of death and his half-assumed awe of the supernatural. He uses the supernatural—or men's belief in it—with the grandest art; but his day was so much nobler than the eighteenth century, that no man of Elizabeth's spacious times would have embodied the arch-fiend in a spurious human shape of mocking, and mocked at, irony. In the very play in which Shakspeare introduces a ghost, he speaks of death as a bourne from which no traveller returns. His ghost is forbidden to reveal to Hamlet the secrets of a purgatorial prison-house; the apparition of the dead king appears chiefly to impel human action in a tragic tangle of murder and of incest. The spirit of dead Cæsar appears to warn Brutus at Philippi; the ghosts of Richard's victims cheer Richmond, and sit heavy on the soul of Richard. The witches, dæmonic agents of Hecate, translate Macbeth's ambitious imaginings into the fulfilment of fatal prophecy; and a popular, superstitious belief in these debased agents of the Evil One is used for high and subtle art purposes, as a lure to tempt the Thane of Glamis to those crimes which lead him to his ruin. The difference of the ages in which

they lived is as great as the difference between the men themselves; and this truth appears clearly when we consider and compare the uses which Shakspeare and which Goethe make of the supernatural in art.

It is a point of some difficulty for the actor playing Mephistopheles to determine how far he shall hide, or seem to hide, from the other persons of the drama, the fact that he is really embodying the devil. It is clear that the author did not intend Mephisto to be recognised for what he is by other characters. Gretchen, it is true, instinctively, dislikes and distrusts him; his countenance is repellent to her—and then he takes no joy in anything—but, on the other hand, Marthe is willing to marry him; and the revellers of Auerbach's Keller, though exasperated by his mocking *persiflage*, do not know that it is the devil himself who has them by the collar. Gretchen herself dislikes him only as a hateful man. The poet could not allow a recognised fiend to mix visibly with human beings in the tragic, or the common-place, affairs of mortal life. For the actor who "plays the devil" ostensibly, it may be urged that the audience know well who Mephisto is; and they also know that the other persons of the drama must not know. The audience are not careful to see the other characters well deceived in this particular. Seydelmann cared much more for his audience than he did for his poet, or for the other characters. He wanted to display Seydelmann through Mephisto, and to get the utmost possible amount of effect out of so doing. The genius of the stern and spectral North—differing therein widely from Greek feeling—has always represented the fiend through an objective form of grotesque, repulsive horror. The vulgar idea of horns and tail expresses this tone of sentiment vulgarly. That art which is Representation has evolved out of itself a law, in virtue of which the fiend cannot be embodied in a beautiful human form. Goethe developed the traditions of the Middle

Ages, and employed, with a happy result, the red doublet and hose, the short red cloak, the long rapier, and the single cock's feather in the cap, when he depicted his Evil Spirit in human shape. Milton stood in no relation to the mediæval spirit; his high and shaping imagination distended his conception of Satan to the vague vastness of a colossal ideal.

Karl Seydelmann, born in 1793, was the son of a grocer and coffee-house keeper, in Glatz. His father's business included a billiard-room, which was much resorted to by the officers of the garrison. These officers were in the habit of getting up amateur theatrical performances, and young Karl Seydelmann, who evinced an early and decided talent for acting, made his *début* at the amateur representations of the officers at Glatz. In 1810, the young Seydelmann elected the profession of arms. Helped, probably, by officers whom he had met in his father's billiard-room, he entered the Prussian artillery; but he soon acquired a disgust for soldiering, and in 1811 he deserted, escaping by means of a forged passport, authenticated by a well-imitated signature of his major. The army succeeded in reclaiming Seydelmann's services; but, on account of his beautiful handwriting, he was exclusively employed in office work. He knew, indeed, so little of his military duties that, as he himself relates with great amusement, he once, on the occasion of an inspection, was wholly unable to fire off a cannon. In 1815 (the year of Waterloo) we find him playing at Count Herberstein's theatre in Grafenort. From Grafenort he transferred his services to the Breslau Theatre, from which he drew a salary of ten dollars a week.

In Breslau he replaced an actor named Kettel, and had there to perform the young-lover parts. For such characters Seydelmann was but little fitted. He was of middle height, and had bow legs. His features were neither striking nor pleasing; his hair was red. The glance of his blue eyes was

full of fire, and yet was cold in expression. But his most serious drawback lay in his speech. His tongue was thick, and was long; and his enunciation was, in consequence, indistinct, awkward, and hissing in tone. His voice was rough and thick, had but a limited compass, and was incapable of tenderness or of modulation. In passionate passages it acquired a tone which suggested the growling of wild animals.

Furnished thus slenderly by Nature with the graces or the powers of an actor, Seydelmann's singular determination, and fierce, strong will managed at length to conquer the defects which hindered the display of his undoubted genius. Director Professor Rhode urged him to abandon the stage; but no discouragement could repress Seydelmann, who, strong in his conviction of his own powers, announced, through tears of disappointment, but with passionate gnashing of teeth and stampings of foot, "You shall see; I will be an actor yet!"

Where genuine power exists, such strong, unconquerable resolution always leads in time to success.

Seydelmann set to work to subdue his tongue to become the organ of his purpose. With incredible assiduity, he practised declamation with a flat stone in his mouth. "What Demosthenes—who was only a man—was able to do, I must also be able to do," said Seydelmann, characteristically and defiantly. His proud determination was successful, and he made his intractable voice his slave.

In 1819 he got his first real opening, in the theatre at Grätz, in Steuermärk. His artistic insight, his burning zeal, his boundless ambition, his desire to surpass others, were assisted by an acquired skill in dealing with men; and at Grätz he rose rapidly in the profession of his choice. He played all sorts of things; even comic characters, for which, indeed, he had no aptitude; though he endeavoured to supply the want of comic power by a close study and artistic imitation of nature.

The theatre at Grätz fell under the direction of a cab-master, and the haughty Seydelmann at once quitted the company. He strolled about for some time from place to place, and learned thoroughly, in poverty and distress, the miseries of the literally poor player's life. The proud, hard man deduced from his time of sore struggle the bitter lesson that the actor must place his chief dependence upon egotism and self-assertion. Sorrows had hardened, and not softened, his harsh, domineering, and arrogant character.

At the Court Theatre, in Cassel, Seydelmann first obtained the undisputed possession of "leading business," and could play the great parts in which his artistic ambition really revelled.

Like a torch, which burns itself away while giving light, Seydelmann consumed his own health in a fiery attempt to attain to the utmost possible amount of *effect* in his performances. Away from the stage he did not drink, but, when acting, he used spirits freely with a view to stimulate his nervous system to its very highest pitch and strain of effort. This practice told, in the long run, very seriously upon Seydelmann's health. Cooke and Edmund Kean both drank spirits freely as stimulants to acting; but then they also drank them when they were not exerting themselves professionally.

Seydelmann must be ranked as a realistic tragedian. He did not belong to the declamatory and ideal school of Quin, or of the Kembles. Garrick, probably the actor who restored most nearly the school of the contemporaries of Shakspeare, the school of Taylor and of Burbage, included in his style both realism and ideality. He remained firmly based upon the truth of Nature, and yet presented ideal characters ideally. Macready, again, belonged to this mixed school, which presents forcibly and naturally profound passion and pathos, and yet maintains a lofty ideal art aim.

Seydelmann aimed at producing strength of effect. He

preferred the terrible, the striking, the sensational, the surprising. He loved villainous rather than noble characters. He loved Richard III. better than King Lear. He did not care for the *ensemble* of a performance, and never showed a loyal consideration for the author. He was selfish as an actor, and sought chiefly to unfold and to display his own great powers. He was inconsiderate and unfair towards his brother artists. He himself has said that "the stage is a field of battle on which one must conquer or must die. Whoever stands in the way of my success is an enemy that I will strike down." He admits that his object is to produce out of every character the greatest possible amount of effect. He made of every part a subjective property, and developed through it the energy of his own personality. One curious habit in studying he early adopted and always adhered to: he copied out, in his own beautiful handwriting every part that he played. He could not learn a part from the handwriting of other men. Nothing in life came easily to Seydelmann, and he was always slow of study. He noted on the margin of his copy the details of his "business." With inventive insight, he easily detected those great moments in a character out of which he could produce his most splendid effects; and to effect he always looked. His art aims were complected with his personal objects. He burned to surpass all his comrades, and to make of his acting a victory and a glory. The triumph of his own acting—not that of the thing acted—was the result for which he strove. He cared for truth to Nature in her strength rather than for adherence to her modesty. The Weimar school of acting, under the direction of Goethe and of Schiller, had somewhat resembled that of our Kembles: Seydelmann was the fiery Kean who despised art when it hampered the success of strong and working effect.

Fanny Kemble says:—"Kean is a man of decided genius, no matter how he abuses Nature's good gift. He has it.



He has the first element of all genius—Power. . . . Let his deficiencies be what they may, his faults however obvious, his conceptions however erroneous, and his characters, each considered as a whole, however imperfect, he has the one atoning faculty that compensates for everything else—that seizes, rivets, electrifies all who see and hear him, and stirs, down to their very springs, the passionate elements of our nature. Genius alone can do this. Kean may not be an actor, he may not be an artist, but he *is* a man of genius, and instinctively, with a word, a look, a gesture, tears away the veil from the heart of our common humanity, lays it bare as it beats in every human heart and as it throbs in his own. Kean speaks with his whole living frame to us, and every fibre of ours answers to his appeal. I do not know that I ever saw him in any character which impressed me as a *whole work of art*; he never seems to me to intend to be any one of his parts, but I think he intends that all his parts should be *him*. So it is not Othello, Shylock, Sir Giles; it is Kean, and in every one of his characters there is an intense personality of *his own* that, while one is under its influence, defies all criticism—moments of such overpowering passion, accents of such tremendous power, looks and gestures of such thrilling, piercing meaning, that the excellence of those parts of his performance more than atones for his want of greater unity in conception and smoothness in the entire execution of them.”

Mrs. Kemble’s fine criticism on Kean would apply, to a very great extent, to Seydelmann also. They were players whose powers were not dissimilar, and whose aims in acting were based upon the same force of personality and fervour of genius.

Seydelmann took but little interest in the abstract drama. He desired eagerly to startle an audience and to surpass all competitors; and he early saw that “he who will rule the

world must not try to better it." He accepted everything that he found existing in any theatre, and strove only to find fit opportunities for the display of Seydelmann himself.

I may, perhaps, be permitted to reproduce here a short extract from a previous essay,\* in which I said of Seydelmann :—

*Vis-à-vis* poet and public, Seydelmann thought chiefly of himself—of the effect which he could produce, of the applause he could obtain. He is accused of having often sacrificed his part and his author to some startling reading, to some surprising point. On the other hand he was wholly original; he followed no other actor; he was full of fire and of force, and his own strong, clear will shone through all his performances. When he is compared, as he often is, with his great rival Ludwig Devrient, you always find that Devrient's performance is spoken of as a whole, while Seydelmann is remembered for his points. Devrient sank his personality in modest devotion to his art; Seydelmann asserted himself through and above his art; he was an intense and most moving actor, of strong points and of electric effects. He always excited his audiences to enthusiasm; and he attracted more, perhaps, than any other German actor has done before or since. He disliked playing with great or even good actors; and he would conceal his most startling points at rehearsal in order to prevent his fellow-artists from divining the effects he intended. He was a great, a powerful, a moving, an original, actor; but was self-seeking and vain. He was the first and the greatest of the matadors, or star-actors in Germany.

Seydelmann died in 1843. Herr Eduard Devrient cites many instances of Seydelmann's violations of the poet's text; violations introduced solely with a view to producing new and startling effects as an actor; and Herr Devrient refers particularly for instances of this vice in conception to Seydelmann's Shylock, Marinelli (Emilia Galotti), Alba (in Egmont), Don Carlos (Clavigo), Antonio (Tasso), Ossip (Isidor and Olga), Brandon (Eugene Aram), and Mephistopheles. Thus, Seydelmann's Shylock was not the despised and humble Jew of Venice, but was a raging fury, who

\* "A Glance at the German Stage."

appeared as a despot, who dominated Doge and Senate, and stood above all other persons. He distorted the relation of Shylock to the drama, and to the other characters; his denunciation of Antonio was so violent that spectators expected to see Shylock assault the merchant, and cut the throat of Antonio. As Alba he received Egmont with such indicated meaning of fell intention, that the *insouciance* of Egmont, as that is depicted by Goethe, seemed the merest folly. He was fond, for the purposes of strong effect, of splitting up a speech into "asides," which were never contemplated by the author. When, in the fourth act, Clavigo confesses his intention to marry, Don Carlos has to exclaim—"Hell, death, and the devil! and thou wilt marry her?" Seydelmann said the first part of the sentence as an aside, and then said, coldly and scornfully, to Clavigo, "And thou wilt marry her?" Into the part of Antonio, in Tasso, he imported a suggestion of suspicious relations with the Countess Sanvitale. But Seydelmann has for us most interest in connection with Mephistopheles.

In Germany, generally, Seydelmann ranks as the great Mephisto. Old playgoers, who accompany you to see some other representative of the arch-fiend of the drama, say, sorrowfully, "Ah, if you could only have seen Seydelmann in the character!" His biographer, Rötcher, speaks with boundless, if with indiscriminating, enthusiasm, of this unquestionably powerful performance, while Eduard Devrient, on the other hand, speaks of it with discrimination, but with a tempered enthusiasm. The part requires the utmost intensity of meaning, but cannot bear the merest suggestion of passion, of warmth of feeling, or of human, earthly force.

Seydelmann maintained that he depicted the devil of the old Faust legend, and that Goethe would have been astonished if he could have seen the terrible attributes and the force that could be thrown by an actor into this fiend

that the poet had raised, but had only sketched in words. Seydelmann said—"He who draws the devil on the wall must not faint with fear if the original should grin at him through the sketch." Apart from the broad, general consentience of popular admiration, that most powerful, that most awful presentation of Seydelmann in Mephisto is a standing subject of critical controversy in Germany. Seydelmann indulged his realistic tendencies to the top of their bent in Mephistopheles. He was always the fiend as he appears on the Blocksberg, where he is recognised as the devil. Seydelmann destroyed the position of Mephisto *vis-à-vis* the other characters and the drama itself. His "make up" was dreadfully impressive. He was fierce, coarse, repulsive, dreadful; he excited wild laughter; though that laughter of spectators was, as I imagine, that relief to overstrained feeling which echoes hollowly through the morbid merriment which greets Iago's murder of Roderigo. Seydelmann would not descend, in irony, to the travelling cavalier, to the possible comrade of humanity. "Where," asks Immermann, "where is the Marinelli of hell that Goethe intended?" But, whatever injury Seydelmann may have done to the meaning of the poet, his Mephistopheles, *i.e.*, himself in Mephistopheles, was most terribly real, was most awfully powerful; the nerves, as the imaginations, of spectators were wholly subdued and dominated, and full theatres emptied themselves, after the performance, of excited, deeply moved men and women, upon whose lives was stamped a permanent image of great horror, who had been in dramatic contact with an infra-human being, and who (as I have learned by experience of them) would never wholly forget the impression made upon them by Seydelmann's weird Mephistopheles. The effect that he then produced resembled that which Kean, Macready, Rachel, have also made on the feelings and on the imaginations of men. It is the effect produced by

mighty abstract acting; and may exist in some cases apart from the design or the creation of the poet whose work has been presented on the stage. The stage itself, as an entity, has something dæmonic in its abstract essence and working.

Kühne of Darmstadt is the best Mephistopheles that I have seen. At proper times he raised a shudder in the spectator at imaginary contact with an evil spirit; and he always suggested, subtly, the infra-natural, while his relations with mortals were sufficiently probable. He could express the cold, cynical, inhuman fiend. Döring was too human, too full of *bonhomie*. You could not enough realise the devil. Dawson is held to have been too forcible and fierce. I think that Macready would have been as fine and subtle a fiend as the stage could wish for; his intellect would have added to the human devilry of Iago the unearthly devilry of the very fiend himself. He who could so well play Shakspeare would also have interpreted Goethe.

Through Seydelmann the poet had raised a devil that he could not control; the actor played, literally, the very devil. His Mephisto must have been recognised as the fiend by the other characters, and such recognition would have been fatal to Mephisto's plans; but, while acting the part, Seydelmann paralysed criticism. Men do not laugh when they are under water; they do not criticise while their judgments are submerged by the genius of abstract acting. In Mephistopheles there is nothing human but the assumption of humanity; but that assumption should be sufficiently depicted. The incarnate Evil Spirit is seen to act visibly, as he does act occultly, in his attempts to lead men to their harm; but to one man only in the play is the fiend really known. Seydelmann forgot, perhaps, too much the modesty of his art in his lust for her power.

Frau Niemann-Seebach is the best Gretchen that I have seen; indeed, it would be impossible to conceive, or to desire, a better representative of the part; nor could a more

perfect Marthe than Frau Frieb-Blumauer be imagined. Emil Devrient was a great Faust ; though he failed, before the magic change to youth came, to depict clearly enough the bowed, worn, prematurely-aged student. After the change, he was an ideal cavalier. Hendrichs, as Faust, was too declamatory, robust, loud ; he opened the play with a voice of rolling thunder. He began in virile middle age, and did not grow younger after drinking the witch's draught.

Faust is held, by German actors, to be what players call a "thankless part." They consider that the character, in stage representation, is overshadowed, is obscured, by that of Mephistopheles. German star-actors prefer the fiend to the philosopher ; nor is it to be wondered at that the greater effect should be produced in the most unique part in the drama ;—in a part which embodies a transcendental apparition seen through the mask of a human form. Faust strives, strains, inquires, acts, wrongs—suffers ; Mephisto is the embodiment of denial, of blindness to goodness, truth, nobleness, beauty ; he represents, through the terribly grotesque, irony, sneering, scorn, filth, evil, mockery. His very appearance on the stage, among human actors, is a sensation, a terror, a wonder, a portent of incarnate *diablerie*. Intrinsically, Mephistopheles is more a puppet than is Faust ; but, on the stage, this does not seem to be so. This wonderful and terrible drama of two souls apparently hopelessly enmeshed by the devil, places Mephisto, to all appearance, in the position of motor, ruler ; but he is so to appearance only, since his fruitless activity in reality only subserves the high, inscrutable designs of omnipotent wisdom. The devil, according to Goethe's views and showing, is the mere puppet and factor of the Deity. Faust is certainly one of the most exhausting parts for an actor. It is very long, and is always to be played throughout at a high pitch of passion. There is, in the first part, the tragedy of thought, and of the soul ; there is, in

the later parts of the play, the tragedy of passion, love, conscience, remorse. In the early parts, Faust's impatient, defiant soul, weighted with cares about its relation to the Unseen, feeling (as Goethe himself had felt) the vanity of knowledge, is driven, in haughty desperation, to the black art, and to the eager fiend; and this part requires, from the actor, most difficult and passionate art. Later, after the magic transformation, after the return to youth, the part culminates in passion, though it is passion of a more human sort. Indeed, it has been suggested (*Werel's Goethe's Faust, in Bezug auf Scenerie und Bühnendarstellung*) that the part of Faust should be played by two actors, one sustaining it up to the scene in the witch's kitchen, the other assuming it at that point, and continuing it to the end. German actors, in my opinion, fail to render in the earlier scenes the comparative age of the over-worn student; they make the Faust of the opening too vigorous and robust; there is not contrast enough between the sage and the cavalier. They trust too much to the philosopher's long beard. Both Emil Devrient and Hendrichs seem to me to have failed in this respect. German actresses, on the other hand, often make Marthe too ugly and too old. A very eminent Mephistopheles said, "The play is called Faust, not Mephisto; and the greatest difficulty in the latter part is, perhaps, to avoid putting it too strongly forward at the expense of the title-part. My rendering of Mephisto will never be properly appreciated from all sides until I play it with a Faust who can play me down."

In Shakspeare's treatment of historical characters, history is enclosed and included in a thing more glorious than itself: he did not merely teach the letter of history, but he exalted it to an imaginative ideal, and raised it to the measure of his art. He did not violate, but he did elevate truth. Rapt up to the heaven of imagination in a chariot of the fire of his own genius, he saw the characters of



history in larger relations, and he depicted them as abstract poetical conceptions. Take Queen Katharine, Henry V., Richard II., as illustrations ;—he did not falsify, but he overrode history, and used it as a basis upon which his insight and his imaginatively creative power could raise types of a wider and more glorious truth than was comprised in the actual, limited fact. Goethe dealt with the Faust of the old miracle-play in something of the same spirit. No popular legend could present a human soul so complex, so many-sided, so tried and tempted, as that which Goethe evolved out of the rough lumber of legend and tradition.

To deal with the old Faust legend according to the highest modern ideas ; to use the *naïveté* of the still vital old popular story as a vehicle for the highest abstract thought and as an enclosure for the most moving tragedy—this was a problem for distinctive genius ; this is the problem which has been solved to a marvel by Goethe. The idea that the Evil One should directly bargain with man for man's soul, should satisfy all the desires of the heart, the desire for pomp, pleasure, power, at the price of the soul of the bargainer, is a direct product of the objectivity of conception, of the *naïveté*, of the superstition, of the very piety itself, of the Middle Ages. The story is essentially German ; it is full of the *diablerie* which is inherent in German imagination. No other country could have so well evolved from its moral consciousness the legend of Faust. No other country could so well have developed the poet who could subordinate the olden story to the highest purposes of thoughtful and imaginative art. The fancy, the half-divine mythus of devil and angel contending for man's soul, is a more direct objective conception ; the bargain between man and demon is the distinctive essence of the Faust story.

The peculiar characteristic of Faust as the subject of a drama is the circumstance that the Spirit of Evil must



appear embodied and incarnate among the merely human characters. The incarnate dæmonic mingles visibly and tangibly with the human action. The infra-human influence is to be watched and traced in its working, and in the result of that working. Take the simple human story of Faust—without visible dæmonic interference—and it resolves itself into a very ordinary drama of seduction, of murder, of sorrow, and of most tragic issue. Place the Evil One ostensibly in action among the mortals, and the drama acquires a weird and deeper meaning—a strange, supernatural influence. How shall the poet conceive and depict this mysterious, this terrible Spirit of Evil? That which the poet's imagination can body forth must be received through the imagination of reader or of spectator. It is difficult to conceive a more difficult imaginative task than that of placing Satan on the stage. How shall the dramatist make such a being speak?—how shall he depict the dark Spirit of Evil, the antagonist of goodness and of God, assuming human conditions and mortal limits? Were not this high problem so nobly solved by Goethe, we should be inclined to hold it to be impossible. In Goethe's *Faust* the fiend does not appear, as he does in Marlowe's *Faustus*, as a mere conjuror, a slave of the ring, who can be called upon at any moment to perform wonderful, if sometimes childish, tasks. No; the Mephistopheles creation of great Goethe is touched to finer issues, and appears for quite other purposes. The mystery of the great—the perhaps apparent only, but yet immortal—conflict between Good and Evil has to be indicated, not dogmatically or doctrinally, but imaginatively, and as it can be conceived by the free and holy spirit of man. In that fine air of spiritual thought which outsoars all the churches and extends above all the steeples must the poet work who will deal adequately and nobly with the Faust legend. There was but one poet who, qualified by very many con-

current circumstances, could discharge the high task ; and that poet was Goethe.

Small wonder that the completion of a drama on this infinite subject should spread over years, long as well as very many, of the great poet's life. He was not in any hurry to complete a work which even he could scarcely exhaust.

A little careful analysis will show how wonderfully Goethe has managed the apparently insuperable difficulty of making Mephistopheles fitly talk. The poet must indicate that the unearthly talker knows more than man can know of the deepest secrets of the universe ; and yet Mephistopheles does not need, or wish, to tell all that he knows ; he unfolds only so much as is necessary to lead and to mislead Faust and the other characters ; though, at times, the fiend speaks as if half thinking his own thought aloud ; while on other occasions—as, for instance, with Marthe and with the student—he speaks in order to indulge his irrepressible, grim, hellish, gross, cynical, bitter humour. Goethe had, of necessity, to make his Devil very like a man. If the fiend were absent from the drama, the action would have the same issue ; but with the very fiend upon the scene, the spectator is subjected to the weird fascination of seeing the process by means of which the end is to be brought about. Goethe believed in “the shows of evil ;” he conceived that the good, that the Deity, was omnipotent and supreme ; and that evil, instead of being a rival power, was only an influence tolerated and used by divinity, to work out divine ends. Hence, he draws Mephisto as a *Geist der stets verneint* ; as a spirit working vainly, always labouring for evil, and yet controlled by a higher power, and always involuntarily working for good—a conception which may be theologically wrong, but is yet possibly divinely true.

Goethe's *Faust*, as he wrote it, is more than a drama ;

not less than a drama; it is never undramatic. The dramatic poem, which deals with such great argument, includes a drama within its larger limit. No great Regisseur—no Tieck or Klingemann—would find any difficulty in compressing action, poetry, and event into the practical stage scope of an acting drama. A work purely, or merely, a dramatic poem is not necessarily a drama. It may contain no moral conflict, no tragic collision with Fate, no action, and no event which springs from dramatic attrition; but Goethe's *Faust* contains all dramatic elements, and, as a tragedy half supernatural, half human, it remains "sad, high, and working."

H. SCHÜTZ WILSON.

*THE ECLECTIC USE OF THE GOSPEL  
NARRATIVES.*

THOSE whose lot it has been to pass through a gradual course of emancipation from the yoke of bibliolatry must all remember the kind persistency with which anxious friends at one time sought to impale them on one or other horn of a dilemma. "Either," it was said, "you must submit to the authority of the Bible in those parts of it which you do not like, or else you can have no authority at all for those parts which you do like." And so long as such inquirers were looking for a positive as distinguished from a natural authority, that is, for an authority imposed from outside the order of nature instead of that which this order resistlessly carries with it, the dilemma was not without its terrors. But so soon as the need for a positive authority ceased to be felt, it was discovered that one of the horns of the dilemma was made of spiritual india-rubber, and, instead of impaling the soul, did not inflict even a prick on the conscience. The Bible was simply taken at its natural value as an embodiment of human experiences within the order of nature. Some of these experiences were felt to have depended on a false interpretation of the external world and of man's relation to it. Others were felt as growing out of universal and fundamental elements in humanity. All practical and moral difficulties then vanished, whatever critical difficulties might remain. Our inquiring souls continued to read their Bibles, not because any positive authority said, "Search the Scriptures," but

because every now and then they came across something that did them good, and such good as—no matter why—they did not get anywhere else. There were a great many sayings in the book, and not a few stories of human experience which, in Coleridge's pregnant sense of the word, "found" them, went right through all the conventional encasement of their souls into the secret sources of action, and there made a stir that sent a thrill through all their energies. They felt it absurd to be told that because they had given up infallibility there was no authority for them in such parts of the Bible. As well might heathen priests tell the doubters of their mythology that if they cease to worship the sun there is no justification for their feeling the warmth of his beams or the joy of revival in spring-time.

It is obvious, however, that this practical discrimination of spiritual value in the Bible has nothing to do with historical or textual criticism. Yet there is one point where it shows a disposition to intrude. In the Old Testament the question does not arise. For when, for instance, the Psalmist says of his enemies, "Let them make a noise like a dog and go round about the city; let them wander up and down for meat and grudge if they be not satisfied," our rationalised Christians do not feel in the least inclined to make their repugnance to this sentiment a test of its Davidic authorship. They only observe that if David uttered this, he must have been in a very objectionable temper at the time, and they enjoy the 23rd Psalm as much as ever.

But in regard to the Gospels their feelings are different. There they have always been affected not so much by principles or doctrines as by the glory of a life. Fragmentary as the memorials of that life are, yet they are so singularly pregnant and suggestive that, when taken in connection with the Jewish past and the Christian future lying on either side of them, they grow into a perfect whole, as fragments

of an antique statue do if viewed by imagination inspired with knowledge and sympathy. But our spiritual pilgrims from the Egypt of orthodoxy are never allowed to proceed very far on their journey before they find themselves somewhat rudely challenged on this subject. They are asked how they have put their image together; and, when they indicate the source of their materials, they are asked how it comes to pass that they refuse other elements which would make the complete figure much more discordant and less agreeable to themselves than it is at present. In fact, they are confronted once more with the objection made by earlier friends on quite other grounds. "I wish to know," says Mr. Voysey, speaking of Mr. Clodd's view of the person and character of Jesus, "on what principle of reason or with what consistency such a conclusion can be arrived at after a candid perusal of the four Gospels? Mr. Clodd, so far as I read aright, starts with the assertion that these records are not trustworthy and not strictly historical; are encumbered with myths; and that neither the writers of these narratives, nor the followers of Jesus, rightly understood him." \* And again, "We ask by what possible means can we rightly determine which of the records are true and which false; or which of the speeches are correct reports and which are not? The usual method with a certain school, of which Mr. Clodd so far as Christ is concerned is a type, is to start with the assumption that, because some good deeds and sayings are reported of Jesus, therefore all the good deeds and sayings must be true, and accurately reported, while all the wrong deeds and false sayings are not to be attributed to Jesus, but to the misunderstanding and inaccuracy of his biographers. This method of dealing with professedly historical documents is precisely as reasonable and legitimate as it would be for any school to accept as true all the

\* This and other quotations are from a published sermon delivered by Mr. Voysey at Christmas, 1879.

bad deeds and wrong sayings of Jesus, and to reject as spurious and false all the records of his good deeds and good sayings."

Thus we are confronted with the old dilemma in a much more formidable shape; more formidable, because there is nothing merely fictitious or conventional in either alternative. It is a question of historical testimony. If you are asked why you believe Jesus to have given a pre-eminently spiritual interpretation to religion, you appeal to the Gospels. But when other people point to the evidence these same Gospels give of apocalyptic sensationalism, you say, "Oh, we make no account of that; that results from '*Aberglaube* intruding' into the vulgar minds of the Evangelists." According to this method of treating historical documents, they may be made the mere reflex of personal inclinations.

Still there is something to be said on the other side; otherwise what is called the "higher criticism" would have no place at all. What I suppose to be meant by the higher criticism is, amongst other things, the discernment of congruities or incongruities with character, time, and place, such as distinguish original elements from accretions in a document or tradition under consideration. Of course, the results of such discernment are often characterised by mere probability of various shades, though sometimes they are tolerably certain. But the question is here of legitimacy, not of the degree of probability. Our spiritual pilgrims, being relieved of the fear of damnation for making a mistake, can afford to be satisfied with a very remote approximation to certainty. The congruities of character are more subtle than the regularity of material action in nature. Yet the long experience of humanity has given us some confidence in insisting upon them. The constable who helped Sheridan out of the gutter was probably not deceived when the drunken M.P. gave the name of Wilberforce. And in the notorious Tichborne case the assent of the more intelligent

public to the verdict depended on their sense of incongruity in character, rather than on any attempt to master the perplexities of evidence.

With regard to the subject before us, the relevancy and force of such an argument is, indeed, not denied. For Mr. Voysey, in the sermon already quoted, allows, on very similar grounds, the necessity of distinguishing between the values of different elements in the Gospels. "They profess," he says, "to give us a portion of the biography of a remarkable man. Some of this is, in all probability, true, and some of it false. Some of the speeches are not unlikely to be reported with sufficient accuracy to make them rank as substantially correct. Others of the speeches, especially those in the fourth Gospel, carry suspicion on the very surface, seeing that they are out of character with the prevailing speeches elsewhere." In other words—for so I interpret this judgment—the same man cannot have delivered both sets of speeches. But why is special suspicion thrown on the discourses of the fourth Gospel, rather than on the Sermon on the Mount? Surely, because, on various grounds, the Sermon on the Mount is thought to accord better with the historical character of Jesus as a teacher than the speeches of the fourth Gospel. I contend, then, that in making this distinction, and in hinting at its grounds, Mr. Voysey has supplied at least the germ of an answer to his own question which he puts with much force in the very next paragraph. "By what possible means," he asks, "can we rightly determine which of the records are true, and which are false; which of the speeches are correct reports, and which are not?"

Of course, any complete reply to this question would require an examination of all the materials to be dealt with, and a discussion of canons for their use. But our object at present is much more limited. We are concerned only with the partial answer suggested by Mr. Voysey himself when



he says that some of the speeches in the Gospels "*carry suspicion on the very surface, seeing that they are out of character with the prevailing speeches elsewhere.*" Of course, it is understood that such a mode of discrimination is applicable only after external criticism, that is, judgment by manuscripts, quotations, references, and historical testimony, has done its work. We assume that the results of this external criticism are before us. It gives us an approximately accurate text of the Gospels as they existed some time in the second century, together with certain ecclesiastical surroundings and reminiscences, apart from which they cannot be understood. There is no dispute that a further criticism is permissible, or even necessary. Mr. Voysey, as we have seen, allows it in references to speeches that "*carry suspicion on the very surface.*" And our liberal Christians—or shall we say our neo-Christians?—maintain that the figure of Christ is a bizarre impossibility without it. The only question, then, is as to the principles of application, and for the purposes of the present discussion we shall deal with these best by taking one or two examples.

In Luke xvii. 20, &c., it is said that the Pharisees demanded "when the kingdom of God should come." Like their modern representatives, they were apparently looking for a sort of proclamation by trumpeters, to be followed by a transformation scene, in which they were to play a conspicuous part themselves. The answer they received was remarkable. "The kingdom of God cometh not with expectation," is not a thing that can be waited for like a royal procession; "neither shall they say, Lo here! or, lo there! for, behold, the kingdom of God is within you." The mode of expression is peculiar—*μετὰ παρατήρησεως* is, indeed, a *ἅπαξ λεγόμενον* in the New Testament. But the idea pervades the reminiscences of Christ's doctrine, *e.g.*, "So is the kingdom of God, as though a man should cast seed on the earth, and should sleep and rise night and day,

and the seed should spring and grow up, he knoweth not how. For the earth bringeth forth of herself"—*αὐτομάτη*, naturally, as we should say, "first the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear" (Mark iv. 26—28). The same un-Jewish principle is inculcated by the parables of the sower, of the leaven, of the mustard-seed. All suggest that the progress of the kingdom is to be like the processes of life, gradual, governed by law, slowly and even imperceptibly arriving at perfection.

Nor are such parables the only testimony to a peculiarly spiritual and inward conception of the heavenly kingdom in the mind of Christ. It is even oftener implied than directly expressed. "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven." "Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth." "Blessed are they which do hunger and thirst after righteousness, for they shall be filled." "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God." "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness." "Lay not up for yourselves treasure on earth,"—in other words, set not your desires on outward things. It may be said that even the most spiritual parables, as, for instance, the first quoted, hint at a harvest suggestive of a world-convulsion in which angels and devils are to play their part. But Christ's notion of a harvest is suggested in the touching incident of the Gospels when "he saw the multitude, and was moved with compassion on them because they were weary and scattered as sheep having no shepherd." Then, said he, "The harvest truly is plenteous, but the labourers are few; pray ye, therefore, the Lord of the harvest that he will send forth more labourers into his harvest."

The impression made on our minds by these elements in the Gospel is that the great Teacher cherished in his soul a wonderfully pure, spiritual, and exalted interpretation of the traditional ideal of his countrymen, a divine kingdom on earth. That such a conception was not inconsistent with a

hazy acquiescence in the claims of pre-existing apocalyptic visions to the reverence generally accorded them in those times is probably enough. But we gather that the bent of the Master's genius was not in that direction. Nay, he was so taken up with the moral character, and consequent gradual development of the kingdom, that he did not stop to inquire whether his teaching was consistent with the apocalypses then in vogue or not. At any rate, he clearly taught that the kingdom was inward,—the rule of God in the hearts of men,—that its growth was so gradual as to be imperceptible,—that its advent should have no local and conspicuous sign, but should only be felt as a universally diffused light.

But now our neo-Christians are confronted with the apocalyptic visions of the Gospels themselves. The orthodox and the non-Christian, with equal triumph over our simplicity, flaunt before us the flaming pages at the end of St. Matthew. "Look here," they say: "'Immediately after the tribulation of those days shall the sun be darkened, and the moon shall not give her light, and the stars shall fall from heaven, and the powers of the heavens shall be shaken; and then shall appear the sign of the Son of Man in heaven, and then shall all the tribes of the earth mourn, and they shall see the Son of Man coming in the clouds of heaven, with power and great glory.' What do you make of this?" cry both orthodox and non-Christians in concert. "Do you not see that you are worshipping an idol, the work of your own brains?" But the neo-Christians are not confounded. They also, upon occasion, can speak in parables, and sometimes they have put the matter thus. The fragmentary records of the Gospel, like the fragments of shattered statuary at Olympia, need sympathetic imagination and a feeling of congruity to complete the pictures they suggest. If, for instance, we found the head and torso of an Apollo with the leg of a satyr cemented to it, we

should say this is either a blunder, or a whim, of some post-classical gropers in the ruins. And it is to us just as impossible to believe that the teacher who told men no sign of the kingdom of heaven was possible, that, in fact, the kingdom was not outward but inward, and its progress gradual and imperceptible, should also have told them that at its advent, and within the lifetime of the generation then living, the stars should fall from heaven, the Son of Man appear in the sky, and all mankind tremble in terrified subjection. *Credat Judæus*. This apocalypse is thoroughly Jewish; but it is absurdly incongruous with the un-Jewish principle attributed elsewhere to Christ.

To this answer it is not a sufficient rejoinder to say that our neo-Christians are here allowing their sense of spiritual value to intrude into questions of historical or textual criticism. It is true they do so; on the principle that the same fountain does not usually send forth sweet waters and bitter. But on further reflection they find themselves confirmed by other considerations. For the character of Christ is not the only personal element in the problem of the Gospels. Contemporary thought and feeling, as influenced by rabbinical culture, have to be considered. The transmitters of the Gospel tradition and its final writers have to be weighed in the balances. Now, there are many tokens that the medium of transmission was thoroughly Jewish. If, then, we find one element in the gospels un-Jewish—except in a very profound sense—while another is instinct with contemporary rabbinism—and if one is incongruous with the other—it is obvious that the rabbinical element may be accounted for by the medium of conveyance, while the other cannot.

But again, not only in feeling but in actual words, the apocalyptic denunciations of the Gospels are a copy, and almost, one may say, a slavish copy of previous, and at that time, popular apocalypses. I need not go into detail

here. It is known to every one. The darkened sun and moon, the falling stars, the sign of the Son of Man, the sounding trumpet, the gathering of the elect, are all directly borrowed from books such as Daniel, and Enoch, and 2nd Esdras. Now, if there is anything beyond their elevation and purity pre-eminently characteristic of the words of Jesus on other than apocalyptic subjects, it is that sort of originality, so easy in appearance, so unapproachable by imitation, which takes every heart with the sweet surprise of an unsuspected simplicity. There is no evidence in the general parables and discourses that Jesus cared much for books. His reading lay in nature and in the human heart. If analogies to his moral sayings are found in the Talmud, they are related to the Gospel as the scattered grains of gold in the quartz reef to the cluster of nuggets near at hand, where the same primeval forces that produced the grains have concentrated their final energy. The speaker of the Beatitudes could never have learned them in a rabbinical school. The truths they express glittered upon him, he knew not how, out of the mysterious background of existence, as stars shine on ordinary mortals out of dark, fathomless space. And can we conceive that a being such as this, when confronted with the problem of the future, should take to gabbling a cento of plagiarisms from the Zadkiels of his race? No; if the supremacy of law over all our thoughts compel us to eliminate preternatural deeds from the history of the time, we do protest that a sense of the congruity never wanting to human character constrains us also to eliminate second-hand apocalyptic common-places from the discourses attributed to Jesus.

Having dealt at so great a length with one illustration, I shall only mention another, which fortunately may be dismissed in a few words. Mr. Voysey tells us very truly that the words, "the Son of Man is come to seek and to save that which was lost" are irreconcilable with other sayings

attributed to Jesus, as *e.g.*, "therefore speak I unto them in parables, that seeing they may see and not perceive . . . lest they should be converted, and I should heal them." Now, a preacher who, at the present day, should at one moment declare his anxiety to save the souls of his hearers, and at another should announce his purpose of securing their damnation by propounding insoluble riddles, would give plain tokens of lunacy. And the laws of human nature, as well as of physical nature, were much the same in Gospel days as they are now. Fortunately, in this case, the contradiction to the general tenor of Christ's teaching is plainly traceable to the hazy-mindedness of the Evangelists in regard to the meaning and bearing of a particular passage from Isaiah, quoted by their Master, to show the necessity for his method of teaching by parable. Isaiah, despairing of the inappreciative people whom he addressed in vain, saw in a vision the terror of the Lord, and heard a voice asking for a divine messenger. He cried out, "Here am I, send me." Then he was told that his errand would be a failure, and that its only effect would be to make men worse than they were before. "Go, and tell this people, Hear ye indeed, but understand not; and see ye indeed, but perceive not. Make the heart of this people fat, and make their ears heavy, and shut their eyes; lest they see with their eyes . . . and convert, and be healed."\* Now, when Jesus was asked why he used so many parables, he said, in effect, that it was his only chance; for the people were very much in the condition described by Isaiah, when plain speaking only made them worse. To such a case the words of the prophet in the original passage were very applicable; but the confusion of the Evangelists is shown by the varied forms in which they give it. Matthew (xiii. 10) is most correct, though not exact. According to him the difficulty lies wholly in the obstinacy of the hearers. Mark (iv. 11)

\* Is. vi. 9, *et seq.*

gives quite a different twist to it, saying, in so many words, that the parables were used for the express purpose of mystifying the vulgar herd, and securing special privileges to the initiated. "Unto you it is given to know the mystery of the kingdom of God: but unto them that are without, all these things are done in parables: *that seeing they may see and not understand*," &c. Luke almost entirely drops the quotation; and in cold-blooded prose ascribes to the Teacher the design of misleading his hearers. "Unto you it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of God: but to others in parables; that seeing they might not see, and hearing they might not understand" (Luke viii. 10). The fourth evangelist again (xii. 39) takes a new departure, and if I understand him rightly, refers the blinding and hardening process to the devil. "Therefore they could not believe, because that Esaias said again, He hath blinded their eyes and hardened their hearts," &c. It must be obvious that the tradition is here involved in perplexity and confusion. The Master by his use of Isaiah's highly-wrought language had unwittingly suggested the pharisaic notion that unbelief was a mysterious predestined doom, and the Evangelists were eager to contrast this with the privileges of the elect. Hence their discordant torturing both of Isaiah's words and of the use originally made of them.

This case I believe to be typical; and it helps to establish a reasonable canon of judgment. The same respect for human experience which casts suspicion on miracles, also makes it difficult to suppose that the Founder of Christianity was an impersonation of violent incongruities. And where obvious and irreducible inconsistencies arise, that hypothesis is most probable which best accords with the general tradition.

Mr. Voysey says, "On the hypothesis that the writers of the Gospels were friends of Jesus, and wished to exhibit his



moral excellence, it actually became more probable that the faults and errors recorded of him were true than that the virtues and excellences were not exaggerated." Yes; but to apply this rule, you must take into consideration the nature of the ideal of moral excellence which probably dominated those Jews who, about the time of the Christian era, were waiting for the salvation of Israel. I venture to think that this ideal was in some respects very different from Mr. Voysey's, and that writers influenced by it were much more likely to invent traits of character discordant with his high standard than those he is compelled to admire. For instance, devoted admirers of the stern eccentricities of ancient prophets were much more likely to exaggerate the curttness with which their Master dismissed waverers—"let the dead bury their dead"—than they were to invent his blessing on little children, or his courageous sympathy for a notoriously sinful woman.

In conclusion, I look at the whole matter thus. We know, from both Christian and pre-Christian sources, what Jewish ideals and Jewish expectations were. We find that through some influences not here discussed those ideals and expectations were, by a few Jewish sectaries, identified with the life and destiny of a certain Jesus of Nazareth, while the vast majority of his countrymen altogether repudiated such a notion, as a forced and monstrous perversion of ancient tradition. On looking into the reminiscences of these sectaries, we find they relate a good many things concerning Jesus that suggest an enlarged conception of the divine life, and an insight into the power of self-sacrifice wholly discordant with the main ideas of the nation. But at the same time we find other elements in the anecdotes of Jesus that are merely second-hand reproductions of well-known apocalyptic visions, and common-places of Jewish prejudice. That there is an incongruity is undeniable. And in feeling our way towards a solution we should hold most firmly by



the original elements, not by the second-hand. We should insist on what is un-Jewish and difficult of invention in that age, rather than on what was rational and easy. We should seek at the supreme personal source, not so much an explanation (where none is needed) for the Jewish and heathen corruptions that have degraded the Church, but rather a *vera causa* for the power of moral regeneration that arose in Nazareth and has overspread the world.

J. ALLANSON PICTON.

*AN EPILOGUE.\**

**A**ND so the play is over, and we doff  
The actor's mask for one more subtle, worn  
By those who hide therein from the world's scorn,  
Smiling for all to see, when some forlorn  
Hope dies, and afar off  
They see their doom ; or frowning hard perchance  
Above joy's secret fires,  
When their fulfilled desires  
On fluttering wings advance  
And round them dance.

The play is over, and 'twas but a play  
Within a play ; the wider stage still holds  
Its living tragedy, and comic interludes, replete  
With godlike pain and laughter, sweet  
Singing, low moans,  
And strife that moulds  
Our clumsy clay to that complete  
Manhood which inly groans  
Toward Godhood, fain would meet  
Once more the vital breath  
That made men living souls, and is more than Death,  
Life, Love.  
Often above  
The murmur of the actors on this stage,  
Prattle of youth, and prattle of old age,

\* Written to be recited after a performance of the *Alcestis*, in a country-house.—[Ed.]

Eager discussion of the moment's need  
And foolish greed  
Of coming morrows, will be heard  
Like music half articulate with passion,  
The meaning of it all, that makes the play  
Worth playing, and has stirred  
Even the pastime of an Easter day  
To sudden grandeur, though the passing fashion  
Of the mere show has vanished soon away  
And only left the meaning. Who shall say  
What it does mean?—  
The power of Love?—  
Joy of Self-sacrifice?  
All that has been  
The soul of the world to keep it from its grave?—

Not always as in this play can Love save  
The life of the beloved. Some have poured  
Their lives like water out upon the ground,  
Yet scarce availed  
To make the road less rough, or the hot dust  
Less wearying; these nor quailed  
Nor doubted, but with one accord  
Joy'd in the sacrifice; and some have stood  
Keeping their trust  
With noble hardihood  
In the thick of the battle for an enemy's sake,  
Or for the one they loved who still returned  
Their love with hate: yet might not their heart break  
Until the fight was over, and they learned  
That other life was safe. And a few wait  
With patient hands and feet till the God say,  
"The sacrificial strife  
Is over; thou shalt die:"—Ah! they,  
Set free at last from the life

That was a costlier offering than death,  
Shall with their ebbing breath  
Find ther. a strange release,  
Shall know at last  
In the joy of that moment all the pain of the past,  
And in the sudden peace  
Shall feel what the storm has been.  
Some in their hand  
Have taken a cup all made of a red flame  
And full of anguish : at Divine command  
They have drained it, with their pale  
Lips set to the deed, lest they should shame  
The power that ruled them ; and with deep amaze  
Have seen the cup transmuted, till, with rapturous gaze,  
They have beheld at last the Holy Grail.

ANNIE MATHESON.

## NOTES AND NOTICES.

### ROBERTSON'S SERMONS.

A NEW volume of sermons by Robertson, of Brighton,\* will commend itself to many besides ordinary sermon readers. It is true this "last fruit from an old tree" will neither add anything to Robertson's fame, nor attract the public attention which twenty years ago made his sermons as popular and well-thumbed as the last new work by Thackeray. So much of what Robertson taught has since become the common property of the whole Christian pulpit, that any young student making his first acquaintance with the author by this volume would scarcely understand the secret of his marvellous popularity. The old lady who in first reading Shakespeare remarked, "Shakespeare would be very wonderful if he were not so full of quotations!" is not an unfair representative of the feeling of the young generation as it takes up the works of the preacher whose fame was and is so great. But those who can look back and remember how they found in his sermons not only a fascinating originality of idea and treatment, but a moral, intellectual, and spiritual suggestiveness which was like food to the hungry, will give a glad welcome to one more sheaf of gleanings from the fruitful field of Robertson's ministry. The selection does not appear in every case to have been judiciously made, a few of the sermons being only skeletons whose gaunt nakedness it is quite certain Robertson himself would never have exposed to public view. Nevertheless, the book gives us the strongly-marked individuality of the man, his fearless thinking, his penetrating glance into all shams and unrealities, his deep, reverent, passionate devotion to the highest ideals of religion, his fine lucidity of style. The intense eagerness with which he was once read may have passed away, but none who ever delighted in him can fail to find their delight renewed as they turn over the pages of the present volume.

It is said that the heresies of one generation are the commonplaces of the next. Nothing will be a greater surprise to our children than that Robertson was ever hounded for his want of orthodoxy. The whole field of theological speculation has assumed another aspect since Brighton

\*The Human Race, and other Sermons, preached at Cheltenham, Oxford, and Brighton. By the late Rev. F. W. Robertson. London: C. Kegan Paul and Co. 1880.

listened to its great prophet, and Brighton's vicar harried him into an early grave. The points on which Robertson was considered unsound are small indeed compared with the questions now at stake, and whereas in his life-time High Churchmen and Low Churchmen were united in attacking him, they now turn to his sermons for a defence of the faith. In spite of the *Record*, the younger Evangelicals are all tinged with "Robertsonianism," and use his books as a happy hunting-ground for ideas, much as their fathers used "Henry" and "Scott." No doubt, the tendency of Robertson's method and teaching was in the direction of a reverent rationalism, and this tendency was a powerful ally of liberal theology. The bold, earnest spirit with which he faced all difficulties, his constant appeal to the court of reason, as against the rulings of tradition and the dicta of authority, his scorn of any cowardly attempt to hush up disquieting questions, his manly outspokenness, showing that he at least had very little faith in the fashionable doctrine of pulpit reserve, all did much to influence the *set* of men's minds towards a still wider faith. It can hardly be said that he made any valuable contribution to the theological thought of his day, but the spirit in which he worked was of immense importance to the new movement. That spirit may be seen in a few striking sentences from a sermon on "Guilt of Judging" :—

We boast of our Protestant freedom ; we say that Romanists shut up the Bible, but that we give it without note or comment and bid men judge for themselves. Now think, do we not really say : " Here is the Bible, read it for yourself ; but these doctrines and no other you must find in it ; inquire freely, but at your peril arrive at any other conclusion than this ; here is the truth, and here is the Bible to prove it by " ? Is it not manifest that this is a bitter mockery, and that it only gives the name of liberty ! Hence it comes to pass that men will not bear to hear the truth. They think that they have it already in the small compass of a single mind, and they come to church to hear it repeated to them in a sermon ; not to get fresh gleams of infinite truth, but, holding all the infinite in their minds, to criticise any departure from it. The multitude dare not think, and they who think dare not speak. And this we call free inquiry ! This is the present case of Christian society, to my mind an awful and appalling one. What is there to prevent the spirit of the old times being applied to us ?—" The prophets prophesied falsely, and the priests bear rule by their means, and my people love to have it so ; and what will be the end thereof ? "

No one could listen to teaching like this and be content to hear submissively the voice of wonted authority. He who breaks up sloth and stagnation of mind, who makes men alive to the dread mysteries of Whence and Whither, who finds in human nature all necessary faculties for arriving at truth, such a one may be orthodox to the back-bone, and yet he is helping on that New Reformation which some are waiting to welcome as the dawn of God's own day on earth.

But Robertson's great work lay in other directions. More than any other man of his age he revolutionised the style and method of preaching. Discarding the conventional jargon of the pulpit and that ponderous three-decker, the model of all sermons, he spoke out in strong, nervous English, perfectly intelligible to every sensible hearer, and without con-

descending to any meanness of device for entrapping the attention of a reluctant audience, made a sermon as direct and interesting, and as much in contact with the living life of the hour, as a speech by John Bright on practical politics. Men were delighted to listen to a man who could be deeply in earnest without extravagance, thoughtful without tediousness, devout without cant. It was a surprise both pleasurable and profitable to hear every topic of the day, where it touched on morals, and every question of social casuistry, frankly discussed in the pulpit, and in the light of a sanctified common-sense. For a generation preachers have learned from Robertson how to preach.

But, more than anything else, Robertson was a great religious influence. Every sentence burns with fire, caught from a spirit intent on calling men off from the idle rout of frets and cares, worldly thoughts and social follies, to the sanctities of love and duty, and the spiritual elevation of a heart loyal to its highest thoughts of life and the eternal. To thousands his words were the most wise, quickening, and inspiring form of religious teaching which the age had to give. Concerned little with the technicalities of theology, he made religion the most living and urgent of all realities, and, rousing men from the sleepy conservatism of habit, moved them now to a wholesome shame and now to "the noble discontent" which makes a better life possible. It is for its directly religious power that this supplemental volume is to be chiefly valued. In such sermons as "The Peace of God" and "The Human Race typified by the Man of Sorrows," we have Robertson at his best, teaching a goodness that is large, balanced, steadfast, and intelligent; revealing a knowledge of the human heart such as only arises from the profoundest sympathy with its needs and aspirations, and which, wherever found, is able to refresh the outworn, reinspire the faint, rekindle the drooping eye, and

Strengthen the wavering line,  
On to the bound of the waste,  
On to the city of God.

JOSEPH WOOD.

IT is not easy to think of Mr. Tennyson as an old man, and his latest ballads\* will certainly not help us to realise the fact that he has passed his seventy-first birthday, and that his poetical career has extended over a good half-century. Wordsworth's *Lyrical Ballads* were published in 1798, and his last volume is dated 1842, giving him six years less than our living poet, who still, let us hope, has many fresh gifts in store for us, with renewed proof that the true poet is always young. Now and then, it is true, we may have begun to be a little alarmed at symptoms shown in some curious utterance, which we may have said, in an irreverent critical humour, we could make neither head nor tail of. But if we found "Out of the Depths" beyond our comprehension, had we not lately read

\* Ballads and other Poems. By Alfred Tennyson, Poet-Laureate. London: C. Kegan Paul and Co. 1880.

with delight in some magazine the stirring ballads of "The Fight of the Revenge" and "The Defence of Lucknow"? And now, if we could have thought that the poetic fire was fading, or that any of the artist's cunning was lost, our doubts are confuted at once by the overwhelming pathos and passion of "Rizpah," the tender pitifulness of "In the Children's Hospital," or the intensely original and characteristic humour of "The Northern Cobbler." No, there are no symptoms of decline; we recognise all the freshness, strength, and vitality of a heart and intellect that can never grow old.

There is nothing in the new volume that can be said to add to the great variety of styles and subjects in which Mr. Tennyson had already shown a versatility of genius which was sometimes a surprise even to his most ardent admirers. The sentimental and dilettante air of his earliest productions has long since vanished quite away. His Claribels and faintly smiling Adelines and airy, fairy Lilians, if they have not already passed into the limbo of masks and shadows, will assuredly be remembered only as pretty, unreal fancies, a foil to the artistic completeness and poetical strength of all his mature work. It is curious and instructive to read, at this distance of time, a criticism like that in which the redoubtable Christopher North, in his merciless, slashing way, dissected the little volume which appeared in 1830, while at the same time he emphatically recognised the promise of real genius. The poems and verses which the critic picked out as choice specimens of "drivel" and "more drivel" seem very soon to have been judged by much the same standard by the poet himself, and he rejected or refashioned till he might almost have sent up his new editions, as a scholar sends up his corrected exercise to the master, pretty sure of getting a good mark for it. The fastidious taste and consummate art with which Mr. Tennyson is for ever giving little finishing touches and polishing to perfect his work seldom leave any mark of artificiality, or make us suspect any lack of spontaneity in his verse; and nowhere has he practised with more perfect success than in the new ballads that art which consists in concealing art. He has written few things in which we think less of the technical skill displayed, or feel more immediately and irresistibly the power of genius which compels us into absolute sympathy with the poet's mind. Most of all is this true of "Rizpah," which is one of the finest things Mr. Tennyson has done. It certainly is unrivalled by anything of its kind in our literature as a living presentment of the deepest and most passionate grief. It is instinct with terrible pathos, and is an instance of the intensest "realism" of a truly noble and moving kind. A poor dying woman, who has been crazed by her cruel grief, tells the story of her son who had been hanged for having robbed the mail, an exploit to which he had been dared by his wild companions. She had gone out, when the nights were dark enough, to gather up his bones, as they fell from the gibbet, and kissed them, and buried them in the night by the churchyard wall. Her whole life had gone out to the son whom the law had murdered, and the passion



of her maternal love and anguish have an overwhelming effect upon us as we read. We cannot pick out specimens for quotation. We cannot criticise, or inquire whether the "lyrical cry," and so on, is present, or ask how it is that the poet contrives to affect us so. Indeed, we can scarcely turn over the pages of this strangely powerful poem again with any equanimity while we are writing about it. The poem entitled "In the Children's Hospital" has a simpler motive, and to attempt to tell in prose the pathetic story of the little patient's innocent trust and prayer would be to transform a most touching poem into a nice little "leaflet." We do not envy any reader who could resist the tender pathos of the incident, as the poet has presented it. "The Northern Cobbler," again, might be turned into a famous temperance tract, if any teetotaler could venture to suggest such an heroic procedure as that by which the rough drunken fellow masters his vice. But with what vigour, what clear, bold humour, the story is told of the man's stand-up fight with the enemy, in the shape of a big black bottle of gin, which he fetches from the public-house, and puts into his wife's hands!

an' I says to 'er, "Sally," says I,  
 "Stan' 'im theer i' the naäme o' the Lord an' the power ov 'is Graäce,  
 Stan' 'im theer, fur I'll loök my hennemy strait i' the faäce;  
 Stan' 'im theer i' the winder, an' let me loök at 'im then,  
 'E seäms naw moor nor watter, an' 'e's the Devil's oän sen."

To say that "The Northern Cobbler" is just what we might have expected from the author of "The Northern Farmer," is to give the highest praise to this latest fruit of that choice gift of humour by which the author of "In Memoriam" took us all by surprise. The village gossip's story of the misfortunes of the Squire and his family, told in "The Entail," is full of the same shrewdness and original character, though less taking and remarkable as a whole. There are some inimitable sayings of the old wife, as when she tells how—

"hoffens we talkt of my darter es died o' the fever at fall:  
 An' I thowt 'twur the will o' the Lord, but Miss Annie she said it wur  
 draäins,  
 Fur she hedn't naw coomfut in 'er, an' am'd naw thanks fur 'er paäins."

She invents a wonderful figure of speech when she says—

"Ya wouldn't find Charlie's likes—'e were that outdacious at 'oäm,  
 Not thaw ya went fur to raäke out Hell wi' a small-tooth coämb."

And when the old man and his son had both died, after letting the estate go to ruin—

"Parson as hesn't the call, nor the moonney, but hes the pride,  
 'E reäds of a sewer an' sartan 'oäp o' the tother side;  
 But I beänt that sewer es the Lord, howsiver they praäy'd an' praäy'd,  
 Lets them inter 'eaven eäsy es leäves their debts to be paäid."

It would be interesting to inquire how much the humour of these unique poems owes to the dialect in which they are written. Something, no doubt, is due to the odd and grotesque effect of the language itself. But

the essential thing is that we have the native speech of vigorous, original character which has not been blended in the featureless average of commonplace life. And Mr. Tennyson has used this quaint literary instrument with wonderful effect.

We have not space left for saying much about the other poems in the new volume. "The First Quarrel" satisfies us less than the other ballads. We feel that the young husband ought not to have treated so lightly the discovery which had aroused his wife's jealousy, and when he goes away for a little while to some work, and she says harsh words and refuses him a kiss at parting, the catastrophe which follows seems too tragic for the "situation." In addition to the five ballads we have mentioned, and "The Fight of the Revenge" and "The Defence of Lucknow," which we knew before, we have an idyl somewhat of the type with which we were made familiar in earlier volumes. "The Sisters," however, is not to be put on the line with "Dora" or "The Gardener's Daughter." The subject is not a pleasing one, and while the treatment of it is essentially Tennysonian, it is in no way remarkable. There are two fine studies, in blank verse, of Columbus in his imprisonment, and of Sir John Oldcastle in retreat amongst the Welsh hills, where he kept his fealty to the new doctrine of Wiclif, "in God's free air and hope of better things." The other noteworthy poem is "The Voyage of Maeldune"—a version of an old Irish legend, wonderfully picturesque, and pleasantly suggestive of a "moral," so long as we do not tease ourselves with too detailed an interpretation.

There will probably be few of our readers to whom the volume itself will not have become familiar before these pages are in print. But we could not take this new gift from the poet's hands without a word of record and a hearty tribute to the lofty genius and true heart which continue to work such wonders of insight and sympathy. The poet has often before dealt with some of the more difficult problems of life and thought; and if it is with simpler and more elementary feelings and affections and purposes that he has here concerned himself—a mother's passionate sorrow, a little child's naïve prayer, a drunkard's sturdy self-conquest—he has made them the theme of poems which may be ranked with some of his finest and most enduring work, and which, once read, can assuredly never be forgotten.

R. CROMPTON JONES.

FOR Christians of every nationality, Palestine is *the* Land, and the Bible is *the* Book.\* To a large extent the study of these two must be carried on in their connection, for the journeys of prophets, the battles of kings, and the many allusions to scenery and physical features which the Bible contains, require detailed topographical knowledge for their full appreciation. Dean Stanley's "Sinai and Palestine" is a precious store-

\* *The Land and the Book.* By William M. Thomson, D.D. T. Nelson and Sons, London, Edinburgh, and New York. 1881.

house of material; and in a different manner Dr. Thomson's work has partly supplied the same want. Resident for forty-five years in Syria and Palestine as a missionary, he has had unusual opportunities, and he has made excellent use of them. His almost innumerable excursions are not imaginary, but real; and he tells us in easy conversational form what he has seen, selecting always the scenes and scenery, the manners and customs, which connect themselves with the books of the Bible.

This volume is not a reissue of a former edition. Since Dr. Thomson first published "*The Land and the Book*," learned and scientific explorers have penetrated every part of the Holy Land and given to the public some of the results of their researches. In 1864, Captain (now Lieut.-Colonel) Wilson, of the Royal Engineers, conducted the ordnance survey of Jerusalem, at the cost of the Baroness Burdett-Coutts, and the results were published in two expensive volumes. In 1865, the Palestine Exploration Fund was established in London, and the committee engaged Captain Wilson to conduct a preliminary expedition and probe the country from Damascus to Hebron. From 1867 till 1870, Captain (now Lieut.-Colonel) Warren, R.E., was engaged in patiently excavating at Jerusalem. Since that time the systematic survey of the whole of Western Palestine has been successfully carried out by Lieutenant Conder, and the great map of Palestine, on the scale of one inch to the mile, is already in the hands of subscribers. The memoirs, drawings, and special studies connected with the survey are not yet issued; but many of the more important results have been forestalled in the various publications of the Palestine Exploration Fund, and the books and articles written by its officers. No future writer on the topography of the Holy Land will be able to dispense with the mass of new material accumulated, and the flood of new light thrown upon hundreds of Scripture passages. Dr. Thomson has done wisely in revising his work, so as to bring it into harmony with the latest results.

On taking up this new volume—which is very handsomely got up, with toned paper, gilt edges, and a large number of well-executed pictorial illustrations prepared specially for the work from photographs taken by the author—our first thought was that it was simply a new edition. But these words will not describe it. Although it is called by the old name—"The Land and the Book"—it is only half the land and half the book. "The Land!" and yet there is nothing about Tyre and Sidon, Nazareth, the Sea of Galilee, Lebanon! "The Book!" and yet the life of the Lord in Nazareth and Capernaum, and the teaching of the Lord "on the Mount" and in the plain of Genesareth, are not at all illustrated. The title-page, we might have noticed, proclaims in red letters that this volume is on "Southern Palestine and Jerusalem." It will require another volume of equal bulk to deal with Northern Palestine, Phœnicia, and Lebanon. So we may suppose the present volume to be only Part I., although it calls itself comprehensively "*The Land and the Book*," and no hint is given of a second part to follow. Looking into the edition of 1872, issued by the same publishers, we find that the writer begins his

journeying from Beirut and covers all the ground, whereas in the present volume he lands at Jaffa, sets his face towards the Philistine country and Jerusalem, and never reaches the north.

But although the book now extends over only half the ground, it contains two-thirds the full amount of matter of the 1872 edition, and is a sufficiently bulky volume. Southern Palestine and Jerusalem have some 50,000 more words bestowed upon their description than was previously the case, and now get 140 illustrations all to themselves, as against 128 formerly for the whole country. Dr. Thomson speaks from a much longer acquaintance with the districts he describes, and has the advantage of the recent explorations we have referred to.

The Preface, which is dated "New York, 1879," rightly credits the Palestine Exploration Fund of England with having made a thorough survey of Palestine Proper. When Dr. Thomson adds that "the American Exploration Society have sent several expeditions to the regions east of the Jordan and the Dead Sea," this statement is somewhat euphemistic in its reticence; nothing is said about the results of those expeditions, and perhaps the less said the better, as the English will have to do the surveying over again. The topographical work of Wilson, Warren, and Conder is often referred to by Dr. Thomson although, of course, he could not find room for very much of their matter without suppressing his own. Sometimes he quotes their descriptions; sometimes he criticises their conclusions. He accepts Conder's identification of Scopus near Jerusalem, and approves the location of Gilgal at Giljuleh, but rejects the site proposed for Bethabara beyond Jordan. Concerning Nob he says that the exact site will probably never be known; yet he clearly inclines to place it on Olivet, and seems to ignore Conder's very strong argument in favour of Nebi Samwil. Jerusalem topography receives a fair share of attention, and the tangle in which it is involved is fully recognised—"On approaching the Holy City you enter upon an arena of great uncertainty and endless controversy." The author himself disputes the traditional site of the Holy Sepulchre, because he "cannot believe that the spot upon which the present church stands was originally without the wall of the city;" no practical engineer would select such a line for the second wall as would be necessary for leaving this site outside. In speaking of the Pool of Siloam and its rock-cut connection with the Virgin's Fountain, the author quotes Warren's graphic description of his perilous crawl from one end to the other of this confined passage. He inclines, and rightly, we think, to accept Robinson's suggestion that the Fount of the Virgin, an intermittent spring, is the pool by the sheep-gate, where an angel used to trouble the water. The present so-called Pool of Bethesda is a great cistern, artificially built in an ancient valley, as Warren proved. In speaking of En-rogel in connection with the present well of Joab, our author is silent about M. Ganneau's discovery of the Stone of Zohelath as bearing upon the identification. Underground Jerusalem is not forgotten, both Robinson's arch and Wilson's arch being described, and reference made

to the cisterns and aqueducts discovered by Warren, and the ancient masons' marks (supposed to be of Hiram's Tyrian workmen) some eighty feet underground at the south-east angle of the Haram wall. After this it seems a little paradoxical that Dr. Thomson should despair of any ingenuity or research being able to do much towards reconstructing the ancient city (page 419). But, perhaps, if we view this book as a development from the edition of 1872, with variations induced by changed circumstances, this despairing sentence may be regarded as a survival of a passage which appears there on page 626, and was natural before the work of exploration was so far advanced.

Besides the publications of the Palestine Exploration Fund, Dean Stanley's well-known work is laid under contribution, and his description of topographical details endorsed as vividly accurate; the explorations of Palmer and Drake are made use of; and Canon Tristram's last journey through the land of Moab. But we do not find that the Rev. Canon's identification of Zoar is mentioned, though so important with reference to the Cities of the Plain; and it can only be an unintentional injustice which accepts the Ciccar or Round of the Jordan as the true locality of those cities, and yet makes no reference to Mr. Grove's articles on the subject in Smith's Dictionary of the Bible. The antiquated "orthodoxy" of Dr. Thomson disturbs his calmness in a few places; though when he insists that Abram must have been the first to receive circumcision, because Moses says so, and conjectures that if the Egyptians practised the rite they received it of Joseph, he may be ignorant of the monumental testimony which shows it to be as early as the fourth Egyptian dynasty. But this does not lessen the value of his description of Palestine scenes and scenery, manners and customs. One who has seen so much of the Holy Land, through many years of vicissitude and adventure, speaks upon these topics with an authority from which there can scarcely be any appeal.

GEORGE ST. CLAIR.

DR. CUNNINGHAM GEIKIE, in his "Hours with the Bible; or, The Scriptures in the Light of Modern Discovery and Knowledge,"\* gives us the first instalment of a popular history of the Israelites, written on the principles of strict Anglican orthodoxy. The book is only in small part a reproduction of the biblical narrative. Most of it is a connection of this with the physical history of the world and a comparison with the history of foreign religions and civilisations. The popular form in which this history is presented does not hinder an elaborate learning from illustrating every side of its subject except the critical. How far Dr. Geikie has penetrated into the critical demonstrations of even half a century ago may be gathered from his opening assertion that the authorship of the book of Genesis "has been assigned by the Jews from the earliest ages to Moses, and modern controversy has done

\* London: S. W. Partridge and Co. 1881.

nothing to shake this belief, although it has shown that the great law-giver made use, as might be expected, of documents ancient even in his day, and has, perhaps, pointed out, here and there, minute additions of a later hand" (p. 1, *et seq.*). This statement will by itself decide the book to fail in the elementary condition of historical writing which calls for an examination of the sources as preliminary to even the most guarded recognition of their contents. Dr. Geikie not only ignores this, but professes, in regard to the Pentateuch, his "acceptance of all its parts as the inspired word of God in the form in which we have received them" (p. 9). He has, in fact, travelled no further than the point arrived at by the present Dean of Peterborough in Dr. Smith's "Dictionary of the Bible" (art. *Pentateuch*), in 1863; and since that time the critical position has been built up afresh by the researches of Graf, Noeldeke, and Kuenen, the last of whom has given it an unassailable strength by placing it side by side with the inner history of the Hebrew nation. But none of these writers appear in Dr. Geikie's pretentious "List of Authorities;" his book is only a history written from the presumed point of view of Moses, annotated by a servile disciple of to-day.

In the scientific part, the pains Dr. Geikie is at to prove the antiquity of the earth and the non-universality of the deluge may excite surprise among those who are not familiar with the stumbling-blocks that everywhere present themselves to theological literalists. But Dr. Geikie has nothing of the crude insolence that repeats the fallacy we still hear declaimed from pulpits, "God is true: if science contradict the Word of God, science is false." On the contrary, his temper is moderate and his reasoning careful; his knowledge is such as we should expect from one of his name. When he comes to the question of the age of man he decides, it is true, in favour of a recent origin, and considers the divergences existing between scientific men as a sufficient reason for rejecting their general tenor. It is impossible not to see that in his advocacy of the traditional view he has been led to exaggerate the doubtfulness of the question, and to lay too heavy a stress upon the uncertainty of details. "It staggers our faith," he says, "in the whole chronological scheme to find, at the outset, that, while one high authority reckons the boulder clay in which old stone implements are found as marking 200,000 years, another, no less eminent, sets it down as 980,000 years old" (p. 133). But Dr. Geikie does not see that the important fact in the argument is the relative and not the absolute date assigned. Every estimate must, in dealing with immense tracts of time, be necessarily conjectural: all we get from them is a general probability of a remote distance, and 200,000 as much as 980,000 is fatal to the biblical scale of chronology. But we are not concerned to support the modern position. It is the literalists who have now to stand on their defence; and they have already deserted most of their outposts. Dr. Geikie himself is fluent in his derision of those who talk of a universal flood (pp. 210, *et seq.*), a belief that not many years since was held an essential constituent of revealed truth. Doubtless, he guards the admission by requiring the extermination of the human

race; for "the descent of all mankind from Noah is, of course, a renewed testimony by Scripture to the unity of the human race—a doctrine so intimately connected with the Divine plan of Redemption, and so vital to the brotherhood and mutual sympathy of man with man" (p. 230). But the vital doctrine seems to have a lax hold upon the author's mind. The reader of his book will be puzzled to say where he seeks the origin of the negro (pp. 239, 244), or whether he holds the Celt and the Accadian to be the brother-descendants of Gomer, the son of Japhet. In fact, the harmony Dr. Geikie attempts to construct between biblical and external history leads him into perpetual contradictions. At one moment the Cushites appear as a "branch of the Semitic stock" (p. 273); at another they are claimed as Hamites (pp. 238, 259). In one place the theory of Ebers, which regards the Philistines as "the remains of a powerful branch of the Caphtorim" of Crete, "who, reaching Egypt first, necessarily advanced towards Palestine, their final home, through the lands of the Casluhim" in the north-east of Egypt, is gladly adopted (p. 247), and the Philistines are ultimately "settlements of Phœnicians;" in another they are only "allied to the Phœnicians, . . . a branch of the primitive race which had once spread itself over the whole district of Lebanon and in the Jordan valley, and had in part launched off to Crete and other Mediterranean islands" (p. 355).

Yet Dr. Geikie's attitude towards modern scholars is throughout respectful, if with a touch of suspicion. Forgetting, for instance, "the kings of the Hittites," whose power is implied in 2 Kings vii. 6 (*cf.* 1 Kings x. 29), he wishes to distinguish the tribe mentioned in the Bible from the Kheta whose wide dominions and lasting importance have recently been discovered (p. 353):—"If of the same stock they must have been a very limited and comparatively feeble tribe" (p. 252). The author is evidently afraid of the change in his literary position which would follow from granting that the book of Genesis is ignorant of the fact of a Hittite empire, and even uses Hittite, Hivite, and Horite indifferently. In the same way, he dismisses the lofty Proverbs of Ptahhotep as "a string of platitudes, often trivial, and never rising above a very humble level" (p. 2), lest they should be brought into an advantageous comparison with the Hebrew Proverbs. But perhaps this example reveals rather the fact that Dr. Geikie's learning, however extensive, is singularly deficient in accuracy.\* The real value of the book, indeed, lies very little in the author's handling of the facts, which is throughout inexact and unscientific; it consists rather in the mass of comparative illustration he has brought together: for we have here for the first time, collected in a convenient and popular shape, the main results of recent discovery in Egypt and Assyria;—unhappily, however, with the old assumption that everything is traceable to Genesis as the original source. For this work of compilation Dr. Geikie deserves cordial praise: it is only to be re-

\* Thus he makes Merodach in one place the planet Jupiter (pp. 272, 321), in another Mercury (p. 322). Such a note, too, as that on page 235 implies an astonishing haze of scholarship.



gretted that he has marred the pleasure which his book should otherwise give by the intermixture of so much that is irrelevant and so much that looks like "cuttings" from his sermons, and by the prevailing influence of a decaying school of religious thought. It is interesting, at the same time, to notice that even in questions that are supposed to concern dogmatics, the author shows at times a certain tendency to travel beyond the limits observed by the traditional orthodoxy. He takes no pains to justify the entire characters of the patriarchs; he goes so far as to regard the temptation of Abraham as intended to prove that he "was not behind the servants of Chemosh or Baal in self-surrender to his God" (p. 399), an admission which has commonly been held derogatory to the unique dignity of the supposed Hebrew monotheism. Nimrod, too, he considers a hunter "well pleasing" to the Lord, perhaps one who, in the special phrase of biblical commendation, "walked before the Lord" (p. 280 and note); so that he does not, with most of his predecessors, confine such an attribute to members of the chosen family. It is unfortunate that he stops short at this distant approach to modern views, and, that, instead of a calm survey of the religious and social relations of the oldest Hebrew stories, we have only a storehouse of material, in which the author's contributions are the least in weight.

It is pleasant to have to notice a third edition of the Rev. J. M. Rodwell's version of the Book of Job,\* as giving evidence of that growing interest in the literary side of the Bible which Mr. Matthew Arnold sought to encourage in his "reading" of the Babylonian Isaiah. Mr. Rodwell's translation has the finish and vigour with which his *Koran* has before made us familiar; but, while it retains in a wonderful degree the poetic force of its original, it has the fault of being too modern. Mr. Rodwell may doubtless claim the precedent of Milton for his antipathy to the ending of verbs in *-eth*; but long usage makes one regret its exclusion from a biblical translation. It is certainly difficult to English so thorny a text as that of Job without increasing the vocabulary of the authorised version; but Mr. Rodwell's additions are not always happy, and such words as "condolence," "wearisome" (used of persons), "vindicator" (for "avenger"—the A. V. "redeemer"), "retract," "cohere," and "saturate," give a sense of discord with the prevailing pitch of the style. This incongruity is emphasised by the retention of the Hebrew names of God, which, however necessary to a translation made for students, are only distracting to the ordinary reader. But these are little faults to find in a book that deserves to be as widely read as possible. It is because the book is so good that we wish for changes that might make it even more acceptable.

\* Very different, in the matter of style, is the version of the Psalms contained in the Rev. E. Johnson's translation of Ewald's "Commentary."†

\* The Book of Job; translated from the Hebrew by J. M. Rodwell, M.A., of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge; Rector of St. Ethelburga, London. Third edition. F. Norgate. 1880.

† Commentary on the Psalms. By H. von Ewald; vol. i. Theological Translation Fund Library, vol. xxiii. London: Williams and Norgate. 1880.



For this Mr. Johnson is only partly to blame, since he is in the hand of one of the most obscure and turgid even of German writers; but he has added the confusion of a too great literalness, which often requires a knowledge of German syntax to get at the sense of the English. If, however, Mr. Johnson has failed to make the book readable, he has only failed where every one else has failed; and the failure suggests whether a scheme could not be arranged to give in English the summary of Ewald's total work, and leave out only his personalities, his digressions, and whatever remains too fantastic or too obscure to be worth keeping alive. For, as things are, while no one will dispute his position as the critic whose intuitive grasp of Hebrew history, equally with his inspired faculty of conjecture, sets him by himself above the scholars of this century, at the same time the defects in his intellectual temper, his arrogant dogmatism, his disdain for others and others' work, cannot but endanger his permanent hold upon the thought of Hebrew students. But it is too daring a hope, at present, that the scholar's greatness should survive alone upon the grave of his littleness; and in the interval we are grateful to have a new part of his writings added to the English literature of the Bible.

R. LANE POOLE.

"THE CHURCH OF THE FUTURE" \* is a sounding title for an archiepiscopal charge, and Dr. Tait has certainly made a bold attempt to rise above the commoner church politics, and to direct the attention of his clergy to their responsibilities in relation to those great controversies in which the *raison d'être*, not of an Establishment, nor even of Episcopacy, but of any Church whatever, is involved. Touching on the Burials Act and the Public Worship Regulation Act—of which latter, it should be noted, he still with complacency assumes the chief responsibility—only to make them the text for lessons of charity and caution, saluting with a generous Christian greeting the great Nonconformist communities of England, the Catholic churches of the East, and the Evangelical communions of the West, he presently takes up the main and threefold theme of his charge, the conflicts of the Church with the Atheist, the Deist, and the Rationalist.

We do not propose to do battle for the Atheist in either of the guises in which the Archbishop has challenged him to the conflict—that of the dogmatic denier of Deity, or of the more cautious, more modest, or more reverent Agnostic. We proceed rather to notice a point here and there in the criticisms which the Archbishop, presenting it under the ill-flavoured names of Deism and Rationalism, lays against a liberal and undogmatic faith.

We find, then, that under the title "Deists" the Archbishop proposes to deal, not with any group of persons so describing themselves, for he assures us that "the old giant [Deism] who frightened, not without

\* The Church of the Future. By Archibald Campbell, Archbishop of Canterbury. London: Macmillan and Co. 1880.

cause, our fathers of the last century was certainly smitten by the Davids of that time with their sling stones, and they were able even to cut off his head as he lay prostrate" (p. 67). No; the persons to be refuted are those who have preferred the name of "Theists"—a distinction which Dr. Tait will "leave them to explain." This they have indeed done, though they have not enjoyed the advantage of embodying their explanations in an archiepiscopal charge. They have done so in this country by the writings of Professor Newman, Miss Cobbe, and Mr. Voysey; but the great coiner of the terms "Theism" (and "Theist") was the American, Theodore Parker. From him the terms have been adopted to signify certain notions (and those who entertain those notions) of the relations of man to God, whether those who have adopted them have chosen, like Parker, still, in combination therewith, to claim the Christian name, or have relinquished that to such as hold by the supernatural personality and mission of Christ.

Theodore Parker, then, being the original professor of "Theism," as distinguished from Deism, it will tend to greater distinctness if we retain him and his teachings in mind while we weigh the charges laid by Dr. Tait against the Theistic position. We proceed to ask of the Archbishop exactly what he understands this Theism to be. Nor does he keep us waiting for an answer:—

A God who hides Himself except so far as He may be known through the efforts of the pure intellect, or in the voices of the loving heart; a life on earth in which He scarcely can be held to interfere, as all things move on irresistibly by the laws which He has established; a life of the spirit hereafter, if there be such life, not assured by any direct manifestations from above, but dimly conjectured as a probable expectation; this, I think, is the residuum supposed to represent the sacred substance which all the confused earthly copies have been caricaturing (p. 73).

Now, let us imagine for the moment—if, indeed, our imagination will stretch so far—that Theodore Parker, whose faith is thus represented, were Primate of all England, that his Theism were embodied in Thirty-nine Articles and were the established religion of this realm, and that Archibald Campbell Tait, a poor American preacher, had died in a foreign land twenty years ago, worn out with self-sacrificing toil at what should have been the zenith of his manhood, and that his name had been a by-word of reproach among men, and he had been driven out of communion with the churches because he had striven to teach those doctrines which, on the contrary, do now actually constitute the doctrines of the Church of England. Then we might have had Theodore, Archbishop of Canterbury, charging his clergy thus, describing the "sophistries" of the doctrine of poor, dead Archibald Tait:—

A God who hides Himself except so far as He may be known on the mere authority of a book written eighteen hundred years ago; a life on earth in which He scarcely can be held to interfere, as the day of miracles is past and they are the only reliable revelations of His activity; a life of the spirit hereafter, not assured by any inalienable trust of the human soul, but dimly conjectured as an inference from the alleged resurrection upon earth and

ascension into heaven of one Man, who, however, was also God—this, I think, is the residuum supposed to represent the sacred substance, &c.

Such a presentation of Archibald Tait's faith would, it seems to us, have been liable to be accounted by some ungenerous, unjust, and untrue; yet we experience difficulty in explaining to ourselves why it would have been more so than the language actually selected to describe the Theism of Parker and his followers by the Archbishop of Canterbury. The modern Theist—between whom and the Deist the difference seems to the Primate so trivial that the names may be used indiscriminately—is distinguished by the ardent vivacity of faith with which he recognises the energy of the living God in every movement of outward nature and every sacred motion of the human heart, by his intense conviction that the hand of God guides the whole order of the unmeasured universe, and (speaking generally, while acknowledging exceptions in men like Professor Newman, whose utter faith in the divine goodness and wisdom seems to have removed them from any keen longing for personal immortality) by the strength of their assurance that this life but preludes a nobler and eternal activity in the service of God. To them the harking back to the Bible for the sole revelation of God seems a miserable failure of the spiritual discernments with which the soul is normally endowed. To them the assumption that the laws which God's own hand imposes on nature both fail themselves to speak of him and so far lack perfection as to have required occasional amendment by miracle seems irreverent and unreasonable. To them the relegation of the doctrine of a future life to proofs by merely literary and historical evidence seems unnecessary and fool-hardy. They believe in no special revelation by the Divine Being at this spot or at that epoch, because his normal revelation in every inch of space and every hour of time seems to them perfect for all those whose eyes are unsealed and their ears unstopped. They may, of course, be wrong. But which view is "sacred substance," and which is justly to be called "residuum," is a matter quite debatable.

But the Archbishop presently dismisses the Theist with the advice to read his Bible, and turns to a yet more unwelcome figure—the Rationalist. Here, too, there seems some laxity of terminology; for the Rationalist with Dr. Tait, is not the critic of the early days of criticism who rationalised the alleged miracles of the Bible, offering natural explanations of seemingly supernatural phenomena. No; he is the Dutch or German critic of to-day, of whom, however, it is assumed, among other characteristics, that he denies the possibility of miracles. It would be too flattering to the pretensions of this *Review* to suppose that it could ever engage the archiepiscopal attention. But it would not have been amiss had the Primate's eye fallen on the emphatic sentences in which Professor Kuenen repudiated, in these pages, the charge of any *a priori* disbelief in miracles.

Be that as it may, however, this chapter is in the main a contention that we should do well to believe in a miraculous and supernatural Christianity. But the force of such a contention is seriously weakened

when we find the Archbishop using the word "supernatural" at one moment to mean "unseen," and at the next to mean "miraculous," and thus deducing with ease from the premiss that the Rationalist recognises the supernatural (*i.e.*, the unseen) in God the conclusion that he may well be prepared for the supernatural (*i.e.*, the miraculous) all through the ministry of Jesus (p. 103).

On the whole, we cannot feel that Dr. Tait's manifesto is, as an effort in apologetics, worthy of the clerical head of a great historic Church. Still less is it adequate to the solemn title which he has given to his charge. "The Church of the Future" will be far too great and noble a temple to stand on the lines which the Primate has drawn for it in the chapter on "Its Dogmatic Teaching."

#### RECENT OLD TESTAMENT STUDY.

THE last instalment of Mr. Herbert Spencer's "Descriptive Sociology" deals with the Hebrews and the Phœnicians.\* The compiler, Dr. Scheppig, has perhaps made the best of an exceedingly difficult task. The method of arrangement adopted by Mr. Spencer serves well enough for the exhibition of the apparatus of life, but is singularly ill-fitted for tracing the growth and progress of moral and religious ideas. The compiler is no doubt conscious of this, and will not wonder that his treatment of these subjects should be found inadequate by students of Old Testament literature. So far as we have consulted the sections dealing with government and various secular concerns, they appear to compress into small compass a really prodigious amount of information very carefully arranged. The sketch of ecclesiastical institutions is also judicious. Dr. Scheppig has surrendered himself to Kuenen's guidance, after having vainly endeavoured to trace a satisfactory line of development on the old theory of the priority of the Book of Origins. We shall certainly not quarrel with him for assuming the exilic or post-exilic origin of the Levitical Legislation; and as the method of supporting the tabular statements by extracts does not admit of the discussion of controverted points, he has, without doubt, chosen wisely in presenting a single and harmonious view. Down to the establishment of the Levitical Law this is expounded with sufficient elaboration; but the subsequent treatment is woefully imperfect, and the various tendencies of Pharisees, Sadducees, and Essenes receive very scanty recognition. Still, the growth of the religious polity of Israel is delineated with a certain unity of plan. The sections on the progress of religious ideas, however, are not equally consistent or clear. On the one hand, we have Professor Max Müller's version of Renan's doctrine of the primitive monotheism of the desert (p. 75, col. 1); on the other, there is abundant evidence of Israel's ancient polytheism. The prophets are, of course, credited with the development of a lofty ethical monotheism; but the stages of it are not distinctly

\* London: Williams and Norgate. 1880.

marked, and, in particular, the Book of Deuteronomy, though its importance for the history of ecclesiastical institutions is made sufficiently plain, altogether fails to receive proper recognition as the first great exposition of the principle of the sole Deity of Yahveh. This is just one of the points which only a careful student of the history of Israel's religion thoroughly understands: it is not surprising that it has not been adequately grasped by the compiler. The short time available for getting up his subject was naturally too brief for mastering the niceties of the criticism of the Pentateuch, or Dr. Scheppig would not have ascribed any part of the story of the intended sacrifice of Isaac, Gen. xxii., or of the brazen serpent, Num. xxi. 6—9, to the Elohist writer—*i.e.*, the Book of Origins (p. 49, col. 2; p. 75, col. 3). And admitting, as he does, the post-exilic authorship of that document, it appears highly unsafe to found on the statement that mankind first lived on vegetable food, Gen. i. 29, the inference that vegetable offerings preceded animal ones (p. 48, col. 3). Nor does it seem quite clear that the story of Jephthah supplies an indisputable instance of human sacrifice (p. 44, col. 1). Unquestionably, the author of the Book of Judges treats it as such; but it is one of the strongest cases in Dr. Goldziher's list of ancient nature-myths. The brilliant treatise on "Mythology among the Hebrews" has not, however, been employed by Dr. Scheppig, though it would certainly have enabled him to enrich his sections on Myths. It is further to be regretted that so many misprints have been allowed to disfigure the work. Still, when all deductions are made, it will remain a useful compilation. Students who desire to see the setting of the great ideas which Hebrew thought and piety contributed to the development of the race will gather here abundant materials happily brought together. But the ideas themselves, and their effect upon life, must be sought elsewhere. The spirit which bloweth where it listeth cannot find a home in the tables of Descriptive Sociology.

The acceptance of the hypothesis of Graf and Kuenen by Dr. Scheppig is not the only recent instance of the change of view wrought by fresh study of the evidence. Dr. Schultz a year or two ago issued a fresh version of his treatise on Old Testament Theology, rewritten on the new basis,\* and now Dr. Smend comes forward with a commentary on the book of Ezekiel, to take the place of that formerly contributed by Hitzig to the well-known "Kurzgefasstes Handbuch."† Dr. Smend formerly advocated the early composition of the Book of Origins. But his study of Ezekiel has convinced him that its priestly legislation follows instead of preceding the sketch of the organisation in Ezek. xl.—xlviii., "the crown and coping" of the prophet's book. Here is the beginning of a new departure for Israel's religion, worked out at greater length in the Levitical Law. In the face of the results thus secured and so candidly avowed, it is worthy of note that critics are still eagerly at work here and there on the old lines. In the "Jahrbücher für Protestantische

\* Alttestamentliche Theologie. Zweite Auflage. Frankfurt-a.-M. 1878.

† Der Prophet Ezechiel. Leipzig. 1880.

"Theologie" (1880, Nos. 1 and 2), Marti has made a vigorous effort to discover traces in the prophetic writers of acquaintance with the "Grundschrift" of the Pentateuch. His argument depends chiefly on very slight indications in the use of language, and appears to us enormously overstrained. The occurrence of two or three similar words—not consecutive—in passages in Exodus or Leviticus and in Isaiah and Jeremiah cannot be held to establish the dependence of one upon the other. All literary propriety is violated by the stress thus laid upon exceedingly remote resemblances. And even where the resemblances are stronger, as between Ex. xxxi. 18 and Ezek. xx. 12, the order of priority must be determined by other considerations than that of the wording of the two passages, or the existing arrangement of the Old Testament books. Dr. Marti holds that Mic. vi. 8 is a distinct quotation from Deut. x. 12; and even finds in Is. vii. 12 an appeal to Deut. vi. 16. It would not perhaps be fair to him to say that these are the grounds on which he refuses his assent to the widely-accepted view of the composition of Deuteronomy in the seventh century B.C. But it may be justly affirmed that it will require evidence far more convincing than any he has yet produced to prove the acquaintance of Isaiah and his contemporaries with the Levitical Legislation.

J. E. C.

#### TWO BOOKS ABOUT BUDDHISM.

THE volume of "Buddhist Birth Stories," translated from the original Pāli by Mr. T. W. Rhys Davids,\* appeals first to two classes of readers, and deserves a warm welcome from the students of Buddhism, and from the larger number of cultivated persons who, whether or not professedly interested in folk-lore, can yet appreciate the vivid presentment of ancient forms of popular thought and life in the East. Nor is this all. This book (or, rather, its Pāli original) further stands in a close relation with many of the fables, apologues, and stories which have been for the last two thousand years the delight of the children of the West. In the very careful Introduction, which must have cost the translator a prodigious amount of labour, Mr. Davids has pointed out some of the channels by which tales of Indian origin gradually passed into the literature of Europe. We cannot now follow him through an investigation conducted with sound and cautious judgment; it will perhaps be more serviceable to say a few words about the contents of the book itself. What are the Jātakas? Why are these stories called *Birth Stories*? Most persons who have heard of Buddhism have a hazy notion that it teaches the transmigration of souls. Mr. Davids has done his best to correct this misconception, and points out that what it really does teach can be better described as the *transmigration of character* (p. lxxv.). When a man dies, the elements of his body, and with it the whole organisation of his consciousness, are dis-

\* *Buddhist Birth Stories, or Jātaka Tales.* Translated by T. W. Rhys Davids. London: Trübner and Co. 1880.

solved, and disappear. All that remains is the moral sum of his thoughts, words, and deeds, his *karma* ("doing"). Out of this there grows, by an inexplicable mystery, a new being, whose condition, habits, and powers are all determined by the conduct of the individual preceding him in a former birth. Properly speaking, indeed, Buddhism does not recognise any individuality in the organisms which are for a time distinct. But it slid insensibly into the use of common language, to which it gave a new meaning, while it could not wholly throw off the traces of old beliefs. Now, the Birth Stories in their present form are founded upon this theory. They are said to have been related by Gotama Buddha in explanation of various incidents occurring in his ministry. If a disciple was despondent of his ability to attain salvation, if he was refractory, quarrelsome, greedy, fond of display—the brethren brought him to the Teacher. The Teacher, perhaps, inquired into the case, and, having administered encouragement or reproof, as might be needful, he "told a tale." There is the clever young fellow who started in life with only a dead mouse for his capital, and ended by marrying the High Treasurer's daughter, and inheriting the family estates. There is the foolish ox who envied the nice food with which his master fattened up the dear little pig, "Sausages." There is the daughter of the king of the Golden Geese who chose the peacock for her husband, but the silly bird in his elation spread his tail and began to dance, and so exposed himself, that the royal Golden Goose was shocked, and refused his consent to the match. There is the ass in the lion's skin who got along very well—till he brayed. The great personages of Eastern life, the king, his officers of state, his courtiers, the travelling merchants with their huge caravans, the pedlars crying their wares up and down the street, the farmer and his bullocks—all are here. Here, too, are the most delightful of animals, sketched evidently from the life, such as the elephant who made friends with the dog, and pined away when the dog's master sold him to a distance. Through all phases of society do these tales range, with a marvellous variety of incident, and a rare amount of humour and insight. Each has some bearing, more or less direct, upon the circumstances which are said to have called forth its relation; and at the end, we read, the Teacher "made the connection"—that is, identified the personages of the story with himself and his hearers; or, more strictly, declared the moral continuity between them. These, then, are the Birth Stories, set in a frame of narrative which has often an independent value of its own. Besides the charm of the stories themselves, therefore, this volume offers us many precious illustrations of the Buddha's method of dealing with the difficulties perpetually arising among his disciples. And the commentator on the stories has further enriched the collection with an account of the life of Gotama up to the conversion of Anātha Pindika, and the foundation of the monastery at Jetavana. This is the oldest version yet published of his early years and the struggles which culminated in his attainment of Buddhahood



and his resolution to found the Kingdom of Righteousness.\* All students of Buddhism will turn to this part of the book with the greatest interest. Those who wish to follow up the inquiries which such a collection suggests—what was the real origin of the tales, how were they combined with the teachings of Gotama, and similar questions—must consult the Introduction of Mr. Davids. We can only hope that he may be able to continue the task he has begun. It is no light one, for we have here only forty out of several hundred stories. And it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find another translator combining such rare qualifications, with a scholarship so complete, a knowledge of Oriental life so extensive, an English style so racy and vigorous, and so keen an appreciation at once of the beauty and the fun of these fascinating tales.

Mr. Ernest de Bunsen has produced another of those singular books which are the despair of reviewers.† They are too painstaking to be dismissed with a laugh; yet not the most serious argument directed against his perversities would ever produce conviction. The purport of the present volume is to prove that Paul, not Jesus, was the cause of the separation between Judaism and Christianity. So far, good. But on what is this conclusion founded? On the supposed fact that Paul took up a doctrine concerning the Angel-Messiah borrowed by Stephen from the Essenes, who in their turn had derived it from Buddhism. Mr. de Bunsen inverts the whole method of inquiry. He first of all reads Christianity into Buddhism, and then has little difficulty in extracting it again afterwards. But he ought to know that his representation of Buddhism is wholly incorrect. Gotama was not "conceived by the Holy Ghost," he was not born upon Christmas-day, he did not teach anything about "the most holy Father of all truth," *karma* is not conscience, nor instinct, nor connected with the "Word," *Nirvāna* is not the sun! Mr. de Bunsen boldly translates the Buddha's title, *Tathāgata* (or, as he prefers to spell it, *Tathāgatha*, p. 18, and *Tathāgatta*, p. 151), "he that should come," and then represents John the Baptist as inquiring whether Jesus was the Buddhist *Tathāgata*. But the smallest acquaintance with Pāli etymology, or even a glance at the dictionary of the late Prof. Childers, would have shown him that the word can have no such meaning. We say nothing about the difficulty of establishing any of the other links in the chain which the writer evidently regards as so firm and sound. He is not afraid to announce that the discrepancies between the Hebrew and Alexandrian Chronologies of the Old Testament depend upon the circumstance that the "authors of the Septuagint" took as their point of departure the date of Buddha's birth, according to the era of his death, recently determined by Mr. T. W. Rhys Davids. Mr. Davids will, no doubt, be delighted by so satisfactory a confirmation of his investigations:

\* A portion of a very similar account was translated many years ago by Mr. Turnour in the "Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal."

† The Angel-Messiah of Buddhists, Essenes, and Christians. By Ernest de Bunsen. Longmans and Co. 1880.



the sober critic, however, undazzled by these brilliant results, still refuses to believe that the Alexandrian translators looked upon Buddha, Moses, Abraham, and Adam as "precursors of Christ as incarnations of the Angel-Messiah." Mr. de Bunsen evidently aims at bringing out the essential truths of the teachings of Jesus. But he has gone the wrong way to work; and, in spite of his unquestionable earnestness, the book wholly fails in its end.

J. E. C.

THE work before us\* appears without preface, table of contents, or indexes. The reader is left to find out for himself, if he can, what is the aim and what shall be the extent of the work. We suppose these volumes are only an instalment, for the first of them deals with some of the lyrics, epic hymns, and smaller prophetic pieces of the Old Testament, while the second confines itself almost entirely to the prophetic books of Micah, Amos, and Hosea. If this natural supposition is correct, Mr. Heilprin has commenced a great labour; if it is not correct, he takes a very arbitrary view of the limits of his subject. Indeed, in any case, is must be regarded as a mistake to bring the writings of the prophets under the head of Historical Poetry. The distinction between the poetical and the prophetic literature of the Hebrews is marked enough.

We are not much better pleased with the way in which the author has executed his work than with his plan of it. The translations from the Hebrew are generally pretty accurate, clear, and forcible. The introductory sketches of the history and circumstances in which each piece is supposed to have been written are sometimes vivid and picturesque. There is a good deal of careful scholarship introduced into the notes. And all this deserves praise. But the book is, after all, mainly a compilation of criticisms and notes from German works. This would be very commendable, particularly as Mr. Heilprin compiles well, had that kind of thing not been done more satisfactorily in the best commentaries on the various Biblical books. Moreover, the value of our author's compilations is greatly lessened by the credulity with which he follows such wild inventions as those of Bernstein in his monograph on the legends of the patriarchs.

Mr. Fenton writes very interestingly upon an interesting subject.† He works, too, in a field which has hitherto been but little cultivated. Comparative sociology is but a recent study, and there has hardly been time to apply its results in detail to Hebrew social institutions. Mr. Fenton attempts such an application. It is not difficult for him to illustrate Hebrew customs by parallels from India and elsewhere; and often light is thus thrown on otherwise unintelligible phenomena. But we must confess that the author does not seem to us either to establish the fact of

\* The Historical Poetry of the Ancient Hebrews. Translated and Critically Examined. By Michael Heilprin. 2 vols. New York. 1879-80.

† Early Hebrew Life: a Study in Sociology. By John Fenton. London: Trübner and Co. 1890.

the particular line of development which he seeks to trace, or, in many cases, to prove the existence of the law or custom which he makes its basis. As an instance, his deductions with regard to the terms *Migrash* and *Sidé* may be referred to. But though these reservations have to be made, the general reader and the Biblical student may both derive larger and clearer ideas of the ancient Hebrew world from a perusal of this little book.

We also record the appearance of Dr. Dillmann's commentary on Exodus and Leviticus.\* Though nominally a second edition of Dr. Knobel's work in this valuable series, it is in reality an entirely new work by the distinguished Orientalist of Berlin. This book has been looked for with special interest, from the fact that its author is the most important opponent of the view of the Levitical Legislation adopted by Graf, Colenso, and Kuenen.

J. F. S.

THE success of "Sister Dora" has no doubt led to the translation into English of the German "Memorials of Amalie von Lasaulx," and the issue of the volume by the publishers of the former work, under the title of "Sister Augustine."† Amalie von Lasaulx leaves the record of a life nobly devoted to the tending of the sick and wounded, now in the peaceful wards of her own hospital, now hard by the battle-fields of Schleswig or Bohemia. But that which gives this book its greatest interest is the movement of her pure and heroic life through the ecclesiastical convulsions which were to her of even deeper significance than the political and military conflicts in which her country was involved. From the charming sketches of her light and careless girlhood in the quaint society of Coblenz half a-century ago, we are led past the brief day of her romance on to the season of her 'early womanhood, when the longing to enter on a religious life induced her quietly to slip away from the home of her youth and pass over the border to Nancy, there to enroll herself in the congregation of St. Charles Borromeo. Sister Augustine strove hard to bring her fine, freedom-loving nature into subjection to the rules of her Order. "How often," she wrote, quite early in her career, "I have to seek help at the large chapel crucifix, in order to hear from the Saviour's lips that He is not held a prisoner there by the sharp nails, but by His infinite love to humanity!" (p. 44) "This biography," says the author's preface, "has been written in consequence of a promise given to the Superior that after her death I would see that her memory was not forgotten" (p. viii.); and it is evidently from the hand of one who stood with her in the midst of those movements from which arose the Old Catholic revolt in Germany. Nor would it be easy for the English Liberal to lay his hands on any other book which in such short

\* Kurzgefasstes exegetisches Handbuch zum Alten Testament. Die Bücher Exodus und Leviticus von August Dillmann. Leipzig. 1880.

† Sister Augustine, Superior of the Sisters of Charity at the St. Johannis Hospital at Bonn. London: C. Kegan Paul and Co. 1880.

compass should give him so vivid a conception of the motives, the aspirations, the principles, and the faith which made venerable to the hearts of thousands in the Rhine-land the sturdy fame of Strossmayer and Döllinger. "Sister Augustine," says her biographer, "loved her own Church with all her heart, and from her childhood she had ever looked on it with pride. The great and simple doctrines of Catholicism were engraven on her soul" (p. 120). What seemed to her the first departure of the Vatican from those "simple doctrines" was the proclamation, in 1854, of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin. Ten years later came the Syllabus, with its list of eighty heretical opinions. "I find myself condemned sixteen times," said Sister Augustine, after she had read the Syllabus (p. 172). A few years more, and the great Council of the Vatican assembled. Very vivid is the sketch of the interest at Bonn in the progress of the Council towards the declaration of Papal Infallibility, the intense opposition it aroused in the bosoms of the Superior and her friends among the professors, the popular excitement in the resorts of the tradesmen and working classes, the long and painful anxiety as to the action of the German bishops, ending, to the grief and shame of the Liberals, in their complete submission to the yoke and acceptance of the dogma. Friends of the Superior on every side were called upon to elect between obedience to the Vatican and persistence in their opposition. "To the remonstrance that was often made to her—'of two evils, one must choose the lesser,' i.e., excommunication must at any price be avoided—she replied very earnestly, 'We must at any price remain faithful to the truth; we are not responsible for the consequences'" (p. 268). "Rather would I shake the dust from my feet than accept one word of the new Credo," she exclaimed; "we will remain in the old Church, won't we? and God and His sacred Gospel will help us" (p. 255). And again, "Döllinger sends a flash of lightning into the deepest recesses of Romanism; the bats and moles will indeed start back affrighted!" (p. 275). Englishmen will understand the better for reading this book how the "old Church," with its "simple doctrines," and "Romanism," stood contrasted in the minds of the non-contents, and how they felt themselves, and not the Ultramontanes, to be the true conservatives and defenders of the faith. Sister Augustine was not herself to escape the ordeal of confession. When her time came, already the kind hand of death was on her. She boldly declared her faith, and was immediately deposed. Amid the sobs of the Sisters, to whom she had been indeed, as an old Protestant pastor loved to call her, a "Mütterchen," the "little mother" passed out of the convent doors. In her refuge at Vallendar she, though excommunicate, received the Sacrament of Supreme Unction from a brave young clergyman who, while celebrating Mass at Bonn, had "hid a consecrated wafer in a small case" (p. 317). A few weeks afterwards, having to the last resisted all importunities to declare her acceptance of the Papal Infallibility, and so reconcile her soul to God, she passed away. The mild, firm countenance of Sister Augustine, which even her close and heavy veil cannot quite

conceal in the beautiful engraving on the frontispiece of this book, will, we hope, induce many readers to peruse its interesting and instructive pages.

"**T**HERE are clear signs," says Mr. Dale, of Birmingham, discussing the "Evangelical Revival,"\* "that the movement of theological speculation which began in the early part of the sixteenth century, and which has assumed a permanent form in the confessions and creeds of the great Protestant Churches, is coming to an end" (p. 18). But this emphatic statement does not preface any proposal to make peace with Rome, or to go over to the swelling ranks of Christian Theism. It introduces a volume full of forcible and noble pleadings for that Faith which has usurped to itself the fair name of Evangelical.

But Mr. Dale is profoundly conscious of the defects of Evangelical Christianity. He asserts that "as yet the Evangelical movement has produced no original theologians of the first or even the second rank" (p. 24); a state of things which we must ask permission to explain by the fact that men who have it in them to be theologians of the first or second rank are decreasingly likely to hold by the Evangelical movement. He alleges that "in the development of the idea of the *Church* the Evangelicals have been singularly ineffective" (p. 30). Lastly, while holding that the Evangelical Revival begun by Wesley and still, as he believes, energetic and effective, unquestionably accomplished a great moral reformation, Mr. Dale adds, "that in its moral aims and achievements it has proved to be seriously defective" (p. 33).

It is, accordingly, in striving to fortify the moral side of the Evangelicism to which he clings with so passionate an ardour, that Mr. Dale expends his greatest strength. And here we find his preaching altogether noble. It is direct, vigorous, moving, dealing with men and things as they are to-day. Seldom have sermons manifested a keener intellectual insight, still seldomer a more rousing moral power, than the two great discourses on "Natural Morality" and "The Education of the Conscience." Could anything be in more vivid contrast with the ordinary Evangelical preaching than this?

Are any of you conscious that the sharp contrast between truth and falsehood is gradually melting away? That it seems a less dreadful thing than it once seemed to violate the law of integrity? That for you there is a less awful difference to-night between purity and impurity than there was five or ten years ago? If so, then moral blindness, moral paralysis, has already begun. You ought to be infinitely more alarmed than if you had discovered that a film was coming over your eyes, or that there was a numbness in your right arm, which sometimes almost prevented you from raising it. With God all things are possible. He who can give sight to the blind, feeling to the paralysed, reason to the idiot, may breathe the breath of life into a dead conscience, but He alone can do it (p. 46).

The whole series of sermons to which this belongs are one long appeal

\* The Evangelical Revival and Other Sermons. By R. W. Dale. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1880.

to the moral faculties. Mr. Dale has a perfect understanding of their energies, their laws, and their diseases, and rarely, indeed, has a preacher with such directness of purpose addressed himself to their awakening and their education. Nay, this Evangelical preacher, while he hotly repudiates the notion that a true Evangelical faith can be content without morality, again and again admits and insists that moral force and culture are often far stronger and deeper in the non-Christian than in the Christian; and he cordially recommends the young man perplexed about his duty in some difficult commercial transaction to consult, not the "excellent Christian woman" who "was a housemaid before she was married, soon lost her husband, went out as a charwoman for thirty years, and for twenty years has been in an almshouse," but rather the "man with no [?] religion," "of stainless character," and "large knowledge of affairs," who "has been at the head of a great firm for twenty years." "His conscience has been trained;" "you value his moral discernment" (p. 101).

After breathing with delight the clear and invigorating moral atmosphere of these splendid sermons, it is almost impossible to conceive that the preacher to whom we owe them cleaves to the belief that "faith in the Son of God," "belief in Christ," is not only good, true, desirable, but actually "*the condition of salvation*," and of "*the gift of eternal life*." Yet, astounding though it be, this dependence of salvation on faith in Christ, says Mr. Dale, is among "the truths to which the Christian preacher must incessantly recur" (p. 126), "the very heart of the Gospel" (p. 127). We have tried to draw from the latter part of the sermon on "Morality and the Evangelical Faith" the inference that Mr. Dale does not really mean to exclude good men who do not share his faith from eternal life; but we are compelled to doubt whether his language will bear the strain of charitable interpretation which we should so rejoice to put upon it.

**D**R. CLEMANCE'S little book,\* which has reached a second edition, is one more manifestation of that revolt all along the line against the current doctrines of future punishment, which has of late inspired the pens of Canon Farrar, Mr. Cox, and even Dr. Pusey. The last-named writer, indeed, expressly replies to "Dr. Farrar's Challenge." Yet, for all that, he asserts that—

The merits of Jesus reach to every soul who wills to be saved, whether in this life they knew Him or knew Him not; and that God the Holy Ghost visits every soul which God has created, and each soul will be judged as it responded or did not respond to the degree of light which He bestowed on it, not by our maxims, but by the wisdom and love of Almighty God.

If Dr. Pusey assists in the break-up of the popular Catholicism, Dr. Clemance promotes the dissolution of the popular Protestantism. We

\* Future Punishment: Some Current Theories respecting it Stated and Estimated. London: John Snow and Co. 1880.

find him devoutly thanking a *Church Quarterly* reviewer for saying that what is really wanted "is a restoration of the primitive doctrine of the intermediate state, with all its possibilities known only to God." Dr. Pusey expounds the view of the Church. Dr. Clemance appeals from the Church to the Bible, and comes to the conclusion that this does not shut us up to the doctrine of the absolute endlessness of future punishment, though such as in this life reject Jesus Christ can never make up lost time. For ourselves, we are bound by neither Church nor Bible; but we rejoice that even men of great reputation for orthodoxy are recoiling from the hideous libels on the divine love which have blotted the fair fame of the Christian religion.

WE turned with no little eagerness to a new volume on the evidential value of the Book of Acts, by so famous a Pauline scholar as the Dean of Chester.\* Here, we thought, we shall find what one well versed in a minute biblical scholarship and familiar with the whole literature that has gathered round this book has to advance in reply to the scholars who have so very much weakened its historical authority in the estimate of free-minded students. We have closed these lectures, however, with a sincere sense of disappointment. It is not enough for one who would maintain a thesis to show that there are many phenomena consistent with it. There are many phenomena consistent with the astronomical theory of vortices, and many, also, with the molecular theory of light. But if any man would now support those hypotheses, he must also deal with the phenomena which men of science have adduced as inconsistent with them, and show that they are not really so. And even when he has done that, if he would quite firmly establish his own view, he must show that no other hypothesis but his will really cover the whole of the phenomena. And the like must he do who would uphold the authenticity and authority of the Book of Acts. Yet not only does Dean Howson not take the third and conclusive step; he does not even attempt the second. Baur's name he names once, quite vaguely, Zeller's not at all, and the only citation from a hostile critic is made from some unnamed writer, who, he is "sorry to add, is an Englishman." The whole historic criticism of Tübingen and Leyden is passed over as "nibbling objections." Almost the whole of Dean Howson's argument—save in the final lecture on "The Usefulness of the Book for Edification," in which, curiously enough, some really interesting antiquarian and geographical points in favour of the accurate knowledge of the historian are adduced—consists in statements of coincidence between Acts and the Gospels on the one hand, Acts and the Epistles on the other. No apparent contradiction is so much as mentioned. Paul's autobiography in Galatians—the standing disproof of the accuracy of the biography in Acts—is not once referred to. The three accounts of Saul's conversion within Acts

\* The Evidential Value of the Acts of the Apostles. By the Very Rev. J. S. Howson, D.D. The Bohlen Lectures. 1880. London: Wm. Isbister.

itself are cited in support of one another, while their mutual inconsistencies are passed over without a word. Finally, Dean Howson, having marshalled his array of agreements and what he deems appropriate and natural adjuncts occurring in the narrative, declares "this kind of evidence" to be "peculiarly strong," and has the assurance to add, "This I infer from the determined way in which it is neglected, or only very slightly noticed, by those who have theories to construct regarding the origin and texture of the Acts of the Apostles" (p. 102). After experiencing "the determined way" in which the whole mass of modern criticism "is neglected"—not even "very slightly noticed"—by Dr. Howson, in the interest of the pre-scientific theory of the origin and texture of the Acts of the Apostles which he is striving to reconstruct, we emphatically endorse his statement that "by developing out of our own thoughts a bold general theory of the intention of this book, and by leaving out of view the minute evidence of the facts of the case, we might make anything out of the book" (p. 103). Yes, we might make of it even an echo of the synoptic Gospels and the four great Epistles of the Apostle to the Gentiles; we might see "the grand shadow of the Baptist thrown over the whole range of the Acts of the Apostles" (p. 76); we might find Paul and Peter meeting "in this book, not, like Laban and Jacob, for a great separation, but for perpetual and sacred union" (p. 84). We are quite sure that Dr. Howson desires to be fair and to approach his theme with an unbiassed mind; but what a pity that he should have travelled to Philadelphia to lecture on Acts in precisely the language that he might have used if Baur never had been born, and with no better epithet in his mouth than "nibbling" for the vast yet minute erudition of the greatest students of this book that have ever lived! The Dean of Chester is himself a man of genuine learning. Would that he displayed also the diffident and scrupulous habit of the genuine critic!

THE indefatigable industry of Mr. Sharpe has given us, in a very convenient form, the curious writing, regarded by some old authorities as part of the New Testament Canon, which is known as the "Epistle of Barnabas."\* No one contends that this production has any great intrinsic value, but as Mr. Sharpe most truly and appositely says (p. 11)—"There are many things in the New Testament which we should understand better if we had more contemporary Christian writings. Even if they were of little value of themselves for religious instruction, yet they would be of the greatest value as offering us examples of style, of the use of words, and of modes of thought for comparison with the New Testament." There is abundant reason, then, why we should pay an amount of attention quite out of proportion to their intrinsic value to the most ancient uncanonical Christian documents we possess; and indeed the conviction

\* Βαρνάβα Ἐπιστολή. The Epistle of Barnabas from the Sinaitic Manuscript of the Bible, with a Translation. By Samuel Sharpe. Williams and Norgate. 1880.



must grow in the mind of every serious student that the vexed problems of New Testament criticism can never be solved, or even fairly stated, without a thorough knowledge of such literature as the Clementine Homilies and Recognitions, the Pastor of Hermas and the Epistle of Barnabas.

Mr. Sharpe, in opposition to the prevailing opinion amongst critics, regards the "Epistle of Barnabas" as genuine, and urges that conceit and want of originality on the part of the author do not at all prove that that author was not Barnabas. On the other hand, the more general considerations which induce scholars of the school of Baur to bring down this epistle to a later date than that of Barnabas hang together with their general view of the development of Christian doctrine and the composition of the canonical books of the New Testament, and can have no weight with one who adopts Mr. Sharpe's views on these subjects. But whether we accept or reject the translator's critical views, we may be equally grateful to him for giving us so handy an edition of the Epistle; and even if we are not prepared to accept as satisfactory his rather startling translations of some obscure and doubtful passages, we always have the original text faithfully reproduced on the page facing the translation, and are specially directed in the preface to those passages in which Mr. Sharpe's rendering differs most widely from the interpretation of other scholars who have studied this curious work. In a word, while giving prominence to his own special views and interpretations, Mr. Sharpe has done everything in his power to put his reader into a position to judge for himself of their value, and to make his little book welcome and useful to all students of early Christian literature, whatever may be the school to which they belong.

P. H. W.

#### SOME PHILOSOPHICAL BOOKS.

MESSRS. BLACKWOOD and SONS have just published a volume on Descartes,\* being the first of "the series of Philosophical Classics for English Readers," of which Professor Knight is the Editor. Mr. Mahaffy appears to have done his work well: the biography of the Father of Modern Philosophy is finely sketched, and the exposition of the salient features of his philosophical system, though brief, is neither meagre nor inaccurate.

Among the forthcoming volumes of this series is one on Spinoza, from the pen of Dr. Martineau. "Spinoza, His Life and Philosophy,"† is also the theme of a portly tome by Mr. Frederick Pollock, which has recently appeared, and which is at present *facile princeps* among English books on the life and doctrine of this great philosopher. On turning to that portion of the exposition of Spinoza's views which treats of "the intellectual love of God," we find that Mr. Pollock is far from endorsing

\* Descartes. By J. P. Mahaffy, M.A. William Blackwood and Sons. 1880.

† Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy. By Frederick Pollock, M.A., LL.D. London: C. Kegan Paul and Co. 1880.



the opinion, so often entertained, that there is a deep and rich mystical vein in Spinoza's thought and sentiment. His conclusion is "that for Spinoza the divine love is nothing else than conscious acceptance of universal law, the 'welcoming every event' of the Stoics; and that the secret of blessedness and glory (for those titles are expressly claimed and justified) is none other than a mind steadfastly bent on the truth." Some critics will, no doubt, call in question this verdict, and will rather side with Schleiermacher's appreciation of the spiritual side of Spinoza's genius. An adequate account and criticism of Mr. Pollock's important work requires a separate article; but we think the readers of the *MODERN REVIEW* will be better pleased if we postpone essaying this task till the appearance of Dr. Martineau's treatise affords us the privilege of comparing Mr. Pollock's estimate of Spinozism with that of an eminent thinker of a philosophical school very different from that to which the friend and disciple of the late Professor Clifford belongs.

Mr. Turner's treatise on "Wish and Will"\* is a vivacious defence of the Libertarian position in the Free-will Controversy. Though it evinces no great originality of mind, and might with advantage have been condensed into half the size by greater conciseness of thought and expression, it is still a valuable and seasonable protest against the present widespread disposition to allow evolution theories to override the clear testimony which self-consciousness bears to man's power of free choice in moments of temptation, and, therefore, to man's true responsibility. The first half of the volume is occupied with an interesting psychological study of the distinction between Desire and Volition, and of the relation of the latter to the other capacities and faculties of the soul. It is in this introductory portion of the work that the chief instances of original treatment appear. While adopting much of Mr. Bain's psychology, Mr. Turner rejects this writer's explanation of the genesis of Volition, saying that it is not an account of Will at all, but simply of Spontaneity, a mode of action essentially different from Volition. Mr. Turner also admits his great indebtedness to Sir William Hamilton; but in dissenting from Hamilton's doctrine of Causality, he shows, we think, as sound judgment as in his repudiation of Bain's theory of the growth of the Will. The following passage will make it evident to our readers that on this important subject (and we may add in the general drift of the treatise) the author is rather in accord with Dr. Martineau's philosophy:—"This merely formal idea of Cause, as that which is 'the invariable and unconditional antecedent'—which is J. S. Mill's definition of Cause, and virtually the notion which Sir W. Hamilton was content to adopt of it, that he might show it to be an illustration of his pet doctrine of the 'Law of the Conditioned'—is a miserable ghost of 'Cause' complete and proper. For of that 'power,' 'efficiency' is the central and most important factor; and the notion of what 'power' is, and what

\* *Wish and Will: An Introduction to the Psychology of Desire and Volition.* By George Lyon Turner, M.A. London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1880.

'efficiency' is, is realised first and most completely in this special case of Volitional *Effort*."

Referring, accordingly, all the causality in nature to the Will of God, Mr. Turner argues that our consciousness of personal origination in acts of moral choice and the accompanying sense of moral accountability demonstrate that man is not wholly either an effect or a phase of that divine causality of which Nature is the expression, but, in his power of free choice between motives of different moral rank, must be regarded as an energy above nature—a true uncaused cause.

"But," says Mr. Turner, "this being so, the investigator recognises the fact that the question is unique in its character, standing quite alone, and in important particulars apart from all other questions of scientific investigation. For it is the one matter in which the sphere of the phenomenal is pierced. It is the one thing, in the whole range of our experience, which acquaints us with the notimènal. To this extent the investigator finds himself an *Ontognostic*, because in *Volition* we are made acquainted with our 'selves' or *conscious-subjects* as the central source of all control."

The treatise closes with some appendices. In one of these is discussed the question of the relation of man's Free-will to God's Foreknowledge; but, as it seems to us, in a manner not wholly satisfactory, owing to the writer's dogmatic bias. In another appendix he treats of the relation of Volition to Miracle, and, as may be expected, finds that philosophy is bound to admit the possibility of miracle. The reality of reported miracles becomes, then, a matter for testimony to determine, and a little testimony, of no very solid description, seems to go a long way with Mr. Turner, for he writes as if he seriously believed that God held a conversation with Adam in the Garden of Eden, and personally handed the Tables of the Law to Moses on Mount Sinai. Such indications of an uncritical spirit will not recommend his book to the scientific world; nor will his appeal, in one passage, to the reported utterances of Jesus of Nazareth, as to an ultimate and final authority on matters moral and spiritual, avail, we think, to settle any question which remains insoluble on purely psychological grounds.

Christians of all denominations are buckling on their intellectual armour to defend the faith against those anti-theological prejudices to which extravagant ideas concerning the nature and capabilities of Evolution have given rise. If these gallant champions were not themselves hampered by certain unscientific theological prejudices, they would prove much more formidable opponents to the scepticism which they seek to refute. But we must not omit to thank them for the good work they do in spite of this drawback. Mr. Turner, as we have seen, ably holds, on the basis of a more accurate psychology, the central citadel of human Free-will against Determinist assailants; and, simultaneously with the appearance of his volume, a medical man of no less than thirty years' practical experience, and who is evidently well read both in the book of nature and in current literature, issues the first of five volumes, the aim

of which is to examine in detail all the recent discoveries of science, and to show that those features in Evolution, which are substantiated by ascertained fact, do not invalidate, but rather confirm, the foundations of Christian belief. The title\* of his book at first repelled us; but we found, on perusal, that the writer's orthodoxy is of a very harmless sort. He recognises within the limits of the Bible a development of opinion on important questions, and except that he occasionally refers certain moral difficulties in creation, which he cannot otherwise solve, to "the malice of Satan," we do not meet with very much that the Christian theist would find objectionable. Dr. Painter accepts the Pauline view of human nature as consisting of Body, Psyche, and Spirit, and in discussing this subject displays no little literary culture as well as scientific knowledge. The style is somewhat diffuse, and we cannot always see the force of his reasonings; but the book is readable, and in addition to summing-up many of the Theistic arguments that are scattered through the writings of Dr. Carpenter, Dr. Beale, Professor Mivart, and others, it contains some original ideas which are worth considering. C. B. U.

**M**R. ALLEN'S three Addresses† will be welcome to many an English reader. He first treats of Calvinism as a force in history, and exhibits, in that appreciative spirit which is happily becoming more familiar to criticism, "the mental vigour, the moral courage, the intolerant hatred of Evil under all disguises, the stern loyalty to Truth," which he hopes will remain "an imperishable possession of mankind" after Calvin's system has for ever passed away. It is well for us to be forcibly reminded just now of the great things which Calvinism has helped men to do; it was the creed of the Huguenots of France; it was the faith of the Netherland Reformers throughout their fifty years' struggle for freedom; it sustained the English Puritans and the Scotch Covenanters; it inspired the founders of New England, and furnished the force which caused their little germ of local liberties to grow into the gigantic system of self-government which now stretches across the whole Continent of North America. One mark of its characteristic temper is Sabbatarianism, "protesting in a certain blind, hard way against the spirit of the pagan revival," the mere love of Beauty for its own sake, the devotion to pleasure, the giving way to self-indulgence. Calvinism—

Is also a fountain head of stern, aggressive, self-sacrificing virtue, rising often to the height of moral heroism, so necessary to brace up the tone of morals in an age of licence, and even, at a crisis, to save the very life of a State, political as well as social. Take, for one type of it, the self-devotion shown in the missionary enterprise; divest it of the horrible dogma it

\* Science a Stronghold of Belief; or, Scientific and Common-sense Proofs of the Reasonableness of Religious Belief, as based on a plain and candid Study of Nature and the Scriptures. By Richard Budd Painter, M.D., F.R.C.S. London: Sampson Low and Co. 1880.

† Three Phases of Modern Theology: Calvinism, Unitarianism, Liberalism. By Joseph Henry Allen, A.M., Lecturer on Ecclesiastical History in Harvard University. Boston: Ellis. 1880.

proceeds upon,—that the souls of the unconverted heathen, without it, must drop incessantly, or rather pour, in a perpetual cataract of eighty thousand souls a day, into the gulf of endless perdition,—and see it only in its spirit of endurance, courage, sympathy, enthusiasm, such that, to a young man looking forward to a career, it shall seem the highest joy to die a martyr in tropical swamps (and I have myself known such); and where else shall we look for a type of character that does more honour to what is highest in human nature?

Or take, again, a movement like the Anti-Slavery or Temperance crusade,—assuming, as under the conditions of human society we may fairly do, that at a given time and place such a crusade is necessary,—and where shall we find the agents and weapons for such a warfare, hearts hot and valiant, weapons tempered and keen, except from that enormous reservoir of moral power which it has been the great mission of Calvinism to keep from running dry? As an intellectual system (as I began by saying), its day is long past; but, as a moral force, there was never, perhaps, more need than now of the spirit it represents. The forms of Puritanism cannot long survive, but from the heart of it, even yet, are some of the best issues of our life.

Of at least equal interest is the second essay on "Unitarianism: Then and Now." It gives us an admirable picture of Boston Unitarianism thirty-five to fifty years ago, when its adherents thought they had done with internal controversy, and established a satisfactory religious system on a secure foundation. It was a form of religion specially adapted to the mind of serious and educated laymen. They clung tenaciously to the historic Christianity which Lardner and Paley had so ably vindicated; the practical side of their faith showed itself in "rational piety, personal morality, and civic virtue." Naturally they shrank, even with intolerant dislike, from any inquiry into the title-deeds of this faith. The Bible was a minister's credentials. "Christianity without a supernatural revelation of truth, without miracles, without the divine authority of Jesus, was a weak delusion, if not a wicked and hypocritical pretence." Nevertheless, it was from the best and soberest scholars they had, from conscientious conservatives, that the first shocks came to the received liberal theology of the day. Professor Noyes's argument on the Messianic prophecies, followed by Professor Norton's rejection of the first two chapters of Matthew, gave the first blow, and the rest followed as a matter of course; Emerson widened the breach, so did Dr. Furness; and Theodore Parker's sermon on the Permanent and Transient in Christianity fairly showed that the days of rest were at an end, and commenced the controversy which cannot yet be said to have subsided. Mr. Allen thinks, however, that this much is now established "among us,—that one may distinctly rule out from his belief everything that is technically supernatural; yet it is free to him, if he will, to profess himself a Christian, and claim the fellowship of his birthright Church. In fact, many of us are rather disturbed if he prefers a different name." With regard to modern scientific discoveries and speculations, Mr. Allen gives us many wise thoughts and suggestive hints which space forbids us to discuss, but which will serve to encourage every earnest worker and devout thinker. Nor can we dwell on the last address, given to the divinity students of Harvard University. The Gospel of Liberalism is indicated with impressive touches, though its

features are hardly brought out as clearly as when our author's subject is a matter rather of the past than of the present and future. Its watchword is neither Culture nor Salvation, but Service, and when we have learned what are the unbelief and despair, the hollow mockery of refined Materialism, which now threaten to overwhelm mankind, "we shall begin to know the privilege and the burden that belong to our better faith." The work of developing the new religion is likely to need centuries for its consummation; the phenomena that have to be watched "include, the height of aspiration, the depth of passion and contrition, the wealth of experience, that make up the higher life of men." Much that was formerly deemed essential to religion has been swept away, but there is compensation even in the loss of the near and comforting sense of the Divine Personality, which, as at present held, is often mere idolatry, but which will surely come back in a glorified form when our minds are sufficiently grown to think more worthily on the divine reality. The fading of the clear vision of the future life will render impossible the familiar appeal to craven fears and selfish hopes, and the sacrifice of the urgent duties of this life to self-indulgent broodings on the life to come. In any case, what we have now to do is to return to the deepest moral convictions of the soul, and seek in the eternal dictates of conscience the foundation for the higher creed and the higher life.

Rightly to appreciate Hegel on Art,\* requires a combination of artistic interest and metaphysical capacity which, we fancy, is very far from common in England. What Hegel said on the subject, however, is full of penetrating truth and fertile germs of thought, and is acknowledged by his countrymen to have inaugurated a new era of art-criticism. The Beautiful he conceives as the outward manifestation of the Idea; it is the indivisible unity of the concept and its realisation, of spiritual contents and outward form. All the various manifestations of beauty, in different times and countries, in architecture, in sculpture, or in painting, music, and poetry, are classified and criticised according to the relation in which they exhibit these two constituent elements. The present volume deals chiefly with the historical development of the three great phases of art-activity, termed respectively—the Symbolic, which finds its home chiefly in the ancient religions of Persia, Hindostan, and Egypt; the Classic, supplied by ancient Greece and Rome; and the Romantic, for which Christianity and Chivalry furnish the main ideas.

H. S. S.

WE have before us a volume of sermons by a German clergyman, full of eloquence, fervour, and faith.† If we mistake not, Erhard Schultz is a member of the *Protestantenverein*, for he was present at the meeting in Gotha held last Whitsuntide. The discourses do not belie

\* The *Philosophy of Art*: being the Second Part of Hegel's *Æsthetic* Translated, with an Introductory Essay giving an Outline of the Entire. *Æsthetic*, by Wm. M. Bryant. New York: Appleton and Co.

† Predigten gehalten von Erhard Schultz. Zweite Auflage. Mülhausen in Elsass. Bußlebsche Hofbuchhandlung. 1880.

their motto, "Wahrheit, Freiheit, That." They are acutely reasoned, dogmatically untrammelled, and practically suggestive. A few of them preached on State occasions are a little too courtly for the taste of the British Nonconformist; but Herr Schultz is neither a Briton nor a Nonconformist, and if here and there he shows a somewhat exaggerated reverence for the powers that be, his veneration never sinks to the level of servility. A very little of his enthusiasm would go a very long way in some of our liberal pulpits; and they would be none the worse for a slight infusion of the same. Unlike most printed sermons, these are nowhere tedious, and none but perfect saints or irreclaimable sinners, if any such there be (which Herr Schultz does not believe), could rise from their perusal without at least desiring to be both wiser and better men.

In the work of another "Protestantenvereiner," Herr Simons, we recognise a most painstaking and scholarly production.\* It is rather alarming to some of our old-fashioned admirers of the Gospel according to Baur to be told that the priority of Mark as against Matthew is no longer an open question; but granting this assumption, and also the still larger one, that there were no other Gospels of any account current in the time of "Luke," save only the "Logia" and Matthew and Mark, we must admit that, working from these premises, the affirmative answer to the question put by the title is given with as near an approach to demonstration as the case admits. But then what becomes of the third evangelist's prefatory words, *Ἐπειδήπερ πολλοὶ ἐπεχείρησαν κ.τ.λ.* ?

E. M. G.

M<sup>R</sup>. JENKINS' book† is a poor and disappointing one. It entirely omits much which, from the title, the reader has a right to expect, and the treatment of the parts of the subject which are not wholly neglected is imperfect and unsatisfactory. As the laws regulating the doctrines and discipline of the Church of England are either omitted or alluded to only in so far as they affect Dissenters, it is a mere misnomer to speak of the book as containing "The Laws Relating to Public Worship." It might with more propriety be described as "A Sketch of the Progress of Religious Liberty and of the Laws affecting Nonconformists;" but even under this title, which would apparently correctly indicate the author's intention, it would still be a disappointing work. The larger half of the book is taken up by an historical sketch of the rise and progress of religious liberty in England, of which the greater part is stated to have been "written more than thirty years ago, when the writer was young and vigorous and active in the performance of professional duties," and which he now feels it his duty to reproduce from its shelf in order to help to counteract "the ascendancy of High Church and Tory principles and parties." Considering the great additional light thrown on English

\* Hat der dritte Evangelist den Kanonischen Matthäus benutzt? Abhandlung der Theologischen Facultät an der Kaiser-Wilhelms-Universität Strassburg: eingereicht von Eduard Simons, Lic. theol., Bonn, Universitäts-Buchdruckerei von Carl Georgi. 1880.

† The Laws Relating to Religious Liberty and Public Worship. By John Jenkins, Esq., Registrar of County Courts, and Delegated Judge in Bankruptcy, &c. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1880.



history during the last thirty years, it may be doubted whether the author's decision is a wise one. His essay was not discreditable as the production of a young man filled with admiration of the Puritans and zeal for religious liberty, and regarded as such, may be read with interest and general approval. But it is somewhat superficial, contains little, if anything, that is original, and is overloaded with commonplace reflections and superfluous rhetoric. The second chapter of the book consists of about thirty pages, containing a digest of decisions upon the Mortmain Acts, and an account of the Acts relating to the Registration of Dissenting Chapels. The rest of the volume consists of an Appendix, containing a few recent statutes (chiefly relating to the acquisition and conveyance of sites for chapels) and four forms for Chapel Trust-deeds for the use of various denominations which, especially that for a "Congregational Chapel," with its schedule of doctrines, would a good deal restrict that liberty of thought for which the author is so eager. This statement of the contents of the book will prevent the reader from expecting too much from it. When it is added that no mention whatever is made of the Unitarian Relief Act of 1813, of the important litigation which led up to the Dissenters' Chapels Act or of that Act itself, or of the Burials Act of last session, and that no allusion is made to the principles adopted by the Courts in interpreting and enforcing trusts for religious purposes, the incompleteness of the work will be still more apparent. Those who desire more information from the historical side will still have to turn to Mr. Tayler's scholarly "Retrospect of the Religious Life of England;" while those who wish for a more adequate treatment of the subject from the lawyer's point of view (apart from mere conveyancing details) will find it in Mr. James Paterson's recent treatise on "Liberty of Speech, of the Press, and of Public Worship."

L. M. A.

CHRISTIANITY and Christian duty have been preached about and written about for many a long year. Dr. Stuckenberg claims to have discovered "a new subject" for consideration in "Christian Sociology."\* But, after all, his new subject is only the old one under a new name. He deals first with the nature of Christ and the special relation of the Christian to Christ; then with the duty of the Christian to himself, to his fellow Christians, and to the rest of the world. His Christ is not Jesus of Nazareth, but the Christ of the Fourth Gospel (pp. 73—75).

"Christian Sociology makes Christ the source of all that is, just as it makes him the source of all that Christian society is. It begins with him, lives in him, and tends to him. From Christ, in Christ, to Christ—that is the whole system" (p. 87).

The fact that Christianity perfects the life both of the individual and of the race is emphatically stated, and the statement is fairly worked

\* Christian Sociology. By J. H. W. Stuckenberg, D.D., Professor in the Theological Department of Wittenberg College. New York: J. K. Funk and Co. 1890.

out. Good principles are suggested, for the most part, with regard to duty and amusement. But there are few who can really treat any principle without personal bias, and we could not but smile to find that, while in matters indifferent in themselves we should often be willing to yield to the weaker brethren, and not offend them by our exercise of liberty, an example of an occasion "when it is to the best interest of the weak brother that the strong one do the very things that offend him" is easily found in "the duty" of eating meat on Friday (by which, of course, only the conscience of a Roman Catholic or a Ritualist is offended).

Another little volume which we have received from America takes a similar view of the nature of Christianity, but deals mainly with Christ and the Christian Religion, and but very slightly with Christian conduct.\* The first chapter, which treats of the character of Christ, is not without insight, and points out one or two things very necessary to remember just at present in England as well as in America, *e.g.*, "He [Christ] does not find it necessary to stand upon his dignity, and he is never lawless in his manner. There is nothing eccentric about him. He never uttered words which brought down the house in a roar of laughter. The majesty of Christ is the majesty of absolute truth and absolute righteousness" (p. 13). But we are tired of the utter ignorance of the origin and history of the New Testament which can say "Christ is either a divine saviour" (of course in the writer's sense) "and Christianity is true, or he is a daring impostor and Christianity is false" (p. 38). We should have thought, moreover, that a writer whose idea of Christian duty must rest almost entirely upon the words "inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me," might at least have understood the beautiful story of how St. Elizabeth took a poor leper into her palace to nurse him, and how, when her husband came in anger to drive out the miserable suffering brother, he found not the leper, but Christ himself.

FRANCIS HY. JONES.

MR. SYDNEY C. BUXTON seems to us to have inherited from his father a very rare faculty of seeing both the gold and the silver sides of the political shield,† and to know how to exhibit either side with conspicuous impartiality to the reader. If it generally comes out quite clearly that the shield *is* golden on one side and silver on the other, that is the fault of the shield, and not of Mr. Buxton. He is, of course, a genuine Liberal, and it is, moreover, easier to present forcibly the reasons for change than the reasons for not changing. Yet we think Conservatives will not complain of any undue bias in the arrangement of the neat antithetical sentences in which Mr. Buxton sets forth the *pros* and *contras* on the leading political topics of the day. Conscientiously used, the book will be of wide and substantial use, and it has well earned its rapid passage to a second and enlarged edition.

\* *Christ and His Religion*. By Rev. John Reid. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1890.

† *A Handbook to Political Questions of the Day, being the Arguments on Either Side*. By Sydney C. Buxton. London: John Murray. 1890.